Joseph F. Bataillon

United States District Court for the District of Nebraska Appointed by Bill Clinton (Democratic) 5 signed orders read

How Judge Bataillon decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

He enforces the in-forma-pauperis service rule strongly: an IFP/pro se litigant who timely delivers completed summons forms to the clerk is entitled to rely on the court's officers and the U.S. Marshals to effect service under 28 U.S.C. 1915(d), and will NOT be penalized for the Marshals' late service. If you represent an IFP plaintiff, get the summons forms in on time and the defendant's late-service dismissal argument fails.

“In forma pauperis litigants are entitled to rely on the court’s officers and the Unites States Marshals to effect proper service, and should not be penalized where such failure is through no fault of the litigant.”

On a habeas petition with a mixed (exhausted + unexhausted) claim he will use Rhines stay-and-abeyance rather than dismiss, where the petitioner shows good cause, a non-frivolous claim, and no abusive delay. A well-documented showing that prior counsel failed to preserve or pursue the claim supplies that 'good cause'.

“the court finds good cause exists for failure to exhaust this claim ... the court will grant Allee’s motion for a stay to complete the exhaustion process”

Procedural preferences

In Sec. 1983 trials he is a strict Daubert/Rule 702 gatekeeper and will not let a police-practices expert opine on the ultimate legal question of Fourth Amendment 'reasonableness', nor let internal-policy violations stand in for a constitutional violation. Frame police-misconduct proof around the constitutional standard and the facts, not around an expert's legal conclusions or SOP breaches.

“the court should not allow an expert to testify as to legal conclusions, and in particular, should not allow an expert to testify as to the reasonableness of officer conduct under the Fourth Amendment.”

Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity bars official-capacity damages claims against state employees; he treats an official-capacity suit as a suit against the State itself and dismisses the damages claim while letting the individual-capacity claim proceed. Against a state-employee defendant, plead individual capacity and seek the right relief.

“damages claims against individual state employees acting in their official capacities are also barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”

Cautions

He holds pro se litigants to the same procedural rules as lawyers and will dismiss for failure to prosecute after clear warnings: ignoring discovery orders and ordered conferences leads to adoption of a magistrate's dismissal recommendation, mooting even a pending summary-judgment motion. Comply with case-management orders or risk dismissal with prejudice.

“A pro se litigant is bound by the litigation rules as is a lawyer, particularly here with the fulfilling of simple requirements of discovery.”

Motion outcomes

Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.

Motion in limine
N = 3
Granted: 1Granted in part: 1Moot / procedural: 1 counts only
Motions to dismiss
N = 2
Granted: 1Granted in part: 1 counts only
Motions to stay
N = 2
Granted: 1Moot / procedural: 1 counts only
Summary judgment
N = 1
Moot / procedural: 1 counts only
Motion to quash
N = 1
Granted: 1 counts only
Motion to reconsider
N = 1
Denied: 1 counts only
Objection to report recommendation
N = 1
Denied: 1 counts only

A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Clinton Brooks Jr. v. Dave Bell
4:07-cv-03226-JFB-PRSE · 2008-08-18
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (filing no. 13) is granted. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Bell in his official capacity are dismissed.”

Motions to stay (defendant) Moot / procedural

“Defendant’s Motion to Stay (filing no. 15) is denied as moot.”

Steven R. Blair v. Nebraska Department of Correctional Services, et al.
8:07-cv-00307-JFB-PRSE · 2009-12-07
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted in part

“Defendants ... Motion to Dismiss (filing no. 59) is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff’s Objection to the Motion to Dismiss (filing no. 64) is granted.”

Motion to quash (defendant) Granted

“Defendants Robertus and Finegan’s Motion to Quash (filing no. 36) is granted.”

Motion to reconsider (plaintiff) Denied

“Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter or Amend (filing no. 31) is denied.”

Steven R. Blair v. Randy Anderson, et al.
8:07-cv-00295-JFB-TDT · 2011-03-04
Motion in limine (defendant) Granted

“Defendants’ motion in limine, Filing No. 354, is granted as set forth herein.”

Motion in limine (plaintiff) Moot / procedural

“Plaintiff’s motion in limine, Filing No. 360, is denied as moot as set forth herein.”

Motion in limine (defendant) Granted in part

“Defendants’ motion in limine, Filing No. 371, is granted in part and denied in part as set forth herein.”

Justin J. Allee v. Nebraska Attorney General, et al.
8:05-cv-00229-JFB-TDT · 2007-08-13
Motions to stay (petitioner) Granted

“Allee’s motion to stay, Filing No. 25, is granted. The writ of habeas corpus is stayed.”

Violet Goodwin v. Timothy Dunning and Burmeister
8:16-cv-00458-JFB-SMB · 2018-03-12
Objection to report recommendation (plaintiff) Denied

“Plaintiff’s objection, Filing No. 42, is denied;”

Summary judgment (plaintiff) Moot / procedural

“The motion for summary judgment, Filing No. 44, is denied as moot;”