Landya Marie Boyer McCafferty
How Judge McCafferty decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On Title IX and gender-identity discrimination, she found the state's attempt to distinguish Title IX's 'on the basis of sex' language from Title VII's 'because of sex' language (at issue in Bostock) unpersuasive, extending Bostock's reasoning to hold a categorical ban on transgender girls playing girls' sports likely violates Title IX.
“The court fails to see any meaningful difference between these two phrases and the State has not articulated any.”
In a consumer-protection RESPA dispute, she found persuasive a line of cases holding that a servicer cannot indefinitely delay a homeowner's standing to sue simply by withholding a formal 'confirmation' letter, reasoning that a stricter rule would let servicers control the timing of their own liability.
“Were SPS correct about its interpretation of the word "confirmed" in the regulation, servicers could avoid liability under RESPA by willfully refusing to consider a plaintiff's ownership interest despite clear and uncontradicted evidence thereof.”
Procedural preferences
On emergency motions, she expects genuine urgency: a plaintiff who assents to a multi-week delay before a preliminary-injunction hearing, and only reveals his real return date at the hearing itself, undermines his own claim of imminent irreparable harm.
“Doe's own delay in asserting to the court that he in fact hopes to return to school on April 11 suggests that he will not actually suffer irreparable harm if he is not allowed to return by that date.”
In discrimination cases against municipalities, she treats a defendant's inconsistent or evolving justifications for its enforcement decisions, and unclear instructions on how to cure an alleged violation, as circumstantial evidence supporting an inference of discriminatory intent at the pleading stage.
“the City "moved the goalposts" ... as to what was required for plaintiffs to cure the purported violations ... it is reasonable to infer that the City's lack of clear instructions to cure, and subsequent goalpost-moving, are both evidence that the City's scrutiny and enforcement were motivated, at least in part, by a discriminatory purpose.”
Cautions
On a motion to dismiss, she will not consider fact-intensive affidavits submitted by either side, and will not convert the motion to one for summary judgment sua sponte -- parties who want the court to look past the pleadings need a properly supported Rule 56 motion, not exhibits attached to a 12(b)(6) brief.
“The court declines to consider the affidavits and exhibits at this stage of the litigation ... The court also declines to convert this motion into one for summary judgment, as a properly supported motion under Rule 56 would provide the court with concise statements and record citations as to genuine factual issues in material dispute.”
She is willing to enjoin a state agency's Medicaid recoupment and debt-reallocation efforts against a hospital pending a full merits determination, signaling that a state's due-process and statutory obligations under the Medicaid Act carry real weight even against a large, contested overpayment claim.
“The Commissioner of the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services is hereby enjoined from recouping alleged DSH overpayments from plaintiff pending the resolution of this action on the merits.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the foregoing reasons, the court denies Doe's motion for a preliminary injunction (doc. no. 3).”
“SPS's motion for summary judgment (doc. no. 24) is granted in part and denied in part as set forth herein.”
“Feoli and Inception's motion to dismiss (doc. no. 31) is granted as to Count 10 (IIED) and denied as to Count 8 (defamation).”
“Moving defendants' partial motion to dismiss (doc. no. 7) is granted in part and denied without prejudice in part as follows...”
“the City's motion to dismiss (doc. no. 8) is hereby granted in part and denied in part. The motion is granted as to Count III for IIED, and denied as to Counts I & II for discrimination under the FHAA and the ADA.”
“At the conclusion of the hearing the court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction (doc. no. 16).”
“The Commissioner's motion to dismiss (doc. no. 19) is granted as to Counts I and III but denied as to Counts II and IV.”
“Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction (doc. no. 2) is granted as follows...”
“The defendants' motion for summary judgment (doc. 79) is granted.”
“Doe's cross motion for summary judgment (doc. 81) is denied.”
“Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction (doc. no. 7) is granted.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
The sampled windows show a docket typical of a generalist district judge: Social Security disability appeals, prisoner and post-conviction habeas petitions, foreclosure and consumer-finance removals, employment and civil-rights suits, plus (from 2018 on) a large share of a nationwide hernia-mesh products-liability multidistrict litigation centered in this district.
Put Judge McCafferty's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge McCafferty actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge McCafferty's own signed orders and cites them.