Edward Cornelius Reed Jr.
Judge Reed no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Reed decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Reed treated a state enforcement action seeking penalties and restitution as an exercise of public police power in bankruptcy.
“The bankruptcy court erred in concluding that the Enforcement Action is not a police power action”
He treated work product as a categorical FOIA exemption rather than requiring factual segregation.
“FOIA does not compel that Defendants segregate ‘purely factual’ information”
He allowed pleaded ERISA fiduciary-duty claims to proceed when the alleged duties and omissions were sufficiently identified.
“Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants breached their fiduciary duties under Section 502(a) of ERISA.”
Procedural preferences
Reed denied dismissal under the exhaustion rule that governed when the prisoner filed the complaint.
“Before Woodford, the law in the Ninth Circuit did not allow for a complaint to be dismissed for failure to exhaust if the prison’s grievance deadline had passed.”
He kept a case in Nevada after applying the governing transfer factors.
“the motion (# 22) to transfer this case to the Eastern District of Texas is DENIED.”
He required proper allegations of both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction before reaching the merits.
“Because no proper allegation of subject matter jurisdiction has been made, and because personal jurisdiction has not been properly pleaded”
Cautions
Reed denied trademark summary judgment where the record contained substantial contrary evidence.
“There is also substantial evidence in the record in support of the contrary conclusion.”
Reed concluded that the asserted patent claims were obvious after applying the governing factual framework.
“All of the asserted claims of the '916 patent are obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103.”
Contract claims failed where the complaint did not allege facts supporting the existence of a contract.
“Plaintiffs first and second claims for breach of contract do not survive the present motion to dismiss because Plaintiff does not allege facts sufficient to permit the inference that a contract existed.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“petitioner’s second amended petition for writ of habeas corpus (docket # 77) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.”
“petitioner is denied a certificate of appealability.”
“the bankruptcy court’s Order of September 13, 2010 denying Appellant’s Police Power Exemption Motion is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED”
“Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (# 25) is granted insofar as the motion (# 25) seeks summary judgment on Plaintiffs claims under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973”
“Defendants’ motion to dismiss (# 257) is denied.”
“the motion (# 22) to transfer this case to the Eastern District of Texas is DENIED.”
“Dickie’s motion (# 159) to file a reply brief is DENIED as moot.”
“Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (# 24) is GRANTED”
“Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (# 39) is DENIED.”
“Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (# 8) is DENIED.”
“Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (# 9) is DENIED as moot.”
“Plaintiff's Emergency Motion (# 11) for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of Policy 136 on First Amendment grounds is DENIED”
“Defendants’ motion to dismiss (# 40) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART”
“Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (# 44) is DENIED.”
“Defendant IGT Profit Sharing Committee’s alternative motion for summary judgment (# 46) is DENIED.”
“petitioner’s motion (# 29) for appointment of counsel, his supplemental motion (# 32) for appointment of counsel, and his motion (# 33) ‘for intervention’ all are GRANTED to the extent consistent with the remaining provisions of this order.”
“Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (# 43) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART”
“Defendant IGT’s motion for summary judgment (# 229) on the issue of invalidity is GRANTED.”
“the other pending motions (## 124, 235, 239, 243, 252) dealing with the infringement, validity, or enforceability of the '916 patent are DENIED as moot.”
“IGT’s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Answer, Counterclaims and Third-Party Complaint (# 203) is DENIED.”
“IGT’s Motion (#224) for summary judgment on claims asserted in the proposed Third Amended Counterclaim is therefore DENIED as moot.”
“Monarch’s ‘Motion for Partial Summary Judgment that Monarch has Priority of Use of the “Atlantis” Mark for Casino Services in the United States’ (# 277) is DENIED.”
“Monarch’s ‘Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue that Kerzner Does not Use an Atlantis Mark to Provide Casino Services in Commerce, in the United States, and Thus Has No Standing to Bring this Action’ (#310) is DENIED.”
“Monarch’s ‘Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue that Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants’ [sic] Cannot Prevail On Their Claims Because They Cannot Prove the Essential Elements of Damages, or Entitlement to Injunctive Relief’ (#299) is DENIED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
The 20 reviewed decisions cover varied litigation but do not establish the distribution of Reed's full caseload.
A historical record
Judge Reed no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.