Jerome C. Murphy
How Judge Murphy decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In premises-liability cases he treats low-profile furniture, mats, and similar fixtures as open and obvious as a matter of law even when a plaintiff's safety expert opines that such objects fall outside a typical person's normal line of sight, so long as comparable objects (curbs, parking dividers, chair legs) have been judicially found non-hazardous.
“If this were sufficient to raise a factual question of fact, the myriad of cases cited by defendants in which individuals tripped and fell over curbs, parking lot dividers, tree stumps, concrete wheel stop or chair leg, would seemingly fall into the same category. Yet, as cited by defendants... they have been judicially determined not to constitute hazardous conditions.”
On LLC membership-interest assignments, he reads the Limited Liability Company Law literally: an assignment conveys only economic rights unless the operating agreement's own admission procedure for new members was actually followed, regardless of the assignment document's own aspirational language calling the assignee a 'substitute member.'
“It is clear from the forgoing that plaintiffs never became members of KGN, as there is no provision in the Operating Agreement which contradicts the language of Section 603(a)(3) that 'the only effect of an assignment of a membership interest is to entitle the assignee to receive, to the extent assigned, the distributions and allocations of profits and losses to which the assignor would be entitled.'”
He will look past a release document's own defined terms to the parties' broader settlement context when a plaintiff's narrow reading would otherwise render an operative release clause meaningless.
“plaintiff's interpretation of the agreement as having released no claims against Lasry renders Section 2(b) of the Mutual Release and Confidential Settlement Agreement meaningless which would run afoul of contract principles.”
Procedural preferences
He requires strict compliance with CPLR 3213's own limits and will reject a lender's fast-track loan-guaranty motion where the loan document itself does not unconditionally fix the payment date, or fails to even identify who signed the guaranty, sending the case back to ordinary pleading practice rather than excusing the gap.
“the evidence submitted by plaintiff does not establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law since it is necessary to look outside of the four corners of the loan agreement to determine when and if money is owed to it”
He is willing to order production of a party's personal tax returns -- ordinarily disfavored as confidential -- when the returns are shown to be indispensable to a central, otherwise-unprovable factual dispute (here, disputed LLC ownership) and no substitute source of the same information exists.
“additional information concerning the question of Ovadia's relationship with ION Tech can only be gleaned from the disclosure of those tax returns and the corresponding Form 1099's issued and plaintiff has demonstrated that it requires this tax information, which cannot be obtained from other sources”
On reargument motions he holds firmly to a prior ruling's underlying legal framework, rejecting attempts to relitigate the same issue with marginally different supporting documents where the movant's own numbers do not actually change the governing legal conclusion.
“This is precisely the same argument made in their earlier motion... The net proceeds received from the loan are not relevant to the calculation of interest in this case.”
Cautions
In multi-count business-divorce complaints between family members or business partners, he will dismiss individual-capacity contract, fiduciary-duty, and fraud claims that really belong to the entity while letting genuinely personal claims (tortious interference, LLC dissolution) proceed to discovery -- a mixed ruling rather than an all-or-nothing dismissal.
“Defendants' motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED to the extent that complaint's causes of action for breach of contract... are hereby DISMISSED... those branches of Defendants' motion seeking dismissal of the seventh cause of action for tortious interference with contract and the eighth cause of action for tortious interference with business relations are denied”
He will find a defamatory-seeming internal disciplinary communication protected by qualified privilege even where neither party raised the defense, once the record shows the sender had an institutional duty to report the matter to the body with authority to act on it.
“he had a legitimate interest and a duty to make the communication to persons with a corresponding interest or duty, whether or not the language would otherwise be defamatory... Defendant's motion to dismiss the Complaint is granted on the grounds that the communication was qualifiedly privileged.”
He treats the continuous-treatment doctrine narrowly, declining to extend a medical malpractice statute of limitations based on a single scheduled-but-never-kept follow-up appointment where there is no prior history of periodic treatment between patient and physician.
“Under the circumstances where there is no prior history of decedent appearing for regularly scheduled visits, and having been seen by Dr. Gerstein on one occasion, there is no basis to conclude that there was any 'continuing trust and confidence' upon which the Court could conclude that decedent had an intention to return for additional treatment.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“ORDERED, that the motion by plaintiff to strike the Answer of defendant Amcor Electrical Contracting Corp. is granted”
“ORDERED, that the cross-motion by defendants to vacate the default and dismiss the action is denied”
“Defendants' motion to dismiss the Complaint is granted.”
“Plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment, or, alternatively, that the landowner had an obligation to plaintiff, which was violated by the placement of a dangerous instrumentality, and that this was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, is denied.”
“Defendant's motion to dismiss the Complaint is granted on the grounds that the communication was qualifiedly privileged.”
“Plaintiff's motion for reargument is denied. The Court did not misapprehend the import of the cited cases, or the fact that disgorgement of a legal fee is not warranted unless it represents damages resulting from a tort, in this case, legal malpractice.”
“The Court therefore concludes that the statute of limitations expired on May 20, 2017, and that the action is barred by the Statute of Limitations. The motion by Dr. Gerstein to dismiss the Complaint as untimely commenced, is granted.”
“Plaintiff's motion to serve a Second Amended Complaint which extends the statute of limitations by extending the period of continuous treatment by Dr. Gerstein, is denied.”
“Defendants' motion to dismiss the Complaint on behalf of plaintiffs against VL 10 1620 New Highway, LLC is granted based upon the Statute of Limitations, and against Little Joseph Realty, LLC based upon the fact that plaintiffs have not rebutted the evidence submitted by defendants that this company has no relationship of any kind with the premises upon which plaintiff claims to have been injured.”
“In Motion Sequence No. 5, plaintiff seeks to further amend its Complaint to add new parties... This motion is denied, as the only named defendant which was timely served was Little Joseph Realty, LLC, which has no relationship to the subject property, and is not united in interest with either VL 10 New Highway, LLC, JPD United, Inc., or JPD I, LLC, the owner and manager, and owner, respectively of the premises.”
“Accordingly, the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the Complaint is denied.”
“Defendant Creative Landscaping by Cow Bay, Inc.'s motion to dismiss the Complaint and any and all Cross-claims against it is granted.”
“The net proceeds received from the loan are not relevant to the calculation of interest in this case. The amount of the loan was $2,782,259.27, as agreed by the parties to the loan, thus exempting it from a claim of usury in accordance with GOL 5-501(6)(b). The motion to reargue the prior Decision and Order of this Court dated September 16, 2019 is denied.”
“ORDERED, that plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment (Motion Sequence 003) is in all respects denied”
“the case is dismissed in its entirety”
“ORDERED that those branches of the Union defendants' motion which are for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it and for leave to enter a default judgment against plaintiff on their first counterclaim are granted”
“ORDERED that those branches of the Union defendants' motion which are for leave to enter a default judgment against plaintiff on their second, third, and fourth counterclaims and for summary judgment on the issue of liability on their counterclaims are denied”
“ORDERED that plaintiff's motion, pursuant to CPLR 3124, to compel the production of the tax returns of defendants Ovadia Meron and Galit Meron for the years 2008 through 2011 and 2019 through 2022 and the Form 1099s issued by defendant Ovadia Meron to TRV Corp. for the years 2008 through 2022 is GRANTED”
“ORDERED that the motion of defendants Ovadia Meron and Galit Meron to compel plaintiffs to produce unredacted copies of the tax documents, the schedule K-1's, of plaintiff ION Technology Solutions, LLC, which had already been produced to them by plaintiff in redacted form is DENIED.”
Put Judge Murphy's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Murphy actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Murphy's own signed orders and cites them.