Joseph Risi
How Judge Risi decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In accident cases turning on the emergency doctrine, he has both granted and denied summary judgment depending on whether the defendant's own account is corroborated or contradicted -- he will grant dismissal where the plaintiff's evidence itself supports an unforeseen emergency, but deny it where the defendant's own operator testimony creates a factual dispute about how sudden or foreseeable the triggering event really was.
“the defendants' submission of the transcripts of the deposition testimony of the plaintiff and of Singh, both of whom offered a different account of the accident, raised a triable issue of fact as to how the accident occurred and which party was at fault”
On motions to dismiss grounded in documentary evidence, he treats a plaintiff's own sworn statements from an earlier, related litigation -- disclaiming wrongdoing or confirming informed consent -- as conclusive judicial admissions that can defeat later claims contradicting them, even where the later suit names different defendants.
“Plaintiff John' statements on behalf of PSSI in the aforementioned affidavits from the Tabco and Beroukhim actions, that he was not deceived into selling the premises to defendant Linden ... constitute informal judicial admissions and documentary evidence warranting the dismissal of plaintiffs' claim”
He requires a party seeking to hold a governmental or public entity liable to actually comply with statutory notice-of-claim and limitations prerequisites before reaching the merits, dismissing claims -- even sympathetic ones -- for failure to satisfy those threshold conditions.
“Timely service of a notice of claim is a condition precedent to the commencement of an action sounding in tort against the Metropolitan Transportation Authority ... The defendant/third-party plaintiff's causes of action which are in the nature for Article 78 relief are time-barred”
Procedural preferences
He is willing to grant leave to reargue and, on reconsideration, reverse his own prior summary-judgment ruling where the moving party persuades him the earlier order overlooked a material point -- reargument here is not merely pro forma.
“upon reargument, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the motion of Slifkin and Balk ... [and separately] the order, insofar as cross-appealed from, granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for leave to reargue her opposition to the defendant's prior motion for summary judgment ... and, upon reargument, vacated so much of the order entered June 22, 2022, as granted that prior motion”
He denies motions to vacate a default or reply default where the movant offers only conclusory, unsubstantiated law-office-failure excuses, without inquiring further into a potentially meritorious defense once the excuse itself fails.
“the plaintiff's conclusory and unsubstantiated assertions of law office failure failed to establish a reasonable excuse for its default in serving a reply to the defendants' counterclaims”
Cautions
He has applied a since-abrogated Second Department line of cases treating a defendant's mere failure to update a DMV address as automatically estopping a challenge to service, without requiring proof the defendant deliberately tried to evade service -- the Appellate Division used his ruling as the vehicle to reverse that doctrine statewide.
“the mere failure to update one's address with the DMV, standing alone, does not automatically equate with a deliberate attempt to avoid service and warrant estopping a defendant from challenging the propriety of service at a former address. To the extent our prior decisions ... conflict with this principle, they should no longer be followed”
In a foreclosure matter he granted the lender summary judgment and rejected the borrower's heir's statute-of-limitations defense, but the Appellate Division reversed outright, holding the debt had already been accelerated by a decade-earlier prior action and the 2022 Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act barred any revival theory -- a reminder that FAPA's retroactive limitations rules can flip an otherwise-routine foreclosure summary-judgment grant on appeal.
“the defendant demonstrated, prima facie, that the instant action ... was time-barred, as the statute of limitations began to run on the entire debt, at the latest, by February 18, 2010, when BOA commenced the prior action to foreclose, and elected in the complaint to call due the entire amount secured by the reverse mortgage”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“an amended order of the same court (Joseph Risi, J.), entered October 10, 2018, granting the plaintiff's unopposed motion for leave to enter a default judgment”
“In the order appealed from, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's motion for leave to enter a default judgment against Charlecius (2020 NY Slip Op 35489[U]). The court determined that ... service upon him at that address was nevertheless permissible because Charlecius had failed to update his mailing address with the DMV”
“the third-party action concerns, inter alia, 'the recovery or payment of money,' the statute requires Dumont to serve a notice of claim upon the PA which he did not do ... the motion by third-party plaintiff Dumont is denied and the motions to dismiss by third-party defendants are granted”
“the motions to dismiss by third-party defendants are granted and third-party's complaint is dismissed in its entirety against all third-party defendants”
“defendant/third-party plaintiff Dumont failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits on any cause of action in this lawsuit ... Dumont also did not show that there is any basis for returning the taxi medallion to him”
“the motions of defendants PRBV and Vitulli, Esq. ... to dismiss are granted and plaintiffs' complaint is dismissed in its entirety against all defendants”
“defendants Vitulli, Jr., JJ and Linden [motions] to dismiss are granted and plaintiffs' complaint is dismissed in its entirety against all defendants”
“The part of the motion of defendants Vitulli, Jr., JJ and Linden seeking an award of costs and to impose sanctions against plaintiffs is denied as the conduct of plaintiffs in bringing the action against them cannot be said to rise to the level of 'frivolous' within the meaning of 22 NYCRR 130-1.1”
“an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Joseph J. Risi, J.), entered November 25, 2019. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.”
“an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Joseph Risi, J.), entered May 14, 2020. The order granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.”
“an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Joseph Risi, J.), entered July 30, 2019. The order denied the plaintiff's motion for leave to renew her opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint”
“an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Joseph Risi, J.), dated March 31, 2021. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability.”
“an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Joseph J. Risi, J.), entered July 6, 2021. The order denied that defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.”
“an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Joseph J. Risi, J.), entered April 19, 2021. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability.”
“the defendants appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Joseph J. Risi, J.), entered February 23, 2022 ... is in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants in the total sum of $1,193,415.54.”
“an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Joseph Risi, J.), entered July 27, 2023. The order granted the defendants' motion for leave to enter a default judgment against the plaintiff on their counterclaims and denied the plaintiff's cross-motion”
“denied the plaintiff's cross-motion, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) to vacate its default in serving a reply to the defendants' counterclaims and, thereupon, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the counterclaims”
Put Judge Risi's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Risi actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Risi's own signed orders and cites them.