Matthew T. Houston
How Judge Houston rules, drawn from 30 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Houston
Matthew T. Houston is a Special Superior Court Judge for Complex Business Cases on the North Carolina Business Court. He joined the Business Court in February 2025 after becoming a Special Superior Court judge in January 2024. He previously practiced commercial litigation in Raleigh and earned his law degree from Wake Forest University School of Law.
Judge Houston's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Houston's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge Houston decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In FS Medical Supplies, LLC v. TannerGAP, Inc., Houston dismissed the later-filed state action without prejudice under the prior pending action doctrine. He declined to assume that the federal court would dismiss its earlier case for lack of jurisdiction.
“This Court declines FS Med's invitation to 'proceed on the assumption' that the federal court will dismiss FS Med's action. Practically, if adopted, FS Med's reasoning would require every judge presiding over a subsequently filed case to act as the arbiter of the initial court's jurisdiction.”
In Tiller v. Phillips, he dismissed derivative claims after finding that an early email did not ask the company to act and a later demand sent with the complaint did not satisfy the statute's pre-suit waiting period.
“A written demand sent simultaneously with the filing of a complaint does not meet the demand requirements of the statute, nor may a complaint serve as the written demand.”
In PCS Phosphate v. Jacobs Engineering, he rejected an argument that North Carolina's out-of-state forum-clause statute covered only traditional construction, finding that the alleged industrial-plant work could qualify as a real-property improvement.
“[N]either the explicit language of the statute nor case law limits § 22B-2 to the 'traditional construction context.'”
In Estevez v. C&S Commerce, he rejected a challenge to an LLC operating agreement's fiduciary-duty waiver where the plaintiffs offered no specific grounds for finding the negotiated provision unreasonable or contrary to public policy.
“[P]ublic policy in North Carolina favors freedom of contract, including the ability for parties to negotiate the scope of a company's operating agreement.”
Procedural preferences
In Castillo v. RRD Financial, he struck a defendant's brief for incorporating earlier arguments by reference and denied that defendant's partial motion for judgment on the pleadings without prejudice.
“[T]his Court has repeatedly made clear that the Business Court Rules preclude a party from adopting or incorporating by reference the party's earlier-filed briefing or briefing by another party without the Court's leave.”
In Ordoñez Cordero v. Ordoñez Cordero, Houston summarily denied a Rule 12(b)(6) motion included in the defendant’s answer because it was not filed separately and had no accompanying brief.
“Thus, in its discretion, the Court summarily DENIES the motion.”
In Oak Grove Technologies v. Seventh Dimension, he dismissed a contract theory based on when a replacement worker started because the agreement required only identification of a replacement within ten working days; he considered other alleged breaches separately.
“[T]he plain language of B.3.1 is unambiguous, particularly when read in context. ... Defendants do not allege that OGT failed to identify a replacement worker within ten working days after notification.”
On a motion to transfer venue, the court required more than a general assertion that witnesses and documents were in another county; the movants submitted no affidavit or other substantive support.
“Movants have provided no affidavit, declaration, or other substantive evidence in support of their motion or their arguments.”
Cautions
In Tiller v. Phillips, Houston dismissed the fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims after finding that the plaintiffs had not adequately pleaded justifiable reliance, including why they could not discover the relevant facts through reasonable inquiry.
“[W]hen the party relying on the false or misleading representation could have discovered the truth upon inquiry, the complaint must allege that he was denied the opportunity to investigate or that he could not have learned the true facts by exercise of reasonable diligence.”
In Moore v. Brooks, Houston cautioned the plaintiffs and their counsel after their brief asserted that the defendant drafted documents when the complaint did not allege that fact or support that inference.
“Merely because counsel want the complaint to assert a fact does not grant them leeway to create unreasonable and unsupported inferences out of whole cloth, and Plaintiffs and their counsel are cautioned accordingly.”
In Oak Grove Technologies, LLC v. Seventh Dimension, LLC, Houston criticized the pleading’s reliance on hundreds of pages of attached exhibits without concise factual allegations. He still addressed the specific contract allegations and denied dismissal of a sufficiently pleaded subclaim.
“[N]either the Court nor the opposing party should be required to parse through hundreds of pages of documents slapped onto a complaint or counterclaims as exhibits without any substantive allegations or descriptions of allegations in the text of the pleading itself. Simply because the Court has a fishing license does not mean that counsel need to put it to the test.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motions to dismiss, and this matter is hereby ABATED and DISMISSED, without prejudice to FS Med's ability to proceed with its causes of action and litigation in Case IV and other pending litigation between the parties.”
“Therefore, in the exercise of its discretion, the Court DENIES Buss's motion to transfer, stay, or otherwise dismiss this action under Rule 12(b)(3), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-258, and the doctrine of forum non conveniens.”
“Accordingly, to the extent that PCS Phosphate's breach of contract cause of action is premised upon PCS Phosphate's purported status as a party to the overall PCS Administration-Jacobs Agreement ..., the Court GRANTS Jacobs's motion to dismiss.”
“The Court DENIES Jacobs's motion to dismiss PCS Administration's breach of contract cause of action.”
“the Court DENIES the motion to dismiss as to PCS Administration’s ... breach of warranty cause of action but GRANTS the motion as to PCS Phosphate’s breach of warranty cause of action, which is DISMISSED without prejudice.”
“Accordingly, the Court DENIES Jacobs's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' professional negligence cause of action.”
“Thus, in its discretion, the Court summarily DENIES the motion.”
“Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants' and Nominal Defendant's motion to dismiss, (ECF No. 66), and this action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”
“DENIES Plaintiff's motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice”
“GRANTS Plaintiff's motion for leave to file first amended complaint”
“DENIES as moot Defendants' and Nominal Defendant's joint motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), (ECF No. 24), without prejudice to any party's right to respond to Plaintiff's first amended verified derivative complaint as appropriate under applicable law”
“Because Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden of demonstrating specific jurisdiction over Brooks, the Court DENIES Brooks's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2).”
“The Court therefore DENIES the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as to Kelly Moore's cause of action, in her official capacity as executor of Drue Moore's estate, for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”
“Therefore, the Court GRANTS the partial motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by defendants RRD and Eskandari and enters judgment on the pleadings in favor of RRD and Eskandari with respect to Plaintiffs' Fourth Claim for Relief for purported violations of Chapter 75 of the North Carolina General Statutes and Seventh Claim for Relief for purported negligent misrepresentation.”
“The Court DENIES the partial motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by defendant Algood, without prejudice to Algood's ability to renew his arguments at a later stage of the case.”
“Defendants’ motion to dismiss, (ECF No. 12), is GRANTED;”
“Plaintiffs’ cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
“the Court determines that the non-compete and non-solicitation provisions of the agreements at issue are overly and unenforceably broad. Therefore, to the extent based on those provisions, Evergreen's cause of action for breach of contract fails as a matter of law”
“Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss Evergreen's cause of action for conversion, and that cause of action against Price and Taylor is DISMISSED.”
“Thus, the cause of action against the Integrity Defendants is appropriately dismissed on that basis.”
“Thus, the Court DENIES Price's and Taylor's motion to dismiss the UDTP cause of action.”
“Thus, in the Court's discretion, Plaintiffs' motion to strike, (ECF No. 63), is DENIED as moot.”
“Accordingly, the Court will DISMISS without prejudice all putative derivative causes of action and claims asserted in this action.”
“In short, considering the allegations of the amended complaint and the plain language of the Operating Agreement, Plaintiffs' claim for breach of contractual duties fails, and the Court will DISMISS this cause of action.”
“Absent factual allegations suggesting that Plaintiffs conferred a measurable benefit on Defendants, and not merely that Defendants wrongfully took something from Plaintiffs, the amended complaint fails to state a claim for unjust enrichment.”
“Thus, the fraud and negligent misrepresentation causes of action fail to state a claim and are properly DISMISSED.”
“The cause of action for conversion therefore fails and will be DISMISSED.”
“the Court determines that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged facts permitting the inference that Phillips acted in his own self-interest rather than the interests of MedShift and that his conduct was neither justified nor privileged. ... the Court ... will DENY the motions to dismiss the cause of action for tortious interference.”
“Thus, the amended complaint fails to state a claim for either civil conspiracy or facilitation of a civil conspiracy, and these causes of action are appropriately DISMISSED.”
“Accordingly, in the Court's discretion where applicable, Defendants' motion to dismiss based on improper venue and alternative motion to transfer venue, (ECF No. 11), are DENIED.”
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