Loretta Copeland Biggs
How Judge Biggs rules, drawn from 30 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Biggs
Loretta Copeland Biggs is a judge of the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. Appointed by President Barack Obama, Judge Biggs received a commission on December 19, 2014. Judge Biggs assumed senior status on December 31, 2024.
Judge Biggs's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Biggs's own (checked October 9, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026).
- Standing Order 10 — Issuance of Subpoenas to Pro Se Litigants ↗
- Standing Order 17 — Sealing of Medical Records Related to Compassionate Release Motions ↗
- Amended Standing Order 18 — Highly Sensitive Documents ↗
- Standing Order 20 — Criminal Case Management ↗
- Standing Order 32 — Criminal Cover Sheet ↗
- Standing Order 40 — Clerk Authority to Grant Certain Motions and Judgments ↗
- Amended Standing Order 41 — Sealed Documents ↗
How Judge Biggs decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In an employment-discrimination case, the judge discounted a plaintiff's own self-serving declaration, offered without corroborating record citations, as insufficient standing alone to defeat summary judgment.
“Such self-serving declarations have little to no value when considering a motion for summary judgment.”
In a civil-forfeiture case, the judge treated a claimant's willful blindness to a co-owner's obvious drug-trafficking activity as defeating an innocent-owner defense, rather than shielding the claimant from forfeiture.
“Claimant Coleman cannot claim willful blindness to escape forfeiture, as other courts within this circuit have found.”
Procedural preferences
In Mathis v. Caswell County Schools Board of Education, Biggs granted some sealing relief but rejected the defendants’ request to seal every exhibit containing nonparty information. She ordered public redacted copies that protected nonparty identities while preserving access to the exhibits.
“This solution is overly broad and cannot be granted consistent with the First Amendment right to public access. Rather, the parties will be instructed to file unsealed, redacted copies of their exhibits with any information that could be used to identify non-parties redacted.”
On a renewed motion to intervene by state legislative leaders, the judge held that mere strategic disagreement with the existing state defendants' litigation choices does not overcome the presumption that those defendants adequately represent the state's interest.
“Proposed Intervenors have offered no real evidence to the contrary ... it is clear to this Court that, at present, the State Board and Attorney General are meeting its duty to defend this action.”
Facing a nearly identical complaint to one the Fourth Circuit had already found jurisdictionally deficient, the judge raised subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte on a post-judgment motion rather than reach the merits, underscoring that a jurisdictional defect must be resolved before anything else.
“As the Court has found that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action, the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend or Alter Judgment.”
In a tax-refund suit after appellate remand, the judge rejected a renewed jurisdictional challenge based on arguments the appeals court had already resolved. The government showed no new evidence or change in controlling law that would reopen the question.
“The Government’s arguments also have not triggered the second exception—when controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of law applicable to the relevant issue.”
When title-loan defendants requested more time to address arbitration without formally moving for an extension, the judge resolved the motion on the existing briefs and compelled arbitration under the written agreements.
“Therefore, the Court will not allow Defendants additional time to respond to the merits of Plaintiffs’ Motion and the Court will consider any arguments Defendants made in their Response brief in deciding Plaintiffs’ Motion.”
On a venue transfer request in a multistate antitrust suit, the judge required concrete evidence that another forum would ease litigation; the defendant’s location and related litigation elsewhere did not by themselves justify shifting the burden to the plaintiffs.
“RealPage has not provided sufficient factual evidence to show they will suffer more than inconvenience by litigating in this District”
Cautions
In Clayton v. Wells, Biggs ordered two self-represented plaintiffs to pay $20,178.89 in Rule 11 attorney fees and costs after finding their repeated litigation of a foreclosure dispute improper and needlessly costly. She calculated reasonable fees using the lodestar method.
“Plaintiffs repeated filings are improper, are not grounded in law, and have needlessly increased the cost of litigation ... this is the minimum sanction needed to deter future frivolous filings.”
On a compassionate-release motion, the judge required concrete evidence that no other caregiver was available for an ill family member, not just a defendant's stated desire to help; a sympathetic family circumstance alone did not meet the extraordinary-and-compelling standard.
“The record reflects she would find it helpful to have Defendant's assistance, but a desire to assist an aging parent, without more, does not amount to an extraordinary and compelling circumstance.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 47), is GRANTED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Elon's Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 20), is GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Continuance of Trial, (ECF No. 26), is DENIED AS MOOT.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(1), (ECF No. 106), is DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motions to File Under Seal Pursuant to Local Rule 5.4(c), (ECF Nos. 108, 116), are GRANTED, and the unredacted versions of materials filed in support of Defendants' briefing on the motion to dismiss ... is and shall be permanently sealed.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to File Under Seal, (ECF No. 111), is GRANTED, and the unredacted versions of materials filed in support of Plaintiff's briefing on the motion to dismiss ... is and shall be permanently sealed.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion captioned ‘Renewed Motion to Intervene’ by Philip E. Berger, in his official capacity as President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate, and Timothy K. Moore, in his official capacity as Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives, (ECF No. 60), is DENIED WITH PREJUDICE.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant North Carolina Department of Public Safety's Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 108), is GRANTED.”
“Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 105), is GRANTED IN ITS ENTIRETY as to Defendants William Bullard, Ronald Covington, Jerry Ingram, Jr., Dean Locklear, Pauletta Pierce, Katy Poole, Shanice Smith, and Lt. Windley ... and that the Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiff's excessive force claims against Defendants Travis Bridges and Michael Johnston in their individual capacities in light of the genuine issues of material fact.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 54), is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. It is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs' claims arising under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. It is DENIED as to all remaining claims.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 56), is DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Documents Under Seal, (ECF No. 59), is GRANTED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to file Documents Under Seal, (ECF No. 66), is GRANTED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 54), is GRANTED; and Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 58), is DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Strike Expert Reports and Testimony, (ECF No. 69), is DENIED AS MOOT.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Strike or Seal, (ECF No. 64), is GRANTED in part, DENIED in part, and DENIED AS MOOT in part in accordance with this Memorandum Opinion.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Second Amended Motion for Leave to File Documents Under Seal, (ECF No. 82), is GRANTED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 31), is DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Town of Chapel Hill's Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 33), is GRANTED and a judgment in Defendant's favor dismissing this action shall be filed contemporaneously with this Memorandum and Order.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File a Surreply in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 42), is DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, (ECF No. 9), is DENIED AS MOOT.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that claimants' Motion for Relief from Order and Judgment, (ECF No. 58), is DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 59), is GRANTED and Defendant Currency shall be and is hereby, forfeited to the United States of America pursuant to 21 U.S.C. Section 881(a)(6).”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment, (ECF No. 18), is DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for a Franks Hearing, (ECF No. 19), is DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Suppress, (ECF No. 20), is DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Suppress All Evidence Seized as a result of the search warrant executed at 4960 Cecil Norman Road, (ECF No. 22), is DENIED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motions to Amend Petition to Enforce Award and Enter Judgment, (ECF Nos. 511; 513; 515; 517; 519; 521; 523; 525; 527; 529; 531; 533; 535; 537; 539), are hereby DENIED without prejudice, and DISMISSED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, (ECF No. 51), is DENIED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median motion-to-ruling time: 5 days (N = 3).
- The sampled dockets spanned Social Security disability appeals, prisoner Section 1983 and habeas petitions (many resolved by referral magistrates or on screening), multi-defendant felony drug prosecutions, consumer and diversity civil suits, and a removed mortgage-foreclosure dispute.
- Several sampled habeas and prisoner cases ended in sua sponte or screening dismissals rather than a contested ruling, and several criminal cases resolved by guilty plea, consistent with a mixed civil/criminal federal docket.
Pending matters in the official report
Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.
| Motions pending more than six months | 0 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 0 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2026 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2025 | 4 | 3 |
| Mar 2025 | 102 | 8 |
| Sep 2024 | 53 | 7 |
| Mar 2024 | 10 | 6 |
| Sep 2023 | 4 | 4 |
| Mar 2023 | 0 | 7 |
| Sep 2022 | 3 | 9 |
| Mar 2022 | 3 | 7 |
| Sep 2021 | 1 | 6 |
| Mar 2021 | 3 | 4 |
| Sep 2020 | 1 | 4 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
How long civil cases take in this court
For the whole of U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, not for Judge Biggs: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
| Cases | Median time | |
|---|---|---|
| All civil cases closed | 590 | 8.4 months |
| Closed with no court action | 377 | 7.1 months |
| Closed before pretrial | 189 | 9.9 months |
| Closed during or after pretrial | 20 | 21 months |
| Closed during trial | 4 | not reported |
| 12 months ending | Cases closed | Median time |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | 590 | 8.4 months |
| Sep 2024 | 679 | 7.8 months |
| Sep 2023 | 642 | 9.8 months |
| Sep 2022 | 615 | 10.6 months |
| Sep 2021 | 643 | 10.6 months |
| Sep 2020 | 569 | 9 months |
| Sep 2019 | 615 | 11.4 months |
The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).
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