Richard Ernest Myers II
How Judge II decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In statutory-interpretation disputes Myers applies the plain, ordinary meaning of unambiguous text and declines invitations to narrow a statute -- whether by the rule of lenity or an out-of-circuit gloss -- when the language is clear. Reading 18 U.S.C. 844(f)(1) literally, he held it reaches arson of ANY building owned by a federally-funded entity (here the City of Fayetteville's Market House), siding with the Fourth Circuit's Davis and a majority of circuits over the First Circuit's narrower Hersom. Practical lesson: before Myers, a textual argument grounded in the statute's ordinary words beats a policy- or lenity-based narrowing whenever the text is unambiguous.
“Here, the unambiguous language of the statute contemplates the malicious damage or destruction of "any building ... in whole or in part owned or possessed by ... any institution or organization receiving federal financial assistance."”
On a motion to suppress a traffic stop, Myers credits an officer's reasonable, good-faith mistake so long as the suspicion was objectively reasonable: reasonable suspicion need not be correct. He upheld a stop premised on a visual window-tint estimate (25% transmission) even though a later light-meter test showed the windows were legal (37%). Practical lesson: a suppression motion premised solely on the officer's estimate turning out to be mistaken is unlikely to succeed if the estimate was objectively reasonable in the circumstances.
“The reasonable suspicion inquiry falls considerably short of 51 % accuracy, for, as we have explained, to be reasonable is not to be perfect.”
Procedural preferences
Myers reviews a magistrate judge's Memorandum & Recommendation de novo only as to portions to which a party files a specific, particularized objection; general or conclusory objections, and unobjected-to portions, are reviewed only for clear error and adopted. He overruled the plaintiffs' objection to the magistrate's recommended lodestar hourly rates and adopted the fee award. Practical lesson: object specifically, identify the precise error, and support a contested rate or issue with evidence -- a generalized 'the rate is too low' objection will be overruled and the M&R adopted.
“Absent a specific and timely objection, the court reviews only for "clear error" and need not give any explanation for adopting the recommendation.”
Cautions
In Section 1983 / constitutional-tort suits Myers enforces Iqbal rigorously: a government official is liable only for his or her OWN misconduct, so naming supervisors on a 'knew or should have known / permitted' theory -- without pleading their own deliberate, causal conduct -- fails and they receive qualified immunity. He also holds discrete discriminatory acts time-barred outside the limitations period and treats stray remarks as insufficient evidence of animus. Practical lesson: plead each defendant's own conduct specifically, mind the limitations clock on discrete acts, and do not rely on supervisory 'permitted'/respondeat-superior theories.
“Plaintiffs allegation that the interim provost and chancellor of the university "permitted" Mountz to engage in the conduct with actual or constructive knowledge is insufficient under Iqbal to demonstrate more than mere respondeat superior.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 3 |
Granted: 2Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 2 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to suppress N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for attorney fees N = 1 |
Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Upon consideration of the pleadings, the parties' arguments, and for the reasons discussed below, North Carolina's motion to dismiss is GRANTED. This Court dismisses each of the Straw's claims for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.”
“Accordingly, the court GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss [DE 10] and directs the Clerk of Court to close this case.”
“This matter comes before the court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count One of the Indictment [sic] [DE 64]. ... For the reasons that follow, the motion is denied.”
“This matter comes before the court on Defendant's motion to suppress, filed March 15, 2021. [DE-33] For the reasons that follow, Defendant's motion is DENIED.”
“Plaintiffs have filed a partial objection to the recommended disposition of their Motion to Approve Attorney's Fees and Costs. ... After careful consideration, the objection is overruled.”
“For the reasons described below, Halcyon's Motion is GRANTED and Echelon's Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.”
“For the reasons described below, Halcyon's Motion is GRANTED and Echelon's Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 175 days (N = 8).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 121.5 days (N = 2).
Nature-of-suit mix observed across the enumerated dockets (2017-2021, both name-string forms). Myers's enumeration is DOMINATED by PRISONER-PETITION and HABEAS matters ('...-ct-...' prison-conditions/1983, '...-hc-...' 2241/2254 habeas, '...-ct-...' Section 2255) -- a large share inherited from the seat that had been vacant since 2005 (Malcolm J. Howard's senior-status docket) and terminated by Myers in 2020-2021. Alongside that runs general civil litigation: Social Security appeals (Worsham, Miller, Partin), insurance/diversity contract (Hill, Prosser, Sports Endeavors, Sterling Pharma), employment / civil rights (Harrison v. Syneos Health, Mack v. ECU, Yates v. Town of Wallace, Launching Pad v. Cooper, Johnson v. YPS), and civil drug-forfeiture in-rem cases (US v. $112,570 Currency). He also draws high-profile civil-rights/elections matters (e.g. North Carolina Democratic Party v. NC State Board of Elections, 5:24-cv-00699). NOTE: this is an administrative/observational mix from a thin enumeration, not an FJC IDB baseline (IDB count timed out for nced).