James E. Gates
How Judge Gates decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On a Section 1988 fee request he applies the lodestar (reasonable hours times reasonable rate) read through the twelve Johnson/Barber factors, and will trim categories of the request he finds unsupported (here, most of the fees claimed for a separate earlier case) while awarding the well-documented fees for the litigation actually won.
“The lodestar amount is determined by multiplying the number of reasonable hours by a reasonable rate. ... The court must exclude from the fees allowed any hours which are 'excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.'”
He construes the scope of civil discovery broadly under Rule 26 and puts the burden on the party resisting discovery to justify its objections, rather than on the requesting party to justify the request.
“The party resisting discovery bears the burden of establishing the legitimacy of its objections. ... 'In order to limit the scope of discovery, the party resisting discovery bears the burden of showing why [the discovery requests] should not be granted.'”
Procedural preferences
A statement in a brief is not evidence. He will not treat an apparent concession in opposing counsel's memorandum as a factual admission that can carry or defeat summary judgment -- the record, not the briefing, controls.
“a concession by counsel in a brief does not amount to evidence sufficient to support or oppose a summary judgment motion.”
On summary judgment the movant must point to record evidence eliminating genuine fact disputes; criticism of the other side's evidence is not a substitute for carrying that affirmative burden, so a plaintiff-movant who only attacks the defense proof will lose the motion.
“Hendrickson's criticisms, though, are not a substitute for the showing, it had the burden of making, that there are no disputes of material fact.”
Cautions
Preserve evidence once litigation is foreseeable. Continuing to destroy plainly relevant documents under a routine retention policy, without a litigation hold, exposes a party to spoliation sanctions including an adverse-inference instruction.
“once a party reasonably anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine document retention/destruction policy and put in place a 'litigation hold' to ensure the preservation of relevant documents.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Hendrickson has thus failed to show with respect to any of its claims or Tyler's counterclaim that there are no genuine disputes of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hendrickson's motion for summary judgment must therefore be denied in its entirety.”
“the motion has been fully briefed and referred to the undersigned for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(A). ... For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be allowed in the amount of $52,426.91.”
“the court finds that the sanction of an adverse inference instruction to the jury is warranted, subject to the ultimate authority of the presiding judge over trial proceedings.”
“For the reasons set forth below, the motion to compel will be allowed and motion for protective order will be denied.”
“Defendants' motion for summary judgment is therefore GRANTED, and the court directs that judgment be entered DISMISSING this case with prejudice.”
“For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion to dismiss will be allowed, and plaintiff's motion to amend will be denied.”
“it is ORDERED that plaintiff's summary judgment motion (D.E. 48) as to defendant Diana Kopelman is ALLOWED and as to defendant Mark Kopelman is denied without prejudice.”
“Plaintiff's motion to strike (D.E. 54) as to defendant Diana Kopelman is DENIED AS MOOT and as to defendant Mark Kopelman is denied without prejudice.”
“For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' motion to compel (D.E. 24) is DENIED.”
“Here, by order entered 12 January 2016 (D.E. 30), the court allowed plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings (D.E. 26) and remanded this case for further administrative proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. Section 405(g).”
“It is therefore ORDERED that: 1. The Commissioner shall pay $5,500.00 in attorney's fees associated with this case in full satisfaction of any and all claims arising under the EAJA.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion by the United States to quash (D.E. 43) is ALLOWED and the subpoena is QUASHED.”
“IT IS ORDERED that the Commissioner's motion (D.E. 20) for judgment on the pleadings be GRANTED, plaintiff's motion (D.E. 17) for judgment on the pleadings be DENIED, and the Commissioner's final decision be AFFIRMED.”
“For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's motion will be allowed, plaintiff's motion will be denied, and the final decision of the Commissioner will be affirmed.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 481 days (N = 5).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 217 days (N = 3).
Put Judge Gates's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Gates actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Gates's own signed orders and cites them.