Jennifer G. Schecter
How Judge Schecter decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
She extends U.S. Supreme Court federal-immunity precedent to state-court proceedings by analogy rather than treating the absence of controlling state authority as a reason for caution, holding that a sitting or incoming President has no special immunity from a private New York lawsuit for unofficial conduct.
“Nothing in the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution even suggests that the president cannot be called to account before a state court for wrongful conduct that bears no relationship to any federal executive responsibility. No one is above the law.”
In arbitration-scope disputes she reads a broad 'relating to' clause expansively, covering every claim connected to the underlying dispute -- contract, quasi-contract, and tort alike -- rather than confining arbitration to claims that arise directly under the agreement itself.
“Simply put, the Holdings Agreement's broad arbitration clause covers all of these claims, whether grounded in contract, quasi contract, or tort.”
She applies res judicata and claim-preclusion doctrine strictly against a litigant who lost a fully-litigated prior action and tries to replead the same underlying transaction under new legal theories after obtaining discovery, even where the new complaint frames the claims very differently.
“Res judicata bars this action. ... once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy.”
On indenture-trustee standing questions she reads the precise contractual text over policy arguments about market efficiency, holding a trustee has no pre-default remedy to sue on noteholders' behalf unless the indenture's own terms expressly confer one.
“The Court is unaware of any case where a trustee was permitted to act without express contractual authorization. ... It is in the contracting parties' hands.”
Procedural preferences
On default-judgment motions she carefully separates the amount the movant has actually proven from what the complaint alleges, granting judgment on liability or on discrete, proven categories of damages while declining to award anything the movant has not documented, and referring open damages questions to a Special Referee rather than deciding them on the papers.
“Porco has not made a sufficient showing of merit on the other claims for fraudulent conveyance and breach of contract ... without any proof there can be no award.”
She denies a second or renewed motion that merely recycles arguments already rejected -- whether on a prior motion or a prior appeal -- as both procedurally improper and, when repeated after a warning, sanctionable.
“Defendants have not come close to establishing new facts not offered on the prior motion or a change in law that would change this Court's prior determination.”
On motions to seal she grants sealing or redaction readily where the parties agree the material is genuinely sensitive personal or competitive business information of limited relevance to the merits, without requiring an adversarial showing.
“the public interest in disclosure is outweighed by the prejudice that Plaintiffs and others would suffer if the Confidential Sensitive Information were disclosed ... Defendants do not oppose the Motion.”
She holds litigants to the excuse-and-meritorious-defense standard strictly on motions to vacate a default, rejecting a belated attempt to blame someone else for years-old discovery noncompliance where the movant could have raised the issue at the time.
“Danzik does not explain why he did not raise this issue as a defense to his failure to produce ESI until now.”
Cautions
Her discretionary rulings on complex commercial questions do not always survive appeal intact -- the Appellate Division has modified her orders to reinstate dismissed affirmative defenses over a foreclosure sale's commercial reasonableness and to strip a broker of a specific commission award based on an undisclosed conflict of interest already found unlawful in an earlier appeal in the same case.
“unanimously modified, on the law, to vacate so much of the judgment as declared that defendant can enforce the brokerage agreement ... to recover a commission for brokering the sublease”
She will impose civil contempt for disobedience of a turnover or injunctive order even without a full evidentiary hearing, so long as the respondent's opposition papers do not raise a genuine factual dispute about the elements of contempt or an available defense.
“The court was not required to hold a such a hearing because defendant's opposition to the motion did not raise a factual dispute as to the elements of civil contempt, or the existence of a defense.”
A fee or sanctions award she enters can be fully reversed and vacated, not merely modified, where an intervening appellate ruling in a companion proceeding removes the legal basis for the award altogether.
“In light of this Court's holding in TRB Acquisitions LLC v Yedid ... the motion court's order awarding defendant attorneys' fees in the amount of $350,000 is reversed and vacated.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Because they do not, defendant's motion to dismiss this case or hold it in abeyance is denied.”
“ORDERED and ADJUDGED that plaintiff's motion is granted and defendant is held in contempt as her conduct--distribution of an email including information covered by Windsor's attorney-client privilege--defeated, impaired, impeded and prejudiced plaintiff's rights pursuant to the Judgment”
“Pursuant to CPLR 32ll(a), defendant David Bargman moves to dismiss the complaint. His motion is granted.”
“Because nothing was overlooked or misapprehended (see CPLR 2221 [d][2]), reargument is denied.”
“ORDERED that defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint is granted and the Clerk is directed to enter judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice”
“ORDERED that the RDX Parties' motion to vacate the judgment is denied”
“ORDERED that the CWT Parties' cross-motion for sanctions and a litigation injunction is denied.”
“the only legitimately contested issue presented on this motion is whether a default judgment should be entered against Summit on the breach of contract claim. The answer is yes.”
“Plaintiff carried its burden, on this motion for a default judgment, to prove defendants' breach of the Agreements and plaintiff's entitlement to an award of $942,753.98 plus interest against Turlington and AG, plus $10,000 against AG.”
“it is ORDERED that Porco's motion for a default judgment against the LDH Defendants is granted only on the fourth cause of action against the Company, the Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Porco and against the Company in the amount of $216,666.58 plus 9% pre-judgment interest”
“ORDERED that defendants' motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration is granted to the extent that all claims pleaded in the PSAC are to be arbitrated in accordance with section 12.8 of the Holdings Agreement and section 13.14 of the Columbia Care Agreement; and it is further ORDERED that this action is stayed pending completion of the arbitration”
“ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for a default judgment is granted as to liability on its first cause of action for breach of contract against defendant Primesource Equity Solutions, LLC”
“WHEREAS Plaintiffs have shown good cause why the documents containing Confidential Sensitive Information should be filed under seal or in redacted form; ... NOW, THEREFORE it is hereby ORDERED that: (a) the Motion is GRANTED”
Put Judge Schecter's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Schecter actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Schecter's own signed orders and cites them.