Anne Elise Thompson
Judge Thompson no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Thompson decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Antitrust pleading is judged on ordinary Twombly plausibility, not heightened 'gatekeeper' scrutiny: a Sherman Act Section 2 monopolization claim survives a 12(b)(6) motion where the plaintiff alleges direct evidence of monopoly power (a dominant rival drove the plaintiff from the market through anticompetitive conduct and then raised prices), without needing to formally define the relevant market at the pleading stage.
“these allegations present a plausible claim for Section 2 liability under a theory of direct evidence of monopoly power: MSD deliberately engaged in anticompetitive conduct that gave it the ability to raise prices for certain foot-care products”
Procedural preferences
Construes pro se complaints liberally and will even consider factual allegations raised in a pro se plaintiff's opposition brief; but still enforces Iqbal/Twombly, dismissing where the well-pleaded facts make a non-actionable explanation (here, firing for threatening messages) more plausible than the pled theory. Dismissals of curable pleading defects are paired with leave to file an amended complaint within a set window.
“Ni has failed to allege facts that push his complaint 'over the line from conceivable to plausible.' ... the Court thus finds that Ni has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted and will dismiss Ni's claims”
A motion to strike under Rule 12(f) is disfavored: even technically appropriate strikes are denied absent a showing of prejudice to the moving party. Move to strike an opponent's allegations without articulating prejudice and the motion fails.
“striking is generally disfavored in the absence of prejudice to the adverse party. ... Defendant has neither asserted nor demonstrated any prejudice”
Cautions
On a prisoner Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim at summary judgment, applies Farmer's subjective deliberate-indifference standard strictly: facility-wide violence statistics do not substitute for evidence that the specific defendants actually knew of and disregarded an intolerable risk to this plaintiff, and a negligent failure to notice an ongoing attack is not a constitutional violation. A municipal defendant also needs a Monell policy/custom, not respondeat superior.
“negligence alone is insufficient to prove a violation of the Eighth Amendment. ... Plaintiff has produced no evidence that Defendants have a custom or policy that resulted in deliberate indifference to a pervasive risk of harm to Plaintiff.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“the Court will grant Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count II of the Complaint ... To the extent that Plaintiff can remedy the above deficiencies, she may refile an Amended Complaint within 30 days.”
“Defendant has neither asserted nor demonstrated any prejudice resulting from Plaintiff's allegations of recklessness in its Complaint. Therefore, Defendant's Motion to Strike such allegations will be denied.”
“For the reasons discussed above, Defendant's motion to dismiss will be denied.”
“ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [docket # 30] is GRANTED”
“ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [docket #33] is DENIED”
“Plaintiff has not carried his burden of showing that the Magistrate Judge's ruling was 'clearly erroneous.' ... the Court will affirm the order of the Magistrate Judge.”
“ORDERED that Defendant Rite Aid's Motion to Dismiss [docket # 3] is GRANTED; and it is ORDERED that this matter is CLOSED. ... If Ni wishes to amend and refile his Complaint he must include either the $350.00 filing fee or a complete application to proceed in forma pauperis.”
“ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [131] is DENIED.”
“the Court grants Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and denies Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.”
“Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment will be denied.”
“ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), or in the alternative, for summary judgment, and for a transfer of venue [6] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART”
“ORDERED that this Court shall retain venue.”
“ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default and Extend Time for Service of Summons and Complaint is GRANTED”
“the Court denies Defendant’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions, finding that both parties failed to behave reasonably, resulting in essentially off-setting penalties.”
“ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [73] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART”
“ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motions for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction [docket nos. 89 and 98] are DENIED.”
“Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings under Rule 12(c) will be granted, and the Court will grant judgment in Defendants’ favor on Count II of the Amended Complaint.”
“Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part.”
A historical record
Judge Thompson no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.