David T. Reilly
How Judge Reilly rules, drawn from 29 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Reilly
David T. Reilly has served as a justice of the New York State Supreme Court in Suffolk County since January 2014. He was elected in the Tenth Judicial District in 2013 and is assigned to the Suffolk County Commercial Division. Before joining the bench, he practiced civil litigation in Northport, New York.
Judge Reilly's practices and standing orders
Rules for cases before Judge Reilly, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.
How Judge Reilly decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In McGrath v. Suffolk County, Judge Reilly held that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111-b capped the charge for each violation at $50 plus a $25 late fee, precluding the county's additional administrative fee; the Appellate Division affirmed.
“A plain reading of Vehicle and Traffic Law 1111-b supports the Supreme Court's determination that the statute precludes the County from collecting anything more than $50, plus a late fee of $25, from an owner for each violation.”
In Slattery v. Strong's Marine, Reilly denied the boat owner's liability motion and granted the marina summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that the marina had not attempted personal service of the lien-sale notice before mailing it.
“the defendant admitted that it had not exercised due diligence in attempting to serve the notice of sale by personal service before resorting to the statutory alternative of service by mail, the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact”
In Lopez v. O'Sullivan, Reilly denied dismissal based on deeds and mortgages because the plaintiff alleged fraud in procuring those documents and they did not resolve the disputed facts.
“the case itself is posited on the alleged fraud that procured the documents. As such, proof of transfers, proof of ownership, and contracts in this case fail to resolve factual issues.”
In Lopez v. O'Sullivan, Reilly denied a jurisdictional dismissal request because he could find no supporting argument in the moving papers.
“This Court was unable to discern within defendant's moving papers support for this claim to dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint. Therefore, defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) is denied.”
Procedural preferences
In Czenszak v. Iasello, Reilly denied the defendants' boundary-line summary judgment request, searched the record, and awarded judgment to the plaintiffs; the Appellate Division affirmed.
“The Supreme Court has the authority, pursuant to CPLR 3212 (b), to search the record and award summary judgment to a nonmoving party with respect to an issue that was the subject of the motion.”
In Sells v. Stonhard, Reilly granted Liberty Moving leave to renew its summary judgment motion after later depositions supplied facts unavailable when it made the prior motion.
“As the depositions had not yet been conducted at the time of the prior motion, and additional facts discovered during the depositions were previously unknown to Liberty, the court finds that Liberty has set forth a reasonable justification for the failure to submit those facts on the prior motion, and that the renewal of Liberty's motion is appropriate.”
In Lopez v. O'Sullivan, Reilly granted the plaintiff's request to dismiss a use-and-occupancy counterclaim after finding that no opposition addressed that branch of the motion.
“An extensive review of the NYSCEF Docket fails to reveal any opposition to this motion. ... there is no opposition to the dismissal of defendant Grausso's use and occupancy counterclaim, and therefore, plaintiff's motion is granted in that respect.”
Cautions
In Perez v. Mendicino, the Appellate Division reversed Reilly's summary judgment for the broker defendants because their moving papers had not addressed damages and had not established entitlement to judgment on the fiduciary-duty claims.
“the Mendicino defendants did not address the issue of damages in support of their cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them, they failed to establish as a matter of law that the plaintiff sustained no damages”
In Lockwood's FOIL proceeding, the Appellate Division modified Judge Reilly's dismissal of the petition. It held that the requested clerk training materials required in camera review before their exemption from disclosure could be determined, while affirming the denial concerning records the agency did not possess.
“without examination of the records that the petitioner seeks, the Supreme Court could not determine that the training materials requested were exempt from disclosure as records of the 'judiciary'”
In the cited service-of-process appeal, the Appellate Division held that Reilly could not use CPLR 2001 to overlook jurisdictional defects in an incarcerated plaintiff's service, despite his pro se status.
“notwithstanding the plaintiff's status as an incarcerated pro se litigant, the plaintiff's failure to comply with the personal delivery requirements of CPLR 308 (2) and CPLR 311 ... are jurisdictional defects that the Supreme Court may not overlook pursuant to CPLR 2001”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The order, insofar as appealed from, denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and, in effect, declaring that the defendants' imposition of an administrative fee for a red light camera violation is authorized under state law”
“granted those branches of the plaintiff's cross-motion which were for summary judgment declaring that the defendants' imposition of a monetary liability for a red light camera violation in excess of $50, or $75 with a late fee, is ultra vires, unconstitutional, preempted, void, or otherwise illegal”
“granted the cross-motion of the defendants Michael Mendicino, Millennium Homes, and Suffolk Real Estate Solutions, Inc., for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them”
“granted those defendants' motion to cancel a notice of pendency filed by the plaintiff against the subject property”
“denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability”
“granted that branch of the defendant's cross-motion which was, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint”
“denied that branch of the motion of the defendants Anthony Iasello and Catherine Iasello which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action for declaratory relief regarding the boundary line between the parties' real properties under the doctrine of practical location, searched the record, and awarded summary judgment to the plaintiffs”
“The order granted the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the complaint.”
“denied those branches of the motion of the defendant Bruce Nagel & Partners Architects, P.C., which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it and on its cross-claim alleging breach of contract”
“granted the cross-motion of the defendants David L. Wasserman and Ellen F. Wasserman for summary judgment dismissing the cross-claims of the defendant Bruce Nagel & Partners Architects, P.C.”
“granted those branches of the separate motions of the defendant Brownstones Coffee, Inc., and the defendant Country Fare Market, Inc., which were for summary judgment dismissing the third amended complaint insofar as asserted against each of them”
“denied the plaintiff's separate cross-motions for summary judgment dismissing those defendants' affirmative defenses asserting that the third amended complaint is barred insofar as asserted against each of those defendants by waiver of subrogation clauses”
“The judgment, in effect, denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.”
“granted those branches of the defendant's motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action to recover damages for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and violations of the Debtor and Creditor Law insofar as asserted against him in his individual capacity and in his capacity as attorney-in-fact for Jane Nobile”
“denied those branches of the plaintiff's cross-motion which were for summary judgment on the causes of action to recover damages for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and violations of the Debtor and Creditor Law insofar as asserted against the defendant”
“the motion of defendant Majestic Flooring Solutions Corporation for an order pursuant to CPLR 3212, granting summary judgment dismissing the complaint and the cross claims against it, is granted”
“the motion of defendant Liberty Moving & Storage Co., Inc. for leave to renew its prior motion for summary judgment, which was denied without prejudice by order of this Court dated August 6, 2022, is granted”
“upon renewal, the motion of defendant Liberty Moving & Storage Co., Inc. for an order, pursuant to CPLR 3212, granting summary judgment dismissing the complaint and the cross claims against it, is granted”
“The order denied the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the amended complaint.”
“The order granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.”
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