Andrew Borrok
How Judge Borrok rules, drawn from 23 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Borrok
Andrew Borrok is a justice of the New York State Supreme Court in the New York County Commercial Division. His docket includes cases alleging violations of the Securities Act of 1933. Before joining the bench, he practiced business and finance law; he earned degrees from Columbia University and Georgetown University Law Center.
Judge Borrok's practices and standing orders
Rules for cases before Judge Borrok, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.
Key rules
Filing
Working or courtesy copies of motions are not accepted without prior court permission.
“Working or courtesy copies of motions and related documents are not accepted by email or otherwise except with prior permission of the Court for in camera review”
Filing
E-filed documents must be text searchable, and electronic memoranda must contain bookmarks.
“All e-filed documents must be text-searchable. All electronically-submitted memoranda of law must contain bookmarks,”
Conferences
Email the Part Clerk at least 48 hours before an appearance to attend virtually.
“Please email the Part Clerk (sfc-part53- [email protected]) at least 48 hours in advance of the scheduled appearance if you intend to appear virtually so that a TEAMS link can be forwarded to you”
Conferences
The court must approve adjournments of oral argument, conferences, and trials in advance.
“All adjournments (oral argument on motions, conferences, trials) require prior Court approval.”
How Judge Borrok decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Retirement Board of Allegheny County v. Ping Identity Holding Corp., he dismissed the complaint after finding that the secondary offering documents had disclosed the performance information the plaintiffs claimed was concealed.
“the complaint in this case is doomed because the very performance that Ping Identity Holding Corporation's (Ping) is alleged to have failed to disclose in its July 2020 secondary public offering (SPO) documents was in fact disclosed in such documents”
In Bennigson v. Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation, he dismissed the decades-old claim on laches grounds after finding unreasonable delay and resulting prejudice apparent from the amended complaint.
“plaintiffs' lack of due diligence and unreasonable delay in bringing this action and the prejudice to defendant from plaintiffs' delay are apparent from the face of the amended complaint”
In New Media Holding Co. LLC v. East West United Bank SA, he treated the parties' choice of a foreign forum for non-contractual obligations as weighing heavily against litigating those claims in New York.
“this intentional and express choice by the parties as to non-contractual obligations (i.e., the gravamen of this lawsuit) weighs heavily when considering whether Plaintiffs should now be allowed to burden New York courts when they chose the exact opposite result when they made their deal”
Procedural preferences
In Board of Directors of Big Deal Realty on Greene St., Inc. v. 60G 133 Greene St. Owner, LLC, he declined to add a flip-tax obligation for a change in a lessee's ownership that the operative cooperative documents did not impose.
“Having failed to provide a provision in the operative Co-Op documents that transfers in ownership of the Lessee are proscribed without Board approval or otherwise that the Flip Tax shall be due upon such transfer, the court shall not rewrite one under the guise of interpretation”
In Starr Russia Investments III B.V. v. Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Ltd., he rejected attorney-client privilege for the RAG report because Starr offered no lawyer affirmation describing the representation or identifying both asserted clients.
“Starr does not proffer an affirmation from a lawyer from A & O or Skadden describing the scope of the representation or identifying both Starr and JC Flowers as clients in the ITB transaction. Thus, the RAG Report is not protected by the attorney client privilege.”
In Frequency Electronics, Inc. v. Bloch, he rejected FEI's argument that naming New York as the jurisdiction specified every county as a venue for the arbitration-related proceeding.
“FEI argues that the absence to specify any county means that the parties specified every single county. The argument fails as nothing more than a nuanced attempt to conflate jurisdiction and venue.”
In Talos Capital Designated Activity Co. v. 257 Church Holdings LLC, he rejected Ashkenazy's renewal arguments as new and unsupported, finding that they conflicted with arguments Ashkenazy had made in opposing summary judgment.
“these are not new facts—they are new, unsupported arguments. Worse, they are new arguments that are at odds with arguments that Mr. Ashkenazy actually made when addressing this point as part of his opposition to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment”
Cautions
In Parc 56 LLC v. Board of Managers of the Parc Vendome Condominium, he found that the defendants had tried to mislead the court with a meritless argument and concluded that striking their pleadings was warranted.
“Having knowingly made this wholly meritless argument to this Court to needlessly elongate these proceedings, and attempting to perpetrate a fraud on the Court, striking its pleadings are warranted.”
In Parc 56 LLC v. Board of Managers of the Parc Vendome Condominium, Judge Borrok held the defendants in civil contempt and imposed the $250 statutory fine after finding they willfully refused to sign the ordered PW-1 form.
“The Defendants have willfully and contumaciously failed to sign the PW-1 and have now attempted to fabricate new concerns ... Thus, the motion for contempt must be granted and the Defendants shall pay the maximum statutory amount of $250 for civil contempt.”
In Lard-PT, LLC v. Seokoh, Inc., he resolved several motions in one order, granting some relief, denying other requests, and granting two motions only in part.
“(i) Seokoh, Inc. (Kolmar)'s motion ... is granted solely to the extent ... but is otherwise denied, (ii) Lard-PT, LLC's ... motion ... is granted, (iii) Lard's motion for summary judgment ... is denied, and (iv) Kolmar's motion ... to discontinue ... is granted solely to the extent”
An August 2025 renewed summary-judgment grant on a contract claim was later reversed because the appellate court found a material factual dispute in the remaining testimony and documents. The trial ruling should therefore be read with its appellate history.
“Supreme Court should have denied Tahari's motion for summary judgment because Narkis's affidavit, the parties' deposition testimony and the documentary evidence created a material issue of fact”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“It is hereby ORDERED that the motion to dismiss the AC is granted without prejudice”
“East-West's motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to CPLR § 327 (a) is granted. ... ORDERED that East-West's motion to dismiss is granted and the Amended Complaint is dismissed, and the Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.”
“60G 133 Greene Street Owner, LLC's (60G) motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR § (a)(1) and (7) is granted. ... ORDERED that 60G's motion to dismiss is granted”
“Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR §§ 3211 (a)(1) and (a)(7) is denied with respect to the cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (second cause of action) and granted with respect to the causes of action for a declaratory judgment (fourth cause of action), violation of General Business Law § 340 (fifth cause of action), and tortious interference with business relations (sixth cause of action).”
“Martin Bloch's motion to change venue to Nassau County is granted. ... ORDERED that the motion for a change of venue is granted, and venue of this action is changed from this Court to the Supreme Court, County of Nassau”
“the court holds that there are no issues of material fact and the evidence establishes that the September 23, 2014 order of the Sao Paolo State Court ordering CIT to relinquish possession of the aircraft to Savon was the proximate cause of CIT's physical loss of the aircraft, CIT's motion for summary judgment (motion sequence No. 002) is granted”
“the Insurers' motion for summary judgment (motion sequence No. 003) is denied”
“the branch of the Moving Respondents' motion for a stay and a preliminary injunction is denied”
“the branch of their motion to seal is also denied and the Moving Respondents are directed to upload unredacted versions of their supporting papers”
“ORDERED that Mtn Seq. No. 23 and Mtn. Seq. No. 24 are granted to the extent set forth herein and Starr shall produce the documents required by this decision and order within 7 days.”
“Seokoh, Inc. (Kolmar)'s motion ... to consolidate the lawsuit ... with the Lard Lawsuit and to stay the consolidated lawsuit until the still later filed ... Delaware Dissolution Proceeding ... is granted solely to the extent that the Lard Lawsuit is consolidated into the Kolmar Lawsuit but is otherwise denied”
“Lard-PT, LLC's (Lard) motion ... for an extension of time to file a responsive pleading in the Kolmar Lawsuit which was filed on February 12, 2020 is granted”
“Lard's motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim in the Kolmar Lawsuit ... pursuant to CPLR § 3212 is denied”
“Kolmar's motion ... to discontinue the Kolmar Lawsuit without prejudice pursuant to CPLR § 3217(b) is granted solely to the extent that Kolmar's complaint filed in the Kolmar Lawsuit seeking specific performance is dismissed without prejudice”
“Lard's motion ... for a preliminary injunction pursuant to CPLR §§ 2214(d), 6301, and 6313(1) is denied”
“David Wormser and Alan Wormser's (the Wormsers) motion to dismiss the Third-Party Complaint ... pursuant to CPLR §§ 3211(a)(1) and (7) and for sanctions pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 130.1-1 is granted to the extent that the Third-Party Complaint is dismissed but is otherwise denied”
“Lard's motion ... to dismiss the counterclaims filed in the Lard Lawsuit is denied.”
“Prada's Order to Show Cause (Mtn. Seq. No. 002) is granted in part.”
“It is hereby ORDERED that NYU's motion to dismiss (Mtn. Seq. No. 004) is granted to the extent that the cause of action for breach of contract is dismissed and the causes of action for declaratory judgment are not dismissed solely to the extent that NYU is a proper nominal defendant”
“ORDERED that Turner's motion to dismiss (Mtn. Seq. No. 003) is denied in its entirety”
“the motion for leave to renew (Mtn. Seq. No. 005) is granted to the extent that the Unit Owner is granted summary judgment”
“the cross-motion to strike the Defendants' answer is granted and the Defendants' answer is struck”
“the motion to strike the complaint (Mtn. Seq. No. 006) is denied”
“Ms. Schrero's motion to strike a subpoena (Mtn. Seq. No. 007) is denied”
“the motion for contempt (Mtn. Seq. No. 008) is granted; ... the Defendants are hereby sanctioned by this Court in the amount of $250”
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