Philip Martin Pro
Judge Pro no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Pro decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Pro required a contractual or qualifying beneficiary relationship before allowing a third party to assert insurer bad faith.
“a contractual relationship is required to assert a claim of bad faith unless a third party is a specific intended beneficiary to the insurance contract or alleges it relied to its detriment on representations made by the insurer.”
He found a noncommercial copyright use favored fair use where the claimant offered no evidence of market harm.
“Righthaven has not presented evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact that Hoehn’s use is harmful.”
He permitted evidence beyond the ERISA record when a new appellate denial rationale prevented the claimant from developing that record.
“By providing a new basis for denial on appeal, Mrs. Purney was prevented from fully developing the administrative record.”
Procedural preferences
Before imposing a prefiling restriction, Pro required a reviewable record and substantive findings about frivolous or harassing litigation.
“The Court must set forth an adequate record for review and make ‘substantive findings about the frivolous or harassing nature of the plaintiffs litigation.’”
He denied additional summary-judgment discovery when the opponent did not identify the needed facts or explain why they were necessary.
“Righthaven has not presented an affidavit showing the specified reasons it needs to conduct discovery to oppose summary judgment, or, the types of facts it hopes to elicit, that these facts exist, and that these facts are necessary to oppose summary judgment.”
He applied the demanding arbitration-vacatur standard rather than treating legal error as enough.
“Manifest disregard of the law means ‘something beyond and different from a mere error in the law or failure on the part of the arbitrators to understand and apply the law.’”
Cautions
Pro predicted that Nevada would not recognize negligent misrepresentation based only on a promise of future performance.
“The Court concludes Nevada would hold that a misrepresentation as to future performance cannot be negligent”
He treated knowing nondisclosure of claims in bankruptcy, coupled with a motive to conceal, as outside inadvertence or mistake.
“Davis’s failure to disclose cannot be attributed to unintentional oversight, inadvertence, or mistake.”
He recognized that qualified immunity does not protect officers where the alleged unlawfulness would have been apparent to a reasonable officer.
“not entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable officer would know the officers’ conduct was unlawful.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, Doug Gillespie, Officer Terry Scott, and Officer Scott Schaier’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 81) is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 112) is DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages (Doc. # 104) is hereby GRANTED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Wyndham Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff Carolyn Davis (Doc. # 74) and Defendant James Friedman’s Joinder in Defendant Wyndham’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff Carolyn Davis (Doc. # 76) are hereby DENIED, but any award to Plaintiff Carolyn Davis is to be capped at the amount necessary to repay her creditors as determined by the bankruptcy Trustee.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Wyndham Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff Karen Banks (Doc. # 72) and Defendant James Friedman’s Joinder to Defendant Wyndham’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff Karen Banks (Doc. # 78) are hereby GRANTED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Wyndham Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff JoEllen Sutherland (Doc. # 73) and Defendant James Friedman’s Joinder to Defendant Wyndham’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff JoEllen Sutherland (Doc. # 77) are hereby GRANTED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff Mid-Ohio Securities Corp.’s Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award and to Stay Proceedings to Enforce Arbitration Award (Doc. # 1) is hereby DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant The Estate of Lawrence D. Burns’ Cross-Motion to Confirm FINRA Arbitration Award (Doc. # 22) is hereby GRANTED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Mutual of Enumclaws’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc #11) is hereby GRANTED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Doc. # 16) and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 8) are hereby GRANTED, and Plaintiffs Complaint is hereby DISMISSED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Liberty Mutual Insurance Company’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint (Doc. # 18) is hereby DENIED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants Thomas R. Moyes, Samuel Clay Rogers, Paul R. Kimmel, Eugene I. Davis, Mark E. Brown, Thomas Y. Hart-ley, Robert Forbuss, and Ikram Khan’s Emergency Motion for Stay in Proceedings (Doc. # 130) is hereby DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Thomas R. Moyes, Samuel Clay Rogers, Paul R. Kimmel, Eugene I. Davis, Mark E. Brown, Thomas Y. Hartley, Robert Forbuss, and Ikram Khan’s Motion to Certify Questions of Law to the Supreme Court of Nevada (Doc. # 132) is hereby DENIED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant PacifiCare’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 27) is hereby GRANTED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Entry of Final Judgment, and to Strike (Doc. # 126) is hereby GRANTED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Leave to File Supplement to Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Second Motion for Summary Judgment and Entry of Final Judgment (Doc. # 130) is hereby GRANTED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis on Appeal (Doc. # 252) is hereby GRANTED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Have Plaintiff Declared a Vexatious Litigant (Doc. # 256) is hereby GRANTED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Emergency Motion for Extraordinary PosWCase Relief (Doc. #254) is hereby DENIED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc. # 27) is hereby granted in part and denied in part.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to All Claims Against Defendant the Charles C. Brennan Living Trust (Doc. # 28) is hereby DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Denial or Continuance Pursuant to FRCP Rule 56(f) (Doc. # 34) is hereby GRANTED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Reliastar’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 60) is hereby DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Purney’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 45) is hereby DENIED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
The 20 reviewed decisions cover varied litigation but do not establish the distribution of Pro's full caseload.
A historical record
Judge Pro no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.