Thomas D. Schroeder
How Judge Schroeder decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In an ERISA excessive-fee case, the judge treats industry comparator plans as a 'meaningful benchmark' sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss even when the defendant shows one of the plaintiff's own supporting fee figures was miscalculated, so long as other unchallenged comparators remain in the complaint.
“As Old Dominion has not challenged four of Plaintiffs’ alleged benchmarks (see Doc. 1 ¶ 99), it has not demonstrated that it is entitled to dismissal of Plaintiffs’ recordkeeping fee claim.”
Procedural preferences
The judge declines to take judicial notice of exhibits a defendant submits with a motion to dismiss unless they are referenced in or incorporated by the complaint itself or independently a matter of public record (like a Form 5500 filing), even while noting concern about plaintiffs avoiding inconvenient documents by simply not citing them.
“The court declines, however, to take judicial notice of Old Dominion's other exhibits, which are "Rule 408(b)(2) disclosures" ... Old Dominion has not shown that these are public records or referenced in the complaint.”
Even when dismissing a pro se plaintiff's entire case, the judge takes care to point the litigant toward whatever forum might actually offer relief, rather than simply closing the case.
“In light of Woods's assertions in his briefing that some ongoing delay continues to exist, the court would be remiss not to advise Woods that, if true, his remedy, if any, lies with the North Carolina state courts.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 90) be granted and that summary judgment be entered against Plaintiff on the claim ... for denial of access to courts for failing to provide adequate legal services”
“IT IS ORDERED that Old Dominion's motion to dismiss (Doc. 13) is DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Durham County Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (Doc. 11) is GRANTED, and Woods’s individual and official capacity claims against Defendants Cveticanin and Edmonds are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8) is DENIED.”
“that Defendant Lynch's motion entitled "Defendant Jeffrey Lee Lynch's Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint" (Doc. 41) is DENIED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9) is GRANTED.”
“Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Portions of Declaration of Constance C. Lowenstein under FRCP 37(c)(1) (Doc. 59) are DENIED AS MOOT.”
“that Plaintiff's Motion to Reverse the Decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (Doc. 8) is DENIED”
“that Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 10) is GRANTED, and that this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11) is DENIED because it relies on evidence outside the pleadings, but such denial is without prejudice to further consideration on a future motion for summary judgment”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 33) is DENIED.”
“The motion to dismiss by SunTrust Mortgage, Inc., SunTrust Banks, Inc., SunTrust Bank, and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (Doc. 14) is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs' claims as to these Defendants are DISMISSED with prejudice”
“The motion for summary judgment by April E. Stephenson, P.A. and Manly Andrew (Doc. 32) is GRANTED;”
“Plaintiffs' "Petition for Motion of Preliminary Injunction and Stay of Possession Prohibiting Seizure of Plaintiffs' Property" (Doc. 47), motion for "Replevin in Detinent" (Doc. 48), and "Motion for Issuance of Cease and Desist Order for the Replevin in Detinent" (Doc. 56) are DENIED as moot”
“Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint (Doc. 61) is DENIED.”
“IT IS ORDERED that Cole's motion for conditional certification (Doc. 23) is GRANTED IN PART, and a FLSA collective is certified as follows”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendants A. Aldridge, III, D.B. Evans, and O.C. Harrington (Doc. 31) is GRANTED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Sampled cases span prisoner habeas and civil-rights suits, employment discrimination removed from state court, and product-liability class litigation. Most of this court's docket entries are stub descriptions listing only the filer, document type, and date, without attached order text, so the sample does not support a grounded dispositive-motion timeline. In McClary v. Covance, for example, the docket shows discovery motions and a protective order before a reported mediated settlement, but no dispositive ruling with quotable text.
Put Judge Schroeder's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Schroeder actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Schroeder's own signed orders and cites them.