Brian R. Martinotti
How Judge Martinotti decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
At the pleading stage he accepts well-pleaded allegations as true and refuses to weigh the defendant's factual rebuttal: once a plaintiff cures a prior dismissal by adding the missing factual enhancement (here, benchmark fee indices), the question of what the defendant actually owes is for summary judgment, not a 12(b)(6) motion.
“What exactly Deloitte owes, if anything, is a question of fact not properly addressed on a motion to dismiss.”
Procedural preferences
Strictly polices motions for reconsideration: counsel cannot use them to add the robust argument or case citations that could and should have been raised on the original motion. Reconsideration is not 'a second bite at the apple.'
“new arguments cannot serve as a basis for the Court's reconsideration of its prior [Order], nor can Defendants revive [their] previous motion to dismiss with a more detailed argument that was not raised in the first instance.”
Will raise and act on a pleading deficiency sua sponte even when neither party briefed it -- e.g. dismissing counts pleaded as freestanding requests for declaratory or injunctive relief -- but pairs the sua sponte dismissal with leave to amend so the plaintiff can respond.
“Though neither party has raised this pleading deficiency, a district court might, sua sponte, raise the issue of the deficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), so long as the plaintiff is accorded an opportunity to respond.”
Cautions
On a Monell / municipal-liability claim he demands non-conclusory facts identifying the policy, custom, or practice and how it caused the injury; reciting the elements ('long-standing de-facto policy', 'pervasive pattern') without supporting facts gets the claim dismissed.
“Wierzbicki's allegations are completely conclusory and, at best, merely recite the elements necessary to establish a Monell claim. The Complaint is devoid of any facts demonstrating a policy or practice that excessive force, racial bias, or negligent supervision was so pervasive and well settled as to constitute a custom under Monell.”
Construes removal statutes strictly against removal; a state-court defendant invoking the civil-rights removal provision (28 U.S.C. 1443) must show both a federal right framed in terms of racial equality and a state-law bar to enforcing it, or the case is remanded.
“removal statutes are to be strictly construed against removal and all doubts should be resolved in favor of remand.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 4 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 1Denied: 1Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 2 |
Granted: 1Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for reconsideration N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to remand N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons set forth above, and for good cause appearing, Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 89) is DENIED.”
“For the reasons set forth above, and for good cause having been shown, Deloitte's Motion to Dismiss Atlantic Spine's Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 19) is DENIED.”
“For the reasons set forth above, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 24) is GRANTED.”
“For the reasons set forth above, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.”
“Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's Section 1983 and NJCRA claims, breach of contract claim, and request for punitive damages. Defendants' Motion is DENIED as to Plaintiff's 'tort claims.'”
“Because NJCAR's Complaint is dismissed, its Motion for Summary Judgment and Mazda's Motion to Dismiss are DENIED as moot.”
“Mazda's Motion to Dismiss and NJCAR's Motion for Summary Judgment are DENIED as moot.”
“For the reasons set forth above, ARA's Motion to Remand GRANTED. This case is REMANDED to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Special Civil Part, Middlesex County.”