Richard Lesley Voorhees
How Judge Voorhees rules, drawn from 25 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Voorhees decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Statesville Roofing, Voorhees treated industry practice and commercial risk allocation as evidence that a standard payment clause did not make owner payment a condition precedent.
“small subcontractors, who must have payment for their work in order to remain in business, will not ordinarily assume the risk of the owner’s failure to pay the general contractor.”
Procedural preferences
In Cohn, Voorhees applied statutory antitrust immunity by focusing on official capacity and authority rather than alleged motive.
“The LGAA makes no provision for consideration of a defendant’s motives, and an allegation that an act was done pursuant to a conspiracy is akin to an allegation that it was done in bad faith or with malice.”
Cautions
In the forest-salvage injunction dispute, Voorhees required concrete evidence of environmental impact rather than an asserted possibility.
“Plaintiffs have offered no evidence as to what the possible impact upon it may be, nor have they even argued that there will be an impact at all; they merely assert that they have raised substantial questions.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Summary judgment for plaintiff is, therefore, appropriate.”
“Defendant’s renewed motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED and this case is hereby DISMISSED in its entirety;”
“the decision of the Bankruptcy Court is hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications:”
“The motion of Defendant-Intervenor, United States of America, for partial summary judgment is DENIED;”
“The motion of Plaintiff, Aetna Casualty and Surety Insurance Company, for partial summary judgment is ALLOWED;”
“The Court will allow Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R. Civ.P. 12(b)(6).”
“Plaintiff’s motions for a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction and partial summary judgment will be dismissed for mootness.”
“the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment is ALLOWED”
“the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED;”
“Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine and to Compel is MOOT and is hereby DISMISSED.”
“defendants’ Motion for Joinder of a Necessary Party will be DENIED.”
“defendants’ Motion is GRANTED, as to the specifics listed therein.”
“plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is DENIED.”
“Respondents’ motion for Joel J. Reinfeld to be their court-appointed counsel is DENIED;”
“Respondents’ motion to compel discovery is DENIED;”
“Respondents’ request for a jury trial on the criminal contempt charge is DENIED;”
“Petitioner’s motion for enlargement of time, filed on November 21, 1988, is rendered MOOT by this Order;”
“Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint, filed on July 14, 1988, is ALLOWED;”
“Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint, filed on November 8, 1988, is ALLOWED;”
“Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint filed on September 28, 1988, is DENIED;”
“Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on factual issues filed on September 28, 1988, is DENIED;”
“Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on statutory immunity filed on September 28, 1988, is DENIED;”
“Plaintiff’s motion for extension of time to respond to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment is rendered MOOT by this Order;”
“Plaintiff’s motion to extend discovery filed July 14, 1988, is rendered MOOT by this Order;”
“Plaintiff’s motion to compel Defendants to answer questions regarding Defendants’ denial of Plaintiff’s application for staff privileges filed on July 14, 1988, is DENIED;”
“Plaintiff’s motion to compel more complete answers from Defendant A.L. Kilby filed on August 30, 1988, is DENIED;”
“Plaintiff’s motion to compel Wilkes General Hospital to produce documents filed August 30, 1988, is DENIED;”
“Plaintiff’s motion to compel Wilkes General Hospital to name an appropriate individual as a Fed.R. Civ.P. 30(b)(6) witness filed on October 14, 1988, is DENIED;”
“Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions filed on October 14, 1988, is DENIED;”
“Defendants’ motion to compel Plaintiff to answer certain questions filed July 20, 1988, is DENIED;”
“Defendants’ motion to compel discovery filed October 19,1988, is DENIED;”
“Defendants’ request for a stay and protective order filed on September 29, 1988, is DENIED.”
“the Defendant’s motion to arrest judgment is DENIED and the Court’s Judgment of Acquittal filed August 9, 1990, stands.”
“Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of this Court’s Order of June 29, 1990, is hereby DENIED;”
“Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is hereby ALLOWED on all claims pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2 and such are DISMISSED on the merits;”
“the Defendants’ motion to preclude thirty-six witnesses from testifying at trial is moot.”
After a bench trial, Voorhees found that the claimant had not proved sex discrimination and dismissed the Title VII claims on the merits: “The Court further concludes that Ms. Peterson was not wrongfully discharged by the Defendant on the basis of her sex and, thus, there has been no violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1984.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
The fixed five-docket sample included antitrust, asbestos, and prisoner-coded matters, plus one uncategorized case. All five cases were terminated, but none had an electronic entry stream, so only case durations and administrative closing categories could be summarized.
Draft for Judge Voorhees with the record in hand
Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge Voorhees, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.
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