Chad N. Cagan
How Judge Cagan rules, drawn from 5 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Cagan
Chad N. Cagan is a judge of the Superior Court of New Jersey in the Monmouth Vicinage. He joined the bench in July 2019 and has served as the vicinage's designated Complex Business Litigation Program judge since July 2024.
Judge Cagan's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Cagan's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge Cagan decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Ranga Bhoomi v. Sequoia Training, Cagan found after a bench trial that the disputed transfer was not a loan. The plaintiff's principal had called it an investment in a contemporaneous email and told the recipient she owed him nothing; the court denied the breach-of-contract claim.
“In an email dated October 24, 2018 Parmar wrote to Sartison in part, ‘...About the investment you received in Ranga Bhoomi LLC, which is now frozen by the govt... You do not owe me anything. I will never ask for anything from you.’”
In the Ranga Bhoomi bench trial, Cagan rejected Parmar's testimony after comparing it with the documents and other evidence in the record.
“The court finds Parmar to be an incredible witness.”
In Borowsky v. U-Haul, Cagan declined to exclude the defense expert's slip-resistance opinion. He found that both experts performed the same coefficient-of-friction testing and left their competing conclusions for the jury.
“[W]hat's very, very clear [in the report] . . . is that the defendant['s] expert[] performed the same scientific testing as the plaintiff['s] expert[] did[;] the coefficient of friction.”
Procedural preferences
In Tag Realty v. Firestone, Cagan reduced a Consumer Fraud Act fee request to $250,000. He considered the common facts across claims but found the request excessive given the plaintiff’s limited success and billing for co-plaintiffs whose claims had been dismissed.
“the court finds plaintiff's request for attorney's fees and costs in the total sum of $840,799.88 is unreasonable, excessive and should be reduced for several reasons.”
In Werksman, Cagan permitted questions about the mayor's prior public works employment but restricted questions about his mayoral role and a 2023 grant application. The appellate court allowed additional questions about the factual basis for statements in that application.
“We discern no error in the trial court's limitation of the deposition, with one exception.”
In State v. Walker, Cagan rejected a petition seeking to reduce restitution. He found the petition untimely, found no factual support for excusable neglect, and held that the requested relief did not fall within the grounds for post-conviction relief.
“The court held the PCR petition was untimely under Rule 3:22-12(a)(1)(A) and defendant's claim of ‘excusable neglect’ was unsupported by the facts presented, but even if defendant's factual assertions were true, there was no reasonable probability enforcement of the time bar would result in a fundamental injustice.”
Cautions
In Tag Realty v. Firestone, Cagan rejected a proposed judgment that would have shifted a settling co-defendant’s share of fault onto Firestone. He found the plaintiff’s requested calculation would create double recovery for the same injury.
“the court rejects plaintiff's request to impute AIA's 42% apportionment of liability to Firestone, even if the argument were not abandoned by plaintiff, as such an outcome would result in an impermissible double recovery for the same injury caused by the same tort feasor.”
In Walker, Cagan denied a petition seeking to reduce restitution for victims who had not been located. He found the petition untimely and outside the grounds for post-conviction relief.
“Judge Cagan then noted defendant agreed at oral argument his sentence was not illegal”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“the court finds a reasonable attorney's fee and costs award is $250,000. This amount represents approximately 469.92% of $53,200, almost 5x the amount of ascertainable losses awarded by the jury.”
“the court finds plaintiff's request for total damages against defendant in the amount of $1,865,844.96 to be excessive and unreasonable.”
“By order filed November 1, 2024, the court granted in part defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed with prejudice plaintiffs' claims for aiding and abetting, civil conspiracy and RICO violations.”
“On March 4, 2025, the court granted defendant's motion to involuntarily dismiss plaintiff's claim for negligence pursuant to R. 4:37-2.”
“By order filed March, 7, 2025 the court denied Firestone's motion for judgment pursuant to R. 4:40-1.”
“By order dated June 6, 2025 the court granted defendant's motion and directed plaintiff to produce an unredacted version of the release and settlement agreement to defendant and the court by June 9, 2025.”
“Plaintiff's request for judgment under count one of the first amended complaint alleging unjust enrichment is DENIED with prejudice.”
“Plaintiff's request for judgment under count two of the first amended complaint alleging common law fraud is DENIED with prejudice.”
“Plaintiff's request for judgment under count three of the first amended complaint alleging breach of contract is DENIED with prejudice.”
“Plaintiff's request for judgment under count four of the first amended complaint alleging conversion is DENIED with prejudice.”
“Plaintiff's request for judgment under count five of the first amended complaint alleging promissory estoppel is DENIED with prejudice.”
“[I am] satisfied . . . under the particular circumstances here that this is not a net opinion . . . [and] that this expert report in fact provides the why and wherefore for the conclusions that were reached.”
“The parties hotly dispute the underlying issue as to whether or not the bay area, the cargo bay area of this U-Haul was defectively designed, and the defense expert says [it was] not defectively designed. The plaintiffs' expert says [it was] defectively designed.”
“the court found plaintiff's request for the video unduly burdensome in both labor and cost, particularly given the lack of demonstrated relevance.”
“plaintiff has already deposed several [City] employees with knowledge of the maintenance of the boardwalk including . . . Bianchini, the head of the DPW at the time of plaintiff's alleged slip and fall in 2021. As such, . . . Moor's deposition testimony would be unnecessarily duplicative.”
“After hearing oral argument, Judge Chad N. Cagan authored a thorough nineteen-page written opinion denying defendant's PCR.”
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