John J. Andrews
How Judge Andrews rules, drawn from 11 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Andrews
John J. Andrews has served as a New York Supreme Court justice in the Tenth Judicial District since 2024 and is assigned to the Commercial Division in Suffolk County. He previously served as a Suffolk County District Court judge in Brookhaven from 2019 through 2023. Before becoming a judge, he practiced civil litigation in Port Jefferson.
Judge Andrews's practices and standing orders
Rules for cases before Judge Andrews, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.
Key rules
Contacting chambers
Copy every party on emails to the court or its staff.
“all parties to an action must be copied on any emails sent to the Court or its staff.”
Contacting chambers
Letters to the court may not exceed two pages or contain exhibits or substantive argument.
“Letters shall not exceed 2 pages in length and shall not contain exhibits and substantive argument.”
Conferences
Seek permission to adjourn a status conference at least two business days before the appearance, absent emergency.
“Counsel/Litigants must obtain Court permission to adjourn a status conference. Adjournment requests less than two business days prior to a scheduled appearance will not be entertained except in the case of an emergency.”
How Judge Andrews decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In People v. Pagan, he held that the prior speedy-trial exclusion for time to gather discovery no longer applied after CPL article 245 made disclosure automatic.
“CPL article 245 'has abolished the requirement of a discovery demand and obligates that the People automatically comply with the statute within prescribed time frame. Since discovery demands are now defunct, the exclusion provided in CPL 30.30 (4) (a) is no longer applicable.'”
In First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. County of Suffolk, Judge Andrews denied summary judgment because the assignee's submissions left a material factual question about its standing to sue on the county contract.
“FCB's submission demonstrates that the County and Carousel entered into a contract. However, its submission fails to eliminate all material issues of fact as to whether FCB has standing to bring a suit against the County as an assignee of that contract.”
In Belfor USA Group v. Northgate Electric, Andrews rejected the subcontractor's force-majeure defense. He found the subcontractor had already breached before the nonunion labor dispute and that its own failure to supply enough union workers caused the need for replacements.
“it is clear, as a matter of law, that the defendant was in breach of contract prior to the use of non-union labor. ... the labor dispute would have to be an event beyond the defendant's control ... the plaintiff has established that the needed workers were due to defendant's failure to provide sufficient union workers.”
Procedural preferences
In People v. Rivas, Judge Andrews ordered a Dunaway hearing on the traffic stop and a Huntley hearing on statements before deciding those suppression questions.
“this Court grants a Dunaway hearing for the purpose of determining whether the initial traffic stop was supported by probable cause. ... this Court grants a Huntley hearing on the question of the admissibility of any statements.”
In Matter of Jankowski v. Cafe NY 05, Inc., he appointed a temporary receiver to value the corporations and directed the petitioner and respondent to share the receiver's cost equally.
“the Court appoints Steven E. Losquadro, Esq. ... as Temporary Receiver in this matter, without bond, for the purpose of determining the value of the subject corporations ... Petitioner and Respondent shall bear the cost of the Receiver ... equally.”
In People v. Laccone, the Appellate Term affirmed Judge Andrews's denial of a self-representation request made on the third day of a four-day trial, finding it untimely and unsupported by compelling circumstances.
“The District Court properly denied defendant's request to represent himself. ... Here, defendant's request to proceed pro se, which was made on the third day of the four-day trial, was clearly untimely and failed to assert compelling circumstances to relieve counsel in favor of self-representation”
Cautions
His Molineux/prior-bad-act evidentiary calls at trial have gone both ways on appeal: a limited admission of background evidence in a harassment case was upheld, but a similar limited admission in a criminal-contempt case was found unduly prejudicial and cost a conviction on appeal; litigants should not assume a 'very limited discussion' ruling is appeal-proof.
“the District Court stated it was 'going to allow a very limited discussion over it' and, subsequently at trial, evidence of one uncharged crime/prior bad act by defendant, which led to the order of protection, was admitted. ... we find the evidence of the prior bad act to have been unduly prejudicial ... and that it should not have been allowed into evidence at trial.”
His CPL 30.30(4) exclusion analysis on a certificate-of-compliance timing question was reversed on appeal in one case (Galante) around the same time an analytically similar ruling was affirmed in another (Pagan): the two decisions turn on different sequencing of the certificate filings, so litigants should read the specific chargeable-period math carefully rather than assume either outcome controls.
“Contrary to the District Court's analysis of the issue, the exclusions that the People argue are applicable here -- CPL 30.30 (4) (b) and (f) -- apply regardless of whether the People have filed a CoC and announced ready.”
In People v. Rivas, Judge Andrews declined to compel the District Attorney to prosecute a complaining witness, explaining that charging decisions belong to the prosecutor under separation of powers.
“Under the doctrine of separation of powers, courts lack the authority to compel the prosecution of criminal actions. ... it is solely within the broad authority and discretion of the district attorney's executive power to conduct all phases of criminal prosecution.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The defendant's motion to dismiss both accusatory instruments on the grounds that her right to a speedy trial has been violated, and in the interests of justice, is DENIED.”
“the defendant's request was not properly made to this Court ... this argument is rejected ... the defendant's motion to dismiss and strike on the grounds of non-receipt of the same is denied.”
“the defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds that the initial stop was illegal is denied, subject to renewal after a Dunaway hearing.”
“this Court grants a Huntley hearing on the question of the admissibility of any statements ... the defendant's motion to suppress is DENIED, subject to renewal after a Huntley hearing.”
“It is blackletter law that '[u]nder the doctrine of separation of powers, courts lack the authority to compel the prosecution of criminal actions.' ... Accordingly, the defendant's request is DENIED.”
“The defendant's motion seeking to obtain notice from the People of any proposed trial issues pursuant to Sandoval is GRANTED, to the extent that the People are directed to provide such notice to the defendant no later than fifteen (15) business days prior to the trial date of this action.”
“By order dated March 5, 2021, the District Court (John James Andrews, J.) granted defendant's motion, finding, among other things, that CPL article 245 'has abolished the requirement of a discovery demand and obligates that the People automatically comply with the statute within prescribed time frame. Since discovery demands are now defunct, the exclusion provided in CPL 30.30 (4) (a) is no longer applicable.'”
“By order dated June 24, 2021, the District Court granted the branch of defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the accusatory instrument on statutory speedy trial grounds. The court, upon concluding that 'exclusions [under CPL 30.30 (4)] are only available after the People have already filed their Certificate of Compliance and have announced their readiness for trial,' found the 137-day period from October 9, 2020 to February 23, 2021 chargeable.”
“Defendant was charged in an accusatory instrument with four counts of animal cruelty ... Following a nonjury trial, defendant was convicted as charged. ... the judgment of conviction is affirmed.”
“The District Court properly denied defendant's request to represent himself. ... defendant's request to proceed pro se, which was made on the third day of the four-day trial, was clearly untimely.”
“Following a nonjury trial, defendant was convicted of criminal contempt in the second degree (Penal Law 215.50 [3]) upon the finding of the District Court (John James Andrews, J.) that defendant had intentionally violated an order of protection. ... the judgment of conviction is reversed, on the law, and the matter is remitted to the District Court for a new trial.”
“Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal trespass in the third degree ... the judgment of conviction is modified, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, by vacating the imposition of the mandatory DNA databank fee; as so modified, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.”
“Following a nonjury trial, defendant was convicted as charged [of harassment in the second degree]. ... the judgment of conviction is affirmed.”
“ORDERED that the motion by plaintiff First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company is denied ... FCB's submission fails to eliminate all material issues of fact as to whether FCB has standing to bring a suit against the County as an assignee of that contract.”
“ORDERED that the motion by defendant The County of Suffolk is denied.”
“FCB's submission fails to satisfy the Court that it met its initial burden in demonstrating that the affirmative defenses proffered by the County are without merit as a matter of law”
“the Order to Show Cause in this matter is denied in part and granted in part to the extent that the Court appoints Steven E. Losquadro, Esq. ... as Temporary Receiver in this matter, without bond, for the purpose of determining the value of the subject corporations.”
“motion sequence:002 has been rendered academic by Respondent's filing an amended answer and is denied as such.”
“Petitioner's second motion to dismiss Respondent's counterclaims pursuant to CPLR Rule 3211 (motion sequence:003) is denied for the reasons stated in this decision and Order. ... this Court finds the pleadings in this matter sufficient to sustain those causes of action.”
“ORDERED that the motions for summary judgment are granted to the extent that an immediate trial on damages is directed ... it is clear, as a matter of law, that the defendant was in breach of contract prior to the use of non-union labor.”
“the defendant does establish that there was no breach of warrant[y], that a cause of action for unjust enrichment is not viable where there is a contract action and no indication that contribution would be needed ... the counterclaims are dismissed.”
“The order dated December 2, 2024, denied the plaintiff's motion for leave to reargue and renew its prior motion for summary judgment on the complaint and to dismiss the defendant's affirmative defenses.”
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