Eugene Andrew Gordon

How Judge Gordon rules, drawn from 30 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Judge Gordon no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

Court
United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina
Position
district
Status
Deceased
Served
1964–2002
Appointed by
Lyndon B. Johnson (Democratic)
Commissioned
1964-06-09
Education
Elon College, A.B. (1941); Duke University School of Law, LL.B. (1941)
Signed orders read
30

How Judge Gordon decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In Golden Belt, Gordon declined personal jurisdiction where an interstate contract was the defendant's only forum contact and the parties were commercial equals.

“To subject the defendant to suit in the state where it has never solicited, advertised, or transacted business and where its only contact is the contract in suit, which was made and substantially performed in another state, would serve no useful purpose in the promotion of interstate commerce.”

Procedural preferences

In Geiger, Gordon declined to enter relief that no party had formally requested.

“The court, however, will not issue an order to that effect since there is no motion for a declaratory judgment before the court.”

Cautions

In Harrison, Gordon emphasized the claim-preclusive force of a dismissal with prejudice.

“The phrase ‘with prejudice’ is a term of art that every attorney should consider with caution.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Spriggs v. State of North Carolina
· 1965-07-09
Habeas petition (state prisoner) Denied

“The Court finds that petitioner has not been denied his constitutional rights; therefore, the relief sought is denied.”

Arrington v. Celebrezze
· 1965-10-18
Summary judgment (plaintiff disability claimant) Granted

“The Court is of the opinion, and finds as a fact, that the record as whole, including the expert medical opinions and the subjective evidence of pain, establishes that the plaintiff has been unable to perform any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable physical impairment which can be expected to result in death or to be of long-continued and indefinite duration, and that the record is barren of substantial evidence to the contrary. It follows that the motion of the defendant for summary judgment should be overruled, and the motion of the plaintiff for summary judgment should be granted.”

Summary judgment (defendant Secretary) Denied
Golden Belt Manufacturing Co. v. Janler Plastic Mold Corp.
· 1967-06-22
Motions to dismiss (defendant manufacturer) Granted

“It is therefore, ordered that the motion of the defendant to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be and the same hereby is allowed.”

Brendle v. General Tire and Rubber Company
· 1969-10-17
Summary judgment (defendant tire manufacturer) Granted

“For the foregoing reasons, the motion of the defendant for summary judgment is granted.”

Wayne v. Finch
· 1969-10-22
Summary judgment (plaintiff disability claimant) Granted

“For the foregoing reasons, it is concluded that the findings of the Secretary are not supported by substantial evidence nor were proper legal standards *905applied in evaluating the evidence. It follows that the motion of the plaintiff for summary judgment should be granted, and the motion of the defendant for summary judgment should be denied.”

Summary judgment (defendant Secretary) Denied
Hanes Dye & Finishing Co. v. Caisson Corp.
· 1970-02-12
Motions to dismiss (defendants Caisson Corporation and Seaboard Surety Company) Denied

“For the foregoing reasons, it is concluded that the motion for dismissal by defendants Caisson and Seaboard should not be granted.”

Harris v. North Carolina
· 1970-04-01
Habeas petition (state prisoner) Denied

“For the reasons stated, it is ordered that the petition of William Edward Harris, the petitioner herein, for a writ of habeas corpus be, and the same hereby is, dismissed.”

Hunter v. Richardson
· 1971-05-10
Summary judgment (plaintiff disability claimant) Denied

“It is, therefore, ordered that the motion of the plaintiff for summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, denied.”

Summary judgment (defendant Secretary) Granted

“It is further ordered that the motion ■ of the defendant for summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, granted.”

Bandag Inc. v. Brad Ragan, Inc.
· 1972-01-17
Summary judgment (defendant) Denied

“Ordered that the motion of the defendant for summary judgment be, and the same is, denied.”

Motion to amend (plaintiff) Granted

“Ordered that the motion by the plaintiff for leave to amend the complaint be, and the same is, allowed.”

Somers v. Strader
· 1977-08-25
Motions to dismiss (defendants) Denied

“*1186Therefore, it is ORDERED that the defendants’ motion be, and the same is hereby, DENIED.”

Mosley v. National Finance Co., Inc.
· 1977-11-23
Motion to deny jury trial (plaintiff borrower) Denied

“For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motion to deny the defendant a jury trial is denied.”

Jacobi v. High Point Label, Inc.
· 1977-12-30
Motions to remand (plaintiff employee) Denied

“IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motion to remand be, and the same is hereby, denied.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

The five sampled terminated matters included one criminal case, one personal-liability matter, and three civil matters without a recorded case-type label. Electronic entry timelines were unavailable for motion or timing analysis.

A historical record

Judge Gordon no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.