Craig L. Wellerson
How Judge Wellerson rules, drawn from 13 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Wellerson
Craig L. Wellerson is a judge of the Superior Court of New Jersey in the Ocean Vicinage and presides over its General Equity Division. He joined the court in February 2001 and became presiding judge of General Equity in April 2025. He earned degrees from Dickinson College and Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
Judge Wellerson's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Wellerson's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge Wellerson decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In insurance-application disputes, he treats questions about objective, verifiable facts (vehicle use, driver ages, passenger-van rentals) strictly: even an innocent misrepresentation on an objective question supports rescission if the insurer shows materiality and detrimental reliance, with no need to prove intent to defraud.
“Even an innocent misrepresentation can constitute equitable fraud justifying rescission... Objective questions call for information within the applicant's knowledge.”
In River Pointe Homeowners Association v. Pulte Homes, Wellerson found that the parent corporation's agreement to assume responsibility for any judgment against its subsidiaries gave the plaintiff the relief sought through veil piercing. He concluded the court could provide no further relief on that theory.
“Once the parent corporation assumes responsibility for any judgment rendered against its subsidiaries, the remedy of corporate veil piercing has been granted to the plaintiff. The Court cannot provide the plaintiff with anything more than the relief offered by the defendants.”
In Blinds To Go, Wellerson held that the option agreement's failure to exclude an existing lease from the property valuation mattered: the agreement could have excluded that encumbrance but did not.
“While Defendant argues that the Lease should not be included in the valuation because the Option Agreement does not refer to the Lease's impact... the Court finds that its absence from the Agreement speaks for itself. The Agreement could have specifically declared that its valuation does not include encumbrances like the Lease, yet it did not.”
Procedural preferences
In Bracken v. Paramount Homes, Wellerson excluded Dr. Pall's causation opinion after finding that the cited publications did not support his theory and that the science was too immature to admit it at trial.
“Dr. Pall's theory of causation falls into the bucket of personal speculation due to its lack of support from peer reviewed publications which the doctor claimed was available to give credence to his opinions... The science is just too immature at the present moment for the causal theory presented by Dr. Pall to be admissible at trial.”
In River Pointe, Wellerson denied Pulte's motion to strike the second amended complaint because he found its allegations were not so prolix, irrelevant, or vexatious as to make the pleading impermissible.
“The Association's Second Amended Complaint (‘SAC’) does not contain such prolix, irrelevant and vexatious allegations as to be impermissible and therefore Defendant Pulte's request to strike the Second Amended Complaint is DENIED.”
In KM Construction, Wellerson found unresolved factual questions about whether the contractor had prosecuted its work at the pace required by the contract.
“Questions of fact remain undecided as to whether the contractor complied with its obligation to prosecute its work, ‘regularly, diligently and uninterruptedly at such rate of progress that will ensure full completion thereof within the time specified.’”
Cautions
In Jenkinson’s South, Wellerson granted insurers summary judgment after finding that COVID-19 caused the business closures and that the policy exclusions barred coverage.
“Here, COVID-19 set in motion the chain of events that caused plaintiffs’ losses as the virus prompted state and municipal orders that required plaintiffs to temporarily close its facilities.”
In MS Services v. Calabria, Wellerson held that the tort counterclaims arose exclusively from the facts underlying a time-barred contract claim and could not be treated as separate claims for limitations purposes.
“The counts sounding in tort derive exclusively from the allegations and facts underlying the breach of contract claim, and thus should not be considered separate claims for statute of limitation purposes.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Accordingly, this Court grants the motion of the Pulte defendants to amend its answer and terminates the obligation of those defendants to produce corporate financial records, employee records, and disclosures previously required by this Court to consider the equities of piercing the corporate veil protecting the Pulte defendants.”
“Once the parent corporation assumes responsibility for any judgment rendered against its subsidiaries, the remedy of corporate veil piercing has been granted to the plaintiff... this Court declares that with the filing of PulteGroup, Inc.'s Second Amended Answer accepting liability for judgments of its subsidiaries, the plaintiff has no right to obtain the veil piercing discovery it seeks.”
“For all the aforementioned reasons, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED and the Plaintiff's motion to enforce the Option Agreement is GRANTED.”
“A contract of sale for the established price shall be executed by the parties within sixty days of this decision. Transfer of fee simple title to the Plaintiff shall occur on or before April 3, 2026.”
“As set forth by the explanation above, the Court is compelled and constrained to grant the Defendant's motion for summary judgment and further dismisses the Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice.”
“For that reason, the pending motion and cross-motion to bar testimony are hereby denied as moot.”
“The Association's Second Amended Complaint (‘SAC’) does not contain such prolix, irrelevant and vexatious allegations as to be impermissible and therefore Defendant Pulte's request to strike the Second Amended Complaint is DENIED.”
“The Association has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Del Webb Corporation and Pulte Home Corporation. The motion to have Defendants dismissed with prejudice is DENIED.”
“The Association's ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil’ allegations are premature and dismissed without prejudice, GRANTED.”
“The motion to dismiss Counts 4, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 14 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is DENIED.”
“Therefore, this Court finds that the appropriate remedy here is to grant Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment seeking recission of the Fitchburg Mutual Insurance Company policy and deny Defendant's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment.”
“Accordingly, defendant's motion in limine barring the opinions of the plaintiff's expert Kenneth Schier is granted.”
“Additionally, Defendant's motion dismissing the plaintiff's complaint is granted as the plaintiffs cannot produce expert testimony indicating the defendant deviated from the accepted standard of architectural practice.”
“Under these circumstances, the court finds that recission of the insurance policy issued by U.S. Fire is the appropriate remedy... Therefore, the Motion for Summary Judgment seeking recission of the U.S. Fire Insurance policy is Granted.”
“The failure to produce any evidence that may convince a reasonable jury that the plaintiff's exposure to toxic chemicals caused T.R. to develop biliary atresia compels the court to grant the defendant's motion to bar plaintiff's expert on causation, Dr. Harpreet Pall, M.D.”
“For the reasons set forth herein, the court DENIES the Defendants' Motions.”
“The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment to bar its obligation to pay liquidated damages to the JTMUA is denied without prejudice. The plaintiff may renew its application upon the determination of the fact finder regarding the alleged breach of contract.”
“Therefore, Christopher Graham's opinions regarding JCP&L's liability for the cause of the fire, constitute net opinions.”
“Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED.”
“After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Defendants, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are not 'entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.' R.4:46-2. The Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.”
“In that light, the R.4:46-2 Cross Motion for Summary Judgment by the Pascarella Defendants is granted. The complaint against them is dismissed... plaintiffs' claims against the Pascarella Defendants are dismissed with prejudice.”
“As a result of the facts outlined above, the R.4:46-2 Motion by Plaintiffs for Summary Judgment against Mr. Deiner personally, is granted.”
“The court denies plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and grants defendants' cross-motions for summary judgment.”
“For the reasons expressed above, this court finds that the defendants are entitled to Summary Judgment and plaintiffs' claims are dismissed with prejudice.”
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