David T. Reilly
How Judge Reilly decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On a preemption challenge to a local fee ordinance, he reads the state statute's numerical cap literally and will not credit a municipality's attempt to layer an additional 'administrative fee' on top of it, even where the fee is framed as separate from the statutory penalty.
“A plain reading of Vehicle and Traffic Law 1111-b supports the Supreme Court's determination that the statute precludes the County from collecting anything more than $50, plus a late fee of $25, from an owner for each violation.”
On a lien-sale notice defect, once a defendant's own witness admits it made a deliberate cost/benefit decision to skip a required step (here, personal service, as 'a waste of funds'), he treats that admission as conclusive against the defendant rather than a fact issue for trial.
“the defendant admitted that it had not exercised due diligence in attempting to serve the notice of sale by personal service before resorting to the statutory alternative of service by mail, the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact”
In a multi-year fraud dispute over real property, he is reluctant to let documentary evidence (deeds, mortgages, signed agreements) end the case on a motion to dismiss where the authenticity of the documents is not really contested but the circumstances of how they were procured is the whole point of the suit.
“the case itself is posited on the alleged fraud that procured the documents. As such, proof of transfers, proof of ownership, and contracts in this case fail to resolve factual issues.”
He holds a bare, unbriefed jurisdictional citation to CPLR 3211(a)(8) insufficient to carry a motion -- a movant must actually argue lack of personal jurisdiction, not just check the box.
“This Court was unable to discern within defendant's moving papers support for this claim to dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint. Therefore, defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) is denied.”
Procedural preferences
When one side's summary-judgment showing exposes a fact question that the record independently resolves against the OTHER side, he will invoke CPLR 3212(b) to search the record and grant judgment to a non-movant, rather than simply denying the pending motion and leaving the issue for trial.
“The Supreme Court has the authority, pursuant to CPLR 3212 (b), to search the record and award summary judgment to a nonmoving party with respect to an issue that was the subject of the motion.”
On a renewal motion, he readily grants leave when discovery genuinely supplied facts unavailable at the time of an earlier motion (here, party depositions taken after his own prior order denied summary judgment without prejudice), rather than treating renewal as disfavored.
“As the depositions had not yet been conducted at the time of the prior motion, and additional facts discovered during the depositions were previously unknown to Liberty, the court finds that Liberty has set forth a reasonable justification for the failure to submit those facts on the prior motion, and that the renewal of Liberty's motion is appropriate.”
In multi-motion omnibus decisions he resolves unopposed branches summarily (granting them without extended analysis) while reserving fuller discussion for the contested branches -- litigants who do not respond to a specific branch of a motion should expect it granted by default.
“An extensive review of the NYSCEF Docket fails to reveal any opposition to this motion. ... there is no opposition to the dismissal of defendant Grausso's use and occupancy counterclaim, and therefore, plaintiff's motion is granted in that respect.”
In an Article 78 proceeding against multiple related respondents, he is willing to grant relief against a public entity while denying identical relief against a private affiliate on the same facts, rather than treating co-respondents as a single unit.
“ORDERED the Article 78 petition is granted as against the Stony Brook Fire District and the Stony Brook Fire District Board of Fire Commissioners ... ORDERED the Article 78 petition is denied as against the Stony Brook Volunteer Fire Department, Inc.”
Cautions
His summary-judgment rulings for defendants in personal-injury and Labor Law cases have been reversed on appeal a notable number of times in this sample -- most often because the Appellate Division found the defendant's own submissions actually failed to eliminate a triable fact question, or because the moving papers never addressed an element (like damages) the trial court nonetheless relied on to grant judgment. Litigants should not assume a favorable outcome at his level is appeal-proof.
“the Mendicino defendants did not address the issue of damages in support of their cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them, they failed to establish as a matter of law that the plaintiff sustained no damages”
In FOIL/Article 78 proceedings against Suffolk County agencies, several of his petition denials crediting the agency's non-possession or exemption claims have been reversed or modified on appeal for not scrutinizing the agency's showing closely enough (an in camera review was required rather than accepting the exemption claim at face value; an agency's affidavit was found to itself raise, not resolve, a factual question about record availability).
“without examination of the records that the petitioner seeks, the Supreme Court could not determine that the training materials requested were exempt from disclosure as records of the 'judiciary'”
He has applied CPLR 2001 to overlook a plaintiff's defective service of process based on sympathetic circumstances (incarcerated pro se status); the Appellate Division has drawn a hard line that CPLR 2001 cures only technical infirmities, never a true jurisdictional defect, so litigants should not count on equitable leniency curing a genuine service failure.
“notwithstanding the plaintiff's status as an incarcerated pro se litigant, the plaintiff's failure to comply with the personal delivery requirements of CPLR 308 (2) and CPLR 311 ... are jurisdictional defects that the Supreme Court may not overlook pursuant to CPLR 2001”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The order, insofar as appealed from, denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and, in effect, declaring that the defendants' imposition of an administrative fee for a red light camera violation is authorized under state law”
“granted those branches of the plaintiff's cross-motion which were for summary judgment declaring that the defendants' imposition of a monetary liability for a red light camera violation in excess of $50, or $75 with a late fee, is ultra vires, unconstitutional, preempted, void, or otherwise illegal”
“granted the cross-motion of the defendants Michael Mendicino, Millennium Homes, and Suffolk Real Estate Solutions, Inc., for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them”
“granted those defendants' motion to cancel a notice of pendency filed by the plaintiff against the subject property”
“denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability”
“granted that branch of the defendant's cross-motion which was, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint”
“denied that branch of the motion of the defendants Anthony Iasello and Catherine Iasello which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action for declaratory relief regarding the boundary line between the parties' real properties under the doctrine of practical location, searched the record, and awarded summary judgment to the plaintiffs”
“The order granted the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the complaint.”
“denied those branches of the motion of the defendant Bruce Nagel & Partners Architects, P.C., which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it and on its cross-claim alleging breach of contract”
“granted the cross-motion of the defendants David L. Wasserman and Ellen F. Wasserman for summary judgment dismissing the cross-claims of the defendant Bruce Nagel & Partners Architects, P.C.”
“granted those branches of the separate motions of the defendant Brownstones Coffee, Inc., and the defendant Country Fare Market, Inc., which were for summary judgment dismissing the third amended complaint insofar as asserted against each of them”
“denied the plaintiff's separate cross-motions for summary judgment dismissing those defendants' affirmative defenses asserting that the third amended complaint is barred insofar as asserted against each of those defendants by waiver of subrogation clauses”
“The judgment, in effect, denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.”
“granted those branches of the defendant's motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action to recover damages for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and violations of the Debtor and Creditor Law insofar as asserted against him in his individual capacity and in his capacity as attorney-in-fact for Jane Nobile”
“denied those branches of the plaintiff's cross-motion which were for summary judgment on the causes of action to recover damages for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and violations of the Debtor and Creditor Law insofar as asserted against the defendant”
“the motion of defendant Majestic Flooring Solutions Corporation for an order pursuant to CPLR 3212, granting summary judgment dismissing the complaint and the cross claims against it, is granted”
“the motion of defendant Liberty Moving & Storage Co., Inc. for leave to renew its prior motion for summary judgment, which was denied without prejudice by order of this Court dated August 6, 2022, is granted”
“upon renewal, the motion of defendant Liberty Moving & Storage Co., Inc. for an order, pursuant to CPLR 3212, granting summary judgment dismissing the complaint and the cross claims against it, is granted”
“The order denied the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the amended complaint.”
“The order granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.”
Put Judge Reilly's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Reilly actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Reilly's own signed orders and cites them.