Catherine C. Eagles
How Judge Eagles decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In a case involving a fintech cash-advance app's arbitration clause, the judge closely parses the actual screens a consumer clicked through, crediting language that explicitly tells the user that continuing constitutes agreement to terms placed directly above or below the action button, while distinguishing sites that bury or ambiguously label the assent step.
“The language on the screen 'explicitly advised that the act of clicking will constitute assent to the terms and conditions of an agreement.' ... EarnIn's 2022 sign-up screens allowed reasonably prudent internet users to know that they were agreeing to the Terms of Service when they followed the sign-up flow and created an account.”
On a patent-eligibility challenge, the judge follows Federal Circuit precedent closely by tracing whether the asserted claims 'begin and end' with a natural phenomenon, rejecting reliance on a favorably-drafted preamble or a patent examiner's earlier eligibility finding as not determinative.
“However artfully Natera drafted the preamble, the claims here are directed to detection of a natural phenomenon.”
Procedural preferences
The judge's standard order for civil cases explicitly discourages extension-of-time requests, framing every case as equally deserving of prompt resolution regardless of counsel's other workload -- a preference she enforces even against consent motions.
“The deadlines in the Local Rules provide adequate time for briefing in all but exceptional circumstances and parties should not expect motions for extension of time to be granted.... The Court expects the parties to promptly move the case towards final resolution.... The press of other legal work is not a valid basis for an extension of time...”
Confronted with duplicate multi-way disputes over lead-plaintiff and lead-counsel appointment in a securities class action, the judge proactively limits briefing to a single consolidated filing per side to prevent docket clutter, rather than letting each competing applicant respond separately to every other applicant.
“To prevent docket clutter, each of the four applicants for lead plaintiff/counsel may file one consolidated brief addressing the motions and applications of the other three and each is prohibited from filing separate responses as to each motion.”
The judge is willing to convert an unopposed motion for a preliminary injunction into a permanent one and to convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment when the record already supports that broader disposition, rather than requiring a separate, duplicative round of motions.
“The plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, Doc. 5, is converted to a motion for permanent injunction and DENIED. ... The defendants' motion to dismiss, Doc. 35, is converted to a motion for summary judgment and GRANTED.”
Cautions
The judge does not hesitate to impose Rule 11 sanctions on a pro se litigant who knowingly misrepresents facts (falsely claiming a prison lockdown) to obtain extensions, tailoring the sanction to require sworn declarations for any future extension request rather than defaulting to a monetary sanction or an access-limiting injunction.
“Whether it is called lying or making a knowing misrepresentation, making a statement to a court that the party knows is not true in order to obtain court action is a serious matter and subjects the offender to sanctions.”
In a construction-contract dispute stayed for arbitration, the judge dismissed the plaintiff's claims with prejudice for failure to prosecute after it did almost nothing to move a consented-to arbitration forward despite repeated deadlines and an explicit order stating her expectations -- underscoring that a stay for arbitration is not license to let a case sit dormant.
“A stay pending arbitration is not permission to sit on one's hands.”
She will strike an unauthorized, intemperate filing on her own motion when it contains personal attacks on opposing counsel, even in the same order that otherwise rules for the filer's side.
“The Court's Local Rules do not permit filing of a sur-reply brief without permission, and nothing in that paper writing is helpful. Moreover, she cites no law anywhere in the paper writing. Name-calling and personal attacks on counsel serve no purpose.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“It is ORDERED that the defendant's motion for summary judgment, Doc. 55, is GRANTED.”
“Covil's motion to stay, Doc. 221, will be DENIED as moot.”
“Zurich and USF&G's motion for partial summary judgment, Doc. 211, is GRANTED in part on the allocation issue as applied to the Finch judgment, and a Declaratory Judgment will be entered separately as time permits. Zurich's declaratory judgment claims and USF&G's declaratory judgment cross-claims are otherwise DISMISSED without prejudice, as the Court declines to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over these issues.”
“Covil's motion for summary judgment, Doc. 209, is DENIED in part on the allocation issue as applied to the Finch judgment. Covil's declaratory judgment claims are otherwise DISMISSED without prejudice, as the Court declines to exercise subject matter jurisdiction.”
“The individual defendants' motion for summary judgment, Doc. 214, is DENIED in part on the allocation issue as applied to the Finch judgment and is otherwise DENIED as moot, as the Court declines to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the remaining declaratory judgment issues.”
“It is ORDERED that the third-party defendant SiteMed North America, LLC's motion to dismiss the third-party complaint, Doc. 29, is GRANTED and all claims against SiteMed North America, LLC are DISMISSED.”
“The City defendants' motion for leave to exceed word limitation, Doc. 47, is GRANTED.”
“The City defendants' motion to dismiss, Doc. 45, is GRANTED in part and the Sec. 1983 claims against Chief Cole, Lt. Velez, and Officer Franks in their official capacities for violating the plaintiffs' First and Fourth Amendment rights, Doc. 25 at paragraphs 175-82, are DISMISSED. ... the City defendants' motion to dismiss is otherwise DENIED as to the Drumwright complaint.”
“The County defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, Doc. 52, is DENIED.”
“It is ORDERED that the defendants' motion to dismiss with prejudice, Doc. 47, is GRANTED. Upon Archer's dismissal of its counterclaim, see Doc. 15, judgment will be entered.”
“Mr. Hill's motion for partial summary judgment, Doc. 17, is DENIED.”
“Carvana and Bridgecrest's cross-motion for partial summary judgment, Doc. 22, is DENIED.”
“The plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, Doc. 5, is converted to a motion for permanent injunction and DENIED.”
“The plaintiffs' oral motion for summary judgment is DENIED.”
“The defendants' motion to dismiss, Doc. 35, is converted to a motion for summary judgment and GRANTED.”
Sitting by designation in the Western District of Virginia, the judge imposed a pre-filing injunction on a serial pro se litigant who, over seven years, filed eight lawsuits and numerous frivolous motions against the same social-services agency, twice adding federal judges as defendants based on their rulings in his earlier cases. Applying the Fourth Circuit's Cromer factors (litigation history, good faith, burden on the courts, adequacy of lesser sanctions), the court found an injunction warranted after a prior warning went unheeded, and narrowly tailored it to bar future filings against the agency or arising from the same allegations, and against any judicial officer, lawyer, or witness based on their role in his past cases, without foreclosing his access to the courts entirely.
“The plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, Doc. 93, is GRANTED in part as to the IUP provision, Sec. 90-21.83B(a)(7), and is otherwise DENIED.”
“The defendant-intervenors' cross-motion for summary judgment, Doc. 97, is GRANTED in part as to the hospitalization requirement, Sec. Sec. 90-21.81B(3), (4); Sec. 90-21.82A(c), and is otherwise DENIED.”
“It is ORDERED that the defendant's motion for compassionate release, Doc. 136, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows: 1. The defendant's motion for a sentence reduction, Doc. 136, is GRANTED, and his sentence is reduced to 314 months total ... 4. The defendant's request for oral argument is DENIED.”
“The defendants' motion for sanctions in Musgrove v. Bridges, 22-CV-311, Doc. 48, is GRANTED. ... The defendants' motion for sanctions in Musgrove v. Ishee, 22-CV-1125, Doc. 32, is GRANTED.”
“The plaintiff's 'Motion for leave to amend under F.R.C.P. 15' in Musgrove v. Ishee, 22-CV-1125, Doc. 35, is DENIED.”
“The defendant Tyler Technologies, Inc.'s motion to dismiss, Doc. 9, is DENIED as to Ms. Teasley's claim for libel per se and GRANTED as to all other causes of action for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted”
“The defendant Abigail Diaz's motion to dismiss, Doc. 11, is GRANTED and all claims against her are DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Sampled cases span employment discrimination removed from state court, prisoner habeas and civil-rights suits, insurance and contract disputes, a securities-fraud class action with a contested lead-plaintiff fight, and a TCPA consumer class action. Most docket entries in this court are stub descriptions without attached order text, so several sampled rulings, including a defendant's summary-judgment win in an ADEA and Title VII case and a contract judgment, are not included as classified outcomes because no verbatim disposition text was available.
Put Judge Eagles's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Eagles actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Eagles's own signed orders and cites them.