Larry R. Hicks
Judge Hicks no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Hicks decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Hicks treated foreseeability at a practical level, asking whether negligent specimen handling could foreseeably cause a harmful misdiagnosis rather than requiring proof that the precise later condition was predictable.
“The question is not whether it was foreseeable that Karen’s ingestion of lactulose would cause her IBS, but whether it was foreseeable that Karen would suffer a medical injury arising from her misdiagnosis as a result of LabCorp’s allegedly negligent conduct.”
He found damages plausibly alleged where the beneficiary identified the interest he could have earned outside the insurer's retained-asset account.
“the court finds that Keife has sufficiently alleged damages based on the different rate of interest he could have received from April 2009, when his TCA was opened, through July 2009, when he closed his TCA, from readily available financial markets than the low rate of interest he received from MetLife during that same time.”
He read federal reemployment protections broadly and declined to create an at-will-employee exemption not stated by Congress.
“the court will not infer such an exemption absent clearer language to that effect.”
Procedural preferences
Hicks denied amendment when the proposed federal claim remained legally barred, despite the usual liberal amendment policy.
“Dachtler’s proposed amendment would be futile, and leave to amend will be denied without prejudice.”
He stayed a federal employment action when tribal jurisdiction was colorable and comity required exhaustion first.
“Principles of comity therefore require the court to stay this action while Paddy exhausts his tribal remedies.”
He followed unambiguous statutory text despite evidence that the rule departed from prevailing industry practice.
“Nonetheless, the court must follow the intent of the Legislature as clearly expressed in the statute.”
Cautions
Specific allegations of knowledge and reckless disregard were enough to preserve a public figure's defamation claim at the pleading stage.
“The court finds that these allegations are sufficient to aver that defendants’ acted with malice in making the alleged defamatory statements.”
He rejected an obviousness theory resting on an untested theoretical possibility rather than evidence that an ordinary practitioner would adopt it.
“A person of ordinary skill, who is not an innovator in the field, would not be persuaded to add unopposed estrogen when the published study identifies it as a theoretical possibility that has not yet been tested and offers a different, tested solution in extending the overall regimen.”
He rejected a defamation theory when the plaintiff could not identify anyone responsible for the challenged display.
“Plaintiff has failed to identify any individual, including Defendants, responsible for this poster.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED the defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. # 36) is GRANTED in-part and DENIED in-part. Plaintiffs first cause of action for negligence per se is DISMISSED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Prudential’s Motion to Dismiss (# 5) is GRANTED. Prudential is hereby dismissed as a defendant from this action.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Countermotion to Amend Complaint (# 10) is DENIED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. # 27) and motion to file a sur-reply (Doc. # 50) are DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs motion to supplement (Doc. # 43) is DENIED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. # 15) is DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. # 49) is DENIED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the State of Nevada’s Motion for Summary Judgment (#78) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Office of the State Controller’s Motion for Summary Judgment (#82) is DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the United States’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (#83) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for summary judgment (Doc. # 175) is GRANTED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs motion to exclude (Doc. # 177) is GRANTED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss (# 7) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (# 14) is DENIED without prejudice.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (# 12) is hereby DENIED.”
“IT IF FURTHER ORDERED that Barrick’s Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings (# 37) is hereby DENIED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (# 78) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Hertz’s Motion for Summary Judgment (# 81) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Hertz’s Motion to Strike (# 97) is DENIED as moot.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (# 30) is hereby GRANTED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Renewed Counter-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (# 35) is hereby DENIED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff Visa International Service Association’s Motion for Summary Judgment (# 211) is GRANTED”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Strike and Exclude Report and Testimony of Edward Blair and Renewal of Motion in Limine to Strike and Exclude Report and Testimony of Itamar Simonson (#212) is DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendant’s Reply in Support of Its Motion In Limine or, in the Alternative, for Leave to File a Surreply (# 219) is GRANTED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
The 21 reviewed decisions cover varied litigation but do not establish the distribution of Hicks's full caseload.
A historical record
Judge Hicks no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.