Joseph E. Lamendola
How Judge Lamendola decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On a defendant's summary-judgment motion in personal-injury and medical-malpractice cases, he has repeatedly credited a moving party's expert affidavit or a discretionary defense (recreational-use immunity, release language, statute of limitations) as establishing entitlement to dismissal, but a clear majority of these particular grants were later found by the Fourth Department -- and, in one case, the Court of Appeals -- to have overlooked a genuine factual dispute the opposing party's expert or documentary evidence actually raised. A lawyer opposing such a motion before him should focus on making that competing factual dispute concrete and record-based rather than relying on the moving party's framing being accepted as conclusive.
“we conclude that plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact whether, at the time the release was executed, the parties were under '[a] mistaken belief as to the nonexistence of [a] presently existing injury,' i.e., a traumatic brain injury”
In Mental Hygiene Law Article 10 annual-review proceedings (sitting on assignment in Oneida County), he defers to the state's evidence and expert testimony when the record supports it, continuing confinement even where an independent examiner reached a different conclusion -- but the Fourth Department affirms him readily in this specific context, treating his live credibility assessment of competing experts as owed real deference.
“the court 'was in the best position to evaluate the weight and credibility of the conflicting [expert] testimony,' we perceive 'no reason to disturb the court's decision to credit the testimony of [respondent's] expert[ ]'”
On discretionary applications such as late notice of claim and out-of-state relocation, his denials are the ones most often narrowed rather than affirmed outright -- the Fourth Department has repeatedly substituted its own discretion once an independent basis for relief (actual notice, a sound-and-substantial-basis defect) appears in the record, suggesting that a well-documented factual record matters more before him on these applications than an emphasis on general standards.
“we conclude that the determination of Supreme Court that the proposed relocation to North Carolina is not in the children's best interests lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record”
Procedural preferences
In post-trial practice, he has twice declined to give a requested missing-witness charge notwithstanding a defendant's undisputed decision not to call a treating physician who was directly involved in a patient's care -- both denials were reversed for placing the burden on the wrong party and for treating the cumulative-evidence question too categorically. Trial counsel should build a specific, on-the-record showing of the uncalled witness's unique, non-cumulative involvement rather than relying on the general rule that a party need not call every treater.
“the court improperly placed the burden on plaintiff to establish that the evidence would not be cumulative”
He is willing to grant a defendant's motion for leave to reargue and, on reargument, reverse an earlier denial of summary judgment -- but the reargued ruling itself gets the same scrutiny as any other grant, and here the underlying legal theory (satisfying a prevailing-wage statute through payments into a shared benefits trust) was found unproven on the existing record rather than accepted at face value.
“defendant failed to meet its initial burden of establishing as a matter of law that its method of paying the acknowledged shortfall of supplemental benefits into the pooled Trust resulted in plaintiffs each receiving full prevailing supplemental benefits”
When multiple defendants each move separately for summary judgment on overlapping theories, he has sometimes granted or denied all such motions in parallel without separately addressing each defendant's distinct factual position (e.g. an owner's passive role versus a subcontractor's active role, or a subcontractor's lack of statutory-agency status) -- on appeal these get sorted out defendant-by-defendant, so counsel representing one of several co-defendants should not assume a favorable outcome for one defendant secures the same result for all.
“we agree with CNY that the court did not err ... [but] we agree with plaintiff and Loretto that the court erred in determining that Pro Scapes did not owe plaintiff a duty of care”
Cautions
A markedly high share of this judge's summary-judgment and motion-to-dismiss GRANTS in favor of a moving defendant in this sample were reversed on appeal -- including two medical malpractice hospital/physician summary judgments, an Adult Survivors Act dismissal, a recreational-use sidewalk-injury dismissal, a release-based summary judgment, a statute-of-limitations summary judgment, and (at the Court of Appeals) a dog-bite summary judgment that became the vehicle for overruling decades-old New York tort precedent -- so a defendant who wins such a motion before him should not assume the win is durable if the plaintiff has a colorable factual dispute or an unaddressed legal theory to press on appeal.
“Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and defendants' motion for summary judgment denied”
His own 2022 summary-judgment grant in a dog-bite case was ultimately the occasion for the Court of Appeals to overrule Bard v Jahnke, its long-standing bar on common-law negligence claims against domestic-animal owners -- a reminder that a routine trial-level grant, once appealed, can become the vehicle for a significant and unpredictable change in the governing substantive law, not just a case-specific reversal.
“to the extent we previously held that a plaintiff may not assert a common-law negligence cause of action against the owner of a domestic animal for harms caused by that animal, we now overrule that precedent”
At least once, a proceeding was transferred to the Fourth Department on a substantial-evidence theory without the trial court ever ruling on the underlying petition's merits -- and the transfer itself was later held to have been improper, since the underlying administrative hearing was contractual rather than a statutory evidentiary hearing. Counsel should confirm that a proposed CPLR 7804(g) transfer is actually appropriate before relying on it to preserve or resolve a claim.
“Supreme Court erred in transferring the proceeding to this Court pursuant to CPLR 7804 (g) on the ground that the petition raised a substantial evidence issue”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The order denied the motion of defendants-appellants to dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint. It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.”
“granted the motion of defendant for leave to reargue and, upon reargument, granted the motion of defendant for summary judgment insofar as it sought dismissal of the breach of contract cause of action.”
“It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously modified on the law by denying the motion for summary judgment insofar as it sought to dismiss the first cause of action and reinstating that cause of action, and as modified the order is affirmed without costs.”
“The order denied defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs for reasons stated in the decision at Supreme Court.”
“Supreme Court, inter alia, granted Pro Scapes' motion and denied Loretto's cross motion. ... unanimously modified on the law by denying those parts of the motion of defendant Pro Scapes, Inc. for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint against it ..., and reinstating the amended complaint against it and the cross claim against it ..., and as modified the order is affirmed without costs.”
“Initially, we note that Supreme Court erred in transferring the proceeding to this Court pursuant to CPLR 7804 (g) on the ground that the petition raised a substantial evidence issue. ... the determination is unanimously annulled on the law without costs and the petition is granted.”
“Supreme Court denied the motion of Serens and Pipas with respect to the claims against them based upon decedent's admission ... The court also denied the motion of Patel and Chan, among others, with respect to Patel ... It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.”
“petitioner-respondent mother appeals from an order that denied her petition seeking permission to relocate with the subject children to North Carolina. ... the order so appealed from is reversed on the law without costs and the matter is remitted to Supreme Court, Onondaga County, for further proceedings.”
“Plaintiff now appeals from an order granting defendants' motion for dismissal of the complaint for failure to prosecute pursuant to CPLR 3216 and, in the alternative, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3212. ... It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is affirmed without costs.”
“plaintiff appeals from an order insofar as it denied plaintiff's motion with respect to the issue of three defendants' liability under Labor Law 240 (1) ... plaintiff failed to establish his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law in that respect inasmuch as there are triable issues of fact whether plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of the accident.”
“granted those parts of defendants' motions seeking summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's Labor Law 240 (1) causes of action. ... unanimously modified on the law by denying those parts of defendants' motions seeking summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law 240 (1) causes of action against defendants Hinsdale Road Group, LLC, CBD Construction, LLC, and Fox Building Group, Inc., and reinstating those causes of action against those defendants.”
“we agree with CNY that the court should have granted its motion with respect to the Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action against it on that ground [not an owner or general contractor].”
“Supreme Court denied the motion, and plaintiff now appeals. ... unanimously modified in the exercise of discretion by granting the application insofar as it sought leave to serve a late notice of claim with respect to the third and fourth causes of action ..., and as modified the order is affirmed without costs.”
“Supreme Court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as time-barred. We reverse.”
“Supreme Court granted the motion. Plaintiff appeals, and we reverse.”
Put Judge Lamendola's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Lamendola actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Lamendola's own signed orders and cites them.