Cheryl Renae Zwart

Zwart enforces standard-form arbitration clauses against commercial purchasers on a contract-formation theory: the seller's pre-season terms-and-conditions sheet plus the clause printed on the product (and incorporated by the invoice) form the contract, and a buyer is bound even if he did not read or sign it. Counsel resisting arbitration before her needs RECORD EVIDENCE that a particular plaintiff/assignor was NOT party to the purchase contract -- she split the Wojtalewicz claims on exactly that evidentiary line, compelling the named purchaser's claims while ordering limited discovery on the assignors'.

“But as to Kendra Wojtalewicz' claim and the claims assigned ... the court found no evidence of record explaining how these parties could be bound by an arbitration clause in a contract to purchase Pioneer seed corn ... The court permitted the parties to engage in limited discovery on this issue.”

On FIRREA venue, Zwart follows the line of authority reading 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(6)(A)'s parenthetical ('or continue an action commenced before the appointment of a receiver') as an ELABORATION of, not an exception to, the venue limitation -- so even a pre-receivership case must be transferred to D.C. or the federal court where the failed institution's principal place of business sits. A plaintiff opposing FDIC transfer on 'injustice'/dismissal grounds is answered that the question is venue, not subject-matter jurisdiction.

“the parenthetical was intended to elaborate on the venue restriction within the statute, and was not to be read as an except[ion]”