Johnson Jay Hayes

Hayes dismissed a surety's declaratory-judgment action for lack of jurisdiction because an indispensable party would destroy diversity.

After resolving a repossession dispute, Hayes held that the borrowers were not entitled to recover.

“The court will, therefore, overrule the motion to dismiss and allow the defendant an exception, but this motion may be renewed at the close of plaintiff’s evidence at which time the court may determine whether there is any substantial difference between the allegations and proof in the instant case from the one previously tried. If there is no substantial difference then the doctrine of res judicata must be applied under the North Carolina law.”

“The claim of Lineberry is therefore disallowed.”

“In view of the recent decision by this court in Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fiber Mills, 4 Cir., 239 F.2d 502, and of the Supreme Court of North Carolina in *380Putnam v. Publications, 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445, it is unnecessary to assign reasons why the motion to dismiss must be granted in the instant case. Painter v. Finance Co., 245 N.C. 576, 96 S.E.2d 731 is inapplicable as it involved an action against a foreign corporation for a tort committed by it in the state of North Carolina.”

Hayes entered judgment for the insurer after finding that an unlicensed teenage driver lacked permission under the policy.

Hayes transferred the principal patent dispute to the Western District and stayed the remaining claim pending that litigation.

Hayes rejected contract and rental claims after finding that the parties had settled and released their disputes.

“The removal from Durham to Raleigh, only a few miles, could not promote the conveniences of parties or witnesses to warrant a change of venue. The motion for a change of venue is denied.”

“It follows that the plaintiff cannot maintain this action in its name, and it is dismissed.”

“It follows that the summary judgment of dismissal should be granted. Bros. Inc. v. W. E. Grace Mfg. Co., 5 Cir., 1958, 261 F.2d 428.”

“In view of what has been said, the court, in the exercise of its discretion, denies the motion to allow the filing of the supplemental bill. If the product of the defendants now differs from that proven or proposed by the newly discovered evidence in October, 1957, and if the plaintiff can show infringement since that date, a new cause of action arises and this dismissal here will not prejudice the plaintiff against prosecuting it. The denial of the motion and the dismissal by summary judgment are based on the proposition that the product of Plymouth up to October, 1957, did not infringe the Oace Patent. What has occurred since that date is not determined now; it is not an issue that existed when the complaint was filed. If the infringement alleged in the original bill had not been decided against the plaintiff and constituted a final determination between the parties, the conduct of defendants in 1958 would be pertinent and the supplemental bill to bring the litigation up to date, would have been granted, in the discretion of the court.”

“This action will be dismissed, but without prejudice to the right of plaintiff to proceed on the bond in the original cause under the North Carolina Statutes G.S. § 1-497; Shute v. Shute, 180 N.C. 386, 104 S.E. 764.”