Lawrence S. Knipel
How Judge Knipel rules, drawn from 16 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Judge Knipel no longer sits on this court. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled here.
About Judge Knipel
Lawrence S. Knipel served as a New York Supreme Court justice in Kings County from 1998 until his retirement in 2025. He was the Second Judicial District’s administrative judge for civil matters from 2013 through 2024 and also presided over Commercial Division cases. Before joining the Supreme Court, he served as a New York City Civil Court judge in Kings County.
How Judge Knipel decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Levy v. Donel Corp., Judge Knipel held that a dispute over the stock option's purchase rights and share valuation did not arise under the separate shareholders' agreement's arbitration clause.
“The Stock Option Agreement, executed separately, relates to Menachem's right to purchase a set amount of shares and provides the mechanism for setting the purchase price. A conflict regarding Menachem's right to purchase a specified amount of shares and the valuation of the shares is not a conflict arising from the terms of the Shareholders' Agreement”
In Matter of Piazza v. Gioia, Judge Knipel allowed a dissolution petition and related nondissolution claims to proceed together because the latter could affect the fair value of the disputed shares.
“since the resolution of the non-dissolution claims may affect the 'fair value' to be determined in valuing Piazza's shares ... such non-dissolution claims, and valuation proceeding are 'inextricably intertwined,' and are appropriately ordered to proceed in tandem before the same court”
In Stewart v. VSR Stewart Management, LLC, he rejected a limitations defense to Shirlea Stewart's deed challenge because her allegations fell within the forged-deed rule discussed in Faison.
“Shirlea's allegations fall within the scope of activities condemned by the Court of Appeals in Faison, precluding the defendant from invoking any statute of limitations defense.”
Procedural preferences
In 52 Monitor Street Lender LLC v. 52 Monitor Street Realty, LLC, Judge Knipel rejected a referee's amount-due report because the referee had skipped the ordered hearing and had not considered the defendants' objections.
“the referee erred in computing the amount due plaintiff without holding a hearing in accordance with CPLR 4313. In addition, the referee issued the Referee Report without considering defendants' October 14, 2020 objections”
In Old Republic National Title Insurance Co. v. Salamon, Judge Knipel compelled acceptance of a late answer after a fourteen-day delay because the plaintiff showed no discernible prejudice.
“where there was only a fourteen-day delay in answering the amended complaint and there is no discernable prejudice to Old Republic, defendants' cross motion to compel Old Republic to accept their answer ... is warranted”
In Zelik v. Rubashkin, he found service of a subpoena on Lipstein insufficient to compel Wasser's testimony and documents because the required follow-up mailing to Wasser had not been made.
“Service of the subpoena on Lipstein to compel pretrial testimony and document production from Wasser is insufficient because no additional mailing to Wasser under CPLR 308 (2) was effectuated.”
In Nemirovsky v. Brailovskiy, Judge Knipel held that an unconditional stipulation of discontinuance ended the court's jurisdiction over the case and that a challenge to the stipulation required a new action.
“Because the court is divested of jurisdiction by reason of the discontinuance, it may not even entertain a motion to vacate the stipulation of discontinuance and restore the action; the movant must instead commence a new plenary action.”
Cautions
In Dean Builders Group, Inc. v. Crew Contracting of New Jersey Inc., Judge Knipel vacated a default judgment after finding the amount appeared inflated and the supporting bill of sale's validity was in question.
“the principal sum of the default judgment of $191,543.14 is three times more than ... the total invoiced amount ... The questioned validity of the bill of sale, coupled with the plaintiff's apparent overstatement of the amount due ... is the type of circumstance warranting vacatur of the default judgment in the interests of justice”
In BK 38th Lender LLC v. 1351 Dekalb Condo Development LLC, he denied summary judgment because the loan officer's account of the borrowers' default relied on unidentified business records the lender had not produced.
“Dweck's affidavit testimony regarding the borrowers' default based on his review of unidentified business records is inadmissible because BK failed to produce the business records upon which Dweck's knowledge is based.”
In Atilgan v. Azuz, Judge Knipel stayed proceedings pending proof and substitution after a party's reported death raised a jurisdictional issue under CPLR 1015(a).
“The death of a party divests the court of jurisdiction and stays the proceedings until a proper substitution has been made ... Moreover, any determination rendered without such substitution will generally be deemed a nullity.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Gioia and KCWC's motion is granted to the extent that Piazza's third, fifth, seventh, and ninth causes of action are dismissed, as well as his claim for punitive damages, and Gioia and KCWC's motion is otherwise denied.”
“JDG and Veneer's motion is denied in its entirety.”
“Here, Guindi asserts claims for alleged wrongs to him individually and to the corporation, thus impermissibly mixing personal and derivative claims. ... Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.”
“the surety's motion to dismiss is granted to the extent that the plaintiff's complaint is dismissed without costs and disbursements under CPLR 3211 (a) (1) as barred by documentary evidence, and the remainder of its motion is denied as academic”
“the joint motion of the defendants Crew and Ahmed for an order, pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (3), vacating the default judgment and further vacating their default in answering the complaint in this action is granted”
“Considering that Crew and Ahmed have not joined issue, the Court may not entertain the plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment as against them, and the same is denied as premature.”
“the branch of the joint cross motion of the defendants ABCD and Westchester for an order, pursuant to CPLR 3212, granting them summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's complaint as against them and discharging the plaintiff's mechanic's lien is granted to the extent that (1) the plaintiff's third cause of action ... on the discharge of lien bond, (2) the plaintiff's fifth cause of action ... for unjust enrichment, and (3) the plaintiff's sixth cause of action ... for conversion are each dismissed, and the remainder of this branch ... is denied with respect to plaintiff's fourth cause of action ... on the payment bond”
“the plaintiff's cross motion, for an order, pursuant to CPLR 3212 and State Finance Law Section 137 (3), for summary judgment on its fourth cause of action against ABCD and Westchester for recovery on the payment bond is denied”
“Menachem's motion to stay arbitration and for a preliminary conference is granted.”
“Defendants' cross motion to compel arbitration and stay the litigation of the fifth through tenth causes of action is denied.”
“it is the finding of this court that because the instant action was discontinued by stipulation of discontinuance signed by counsel for all parties and filed on March 17, 2016, the court is without jurisdiction to determine the motions presently before it (Motion Sequences Nos. 7-11). ... Accordingly, all motions are denied.”
“the defendant's preanswer motion to dismiss ... is denied”
“defendants are not entitled to discovery of plaintiff's tax returns and the W-9 forms ... Defendants have failed to demonstrate the existence of special circumstances warranting disclosure of plaintiff's tax returns and the W-9 forms.”
“both mot. seqs. three and four are held in abeyance pending receipt of these supplementary documents ... all proceedings herein are stayed to receive the needed information and until a decision whether CPLR 1015 (a) and related provisions are applicable.”
“Saul Wolf is hereby compelled to produce ... all documents regarding the 2017 sale of his ownership interest in Carter Industries ...; Carter Industries is hereby compelled to produce ... all documents regarding the negotiations and due diligence conducted in connection with the 2017 sale ...; Carter Enterprises and Chaim Wolf are hereby compelled to produce ... all documents required by the Discovery Order”
“Carter Industries' cross motion is only granted to the extent that Azrak is compelled to submit all previously produced, redacted documents to the court for an in camera inspection, as previously directed in the Discovery Order.”
“plaintiffs' motion (in mot. seq. four) to confirm the Referee Report and for other relief is denied”
“defendants' cross motion (in mot. seq. five) is granted only to the extent that the Referee Report is rejected; ... the matter is remitted back to the referee for a hearing (via Zoom) on notice to defendants regarding the amount due and owing”
“Consequently, BK's motion for summary judgment, an order of reference and a default judgment are denied with leave to renew based on papers that provide a proper foundation.”
A historical record
Judge Knipel no longer sits on this court. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled here. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.