Steven James McAuliffe

United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire Appointed by George H.W. Bush (Republican) 18 signed orders read

How Judge McAuliffe decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In discrimination cases he applies the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework strictly in sequence -- a plaintiff who skips straight to arguing pretext without first making a developed prima facie showing gets no benefit of the doubt, even where the underlying facts might arguably support one.

“Russo omits the elements of a prima facie case and moves directly to evidence of pretext. ... In the absence of showing material facts to support the elements of a prima facie case, however, Russo has not carried her burden of establishing a triable issue of an unlawful discriminatory practice based on the burden-shifting framework.”

On requests for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. section 1292(b), he distinguishes sharply between a genuinely unsettled question of law and a party's disagreement with how settled law applies to its facts -- only the former qualifies, and he treats the mechanism as reserved for truly exceptional cases.

“Accordingly, defendant's request is properly characterized as a challenge to the court's application of Bestfoods and its progeny to the facts of this particular case. Such a challenge is not appropriate for interlocutory review because defendant has not sufficiently established a 'substantial ground for difference of opinion'”

Procedural preferences

He treats a motion for reconsideration as a narrow, backward-looking remedy -- it cannot be used to raise arguments, theories, or evidence a party could have (but did not) present the first time around, no matter how the motion is framed.

“A motion for reconsideration is not a means for a losing party 'to undo its own procedural failures, and it certainly does not allow a party to introduce new evidence or advance arguments that could and should have been presented to the district court prior to the judgment.'”

Even where a self-represented litigant's conduct is plainly non-compliant, he documents a lengthy record of specific warnings, extensions, and a show-cause opportunity before granting an involuntary dismissal with prejudice -- the sanction of last resort follows a clearly built record, not a snap judgment.

“Melendez has demonstrated a pattern of noncompliance, neglect, and intentional disregard for both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and court orders. He has repeatedly ignored court directives and deadlines and, critically, he has failed to meaningfully participate in any aspect of the discovery process.”

Cautions

He is willing to raise subject-matter jurisdiction on his own even where neither party has challenged it, and to hold a case at the pleading stage rather than rule on the party's own (often mislabeled) motion until jurisdiction is properly established.

“Federal courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even when, as here, no party challenges it.”

Before dismissing a case for apparent abandonment or failure to prosecute -- especially with prejudice -- he gives the plaintiff one final, explicit chance to respond rather than dismissing on the existing record alone.

“Dismissal, particularly with prejudice, is a strong remedy, however, and plaintiff's circumstances, as pled, are such that the matter ought to be clear ... plaintiff shall show cause on or before December 16, 2012, why this case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Fitzgerald v. Red Roof Inn, Inc.
11-cv-339-SM · 2012-11-29

The docket text records the underlying motion to dismiss as 'granted, in part,' but the order itself is a deferred procedural ruling: the court found the record suggested the plaintiff had abandoned her claims but held that dismissal, especially with prejudice, was too serious a step without first giving her a final chance to respond, ordering her to show cause within roughly two weeks why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute.

Raitport v. Harbour Capital Corporation
09-cv-156-SM · 2010-03-04
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Denied

“The motion to dismiss (document no. 10) is denied.”

Gallant v. Gallant
11-cv-600-SM · 2013-04-22
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“Defendants, on the other hand, have demonstrated that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and, given the undisputed material facts, they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law”

Bryant v. Liberty Mutual Group, Inc.
11-cv-217-SM · 2013-10-24
Motion for sanctions (defendant) Denied

“Defendant's Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions (document no. 73) is denied.”

De Leon v. Radisson Hotels International, Inc.
13-cv-218-SM · 2014-06-23
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“Harbour Plaza's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (document no. 14) is, therefore, granted.”

Sig Sauer, Inc. v. Freed Designs, Inc.
14-cv-461-SM · 2017-03-09
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Denied

“the patentee's motion for partial summary judgment with respect to literal infringement (document no. 63) is hereby denied.”

Kinetic Systems, Inc. v. IPS-Integrated Project Services, LLC
20-cv-1125-SM · 2024-09-03
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“IPS's motion for summary judgment (document no. 98) is granted. The quantum meruit claim is dismissed.”

Fellers, et al. v. Kelley, et al.
24-cv-311-SM-AJ · 2024-11-13
Motion for leave to amend (plaintiff) Granted

“the court grants plaintiffs' motion to file a second amended complaint (doc. no. 48), and plaintiffs shall file the second amended complaint (doc. no. 48-1) as a separate document within three days from the date of this order.”

Motion for bench trial (plaintiff) Denied

“The court denies plaintiffs' expedited motion to hold a bench trial on the merits (document no. 49).”

Motion for judicial notice (defendant) Denied

“The court denies defendants' motion to take judicial notice of facts found in Tirrell v. Edelblut (document no. 39).”

Russo v. New Hampshire Neurospine Institute, P.A. and Uri M. Ahn
21-cv-703-SM-TSM · 2024-11-15
Motions to strike (defendant) Denied

“the Institute's motion to strike (document no. 56) is denied.”

Russo v. New Hampshire Neurospine Institute, P.A. and Uri M. Ahn
21-cv-703-SM-TSM · 2024-11-22
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“Dr. Ahn's motion for summary judgment (doc. no. 42) is granted. The claims against Dr. Ahn in Counts II, III, and V are dismissed.”

Russo v. New Hampshire Neurospine Institute, P.A. and Uri M. Ahn
21-cv-703-SM-TSM · 2025-02-24
Motion for reconsideration (plaintiff) Denied

“For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration (doc. no. 78).”

Russo v. New Hampshire Neurospine Institute, P.A. and Uri M. Ahn
21-cv-703-SM-TSM · 2025-04-24
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“the Institute's motion for summary judgment (doc. no. 82) is granted.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

The sampled window shows a docket mixing prisoner Section 1983 and pro se civil-rights suits (several ending in early 1915A/1915(e) screening dismissals), a substantial share of cases that resolve by negotiated settlement or stipulated dismissal well before any dispositive motion is briefed, and a smaller share of contested commercial and constitutional litigation (a federal Telecommunications Act tower-siting suit, an FLSA collective action resolved by consent decree).

Put Judge McAuliffe's record to work

Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge McAuliffe actually rules, not a generic AI guess.

Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge McAuliffe's own signed orders and cites them.