Mark A. Davis
How Judge Davis rules, drawn from 22 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Davis
Mark A. Davis is a Special Superior Court Judge assigned to the North Carolina Business Court. He previously served on the North Carolina Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. He earned his undergraduate and law degrees at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
Judge Davis's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Davis's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge Davis decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Davis v. HCA Healthcare, he found that the complaint's example of an insurer negotiation ending below the hospital's demanded rate undermined its allegation that the defendants could control prices.
“This incident undermines their allegation that Defendants possess the power to actually control prices.”
In Environmental Holdings Group, LLC v. Finch, Davis applied Virginia law to the misappropriation claim because the complaint placed the alleged wrongful conduct there. The plaintiff’s North Carolina headquarters and the employee’s reporting relationship did not change where the alleged tort occurred.
“Absent from the Complaint are allegations of any act taken by Finch in North Carolina other than the fact that he reported to his supervisor in Alloy's Raleigh office ... the 'last event required to constitute the tort' -- i.e., the alleged misappropriation -- could only have taken place in Virginia.”
In Lafayette Village Pub, LLC v. Burnham, Davis dismissed an unfair trade practices claim arising from a dispute among company members. References to third parties and indirect commercial effects did not change the internal character of the pleaded dispute.
“The mere presence of [the other company] as a potential beneficiary of [defendant's] alleged wrongful conduct does not alter the fundamental character of this internal dispute.”
In Lafayette Village Pub v. Burnham, he rejected the Bronsons' de facto fiduciary-duty theory because their votes could have overridden Burnham's actions and the complaint did not allege that they had called a managers' meeting or voted against him.
“Had the Bronsons called a managers' meeting and voted against any of Burnham's actions, they would have prevailed. ... The Complaint does not allege ... that the Bronsons have ever called a managers' meeting or that they have ever formally voted against the acts taken by Burnham.”
Procedural preferences
In Hengqin Dingsheng Zhirong Equity Investment Fund v. Li, Davis stayed the North Carolina action in favor of litigation in China. He found that China’s inquisitorial procedure alone did not make its courts an inadequate forum.
“The mere fact that another country's judicial system utilizes the inquisitorial method is insufficient, standing alone, to establish the inadequacy of their courts as an alternative forum.”
In Woodcock v. Cumberland County Hospital System, Inc., Davis denied declaratory judgment without prejudice because the factual record was not yet developed. He also observed that the motion sought broader relief than the complaint requested.
“[I]t is simply too early for the Court to tell whether there is only 'one reasonable inference' that can be drawn from the facts ... or that there is 'nothing more to discover' that could impact this 'one reasonable inference.'”
In Action Learning Associates v. Kenan-Flagler Business School Executive Education, he dismissed claims with prejudice after the amended complaint failed to address defects identified in an earlier dismissal motion.
“Plaintiff has now had two bites at the apple to plead sufficient facts to support its various claims arising from these events and has failed to convince the Court that it should be given a third.”
In Innovare, Ltd. v. Sciteck Diagnostics, Inc., Davis criticized the defendant’s excessive affirmative defenses but required the plaintiff to identify the particular defenses it challenged. He struck three defenses the plaintiff identified and supported in its motion.
“It is incumbent upon Innovare as the moving party to demonstrate with specificity which affirmative defenses have been inappropriately raised. In their Motion to Strike, Innovare has only identified four such defenses.”
In a financing dispute, Davis barred categories of claimed special damages that the plaintiff had not specifically pleaded, even though the defendants had participated in some related discovery.
“the Court is not satisfied that Defendants have waived Daedong’s compliance with the applicable pleading requirements.”
Cautions
In Villa Capriani Homeowners Association v. Lexington Insurance, he dismissed an excess flood-policy claim without prejudice because the complaint did not allege payment or admission of liability for the primary policy's full limit.
“Plaintiff has not alleged that either of the unambiguous pre-conditions to the triggering of the Excess Flood Policy have been met ... the Court CONCLUDES that Plaintiff's breach of contract claim against the Excess Underwriters is premature.”
In Brakebush Brothers v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, he denied dismissal of the insurers' fraud-based counterclaim after finding that they alleged a knowingly inflated fire-loss claim rather than an honest disagreement over value.
“Defendants take great pains in their counterclaims to make clear that they are asserting that the inflated proof of loss information was the result of deliberate fraud rather than due to an honest mistake.”
In Downing v. Cycle Holdings, he granted partial summary judgment for the defendants after finding that a voting agreement constrained how signatories cast their shares without conflicting with the certificate's voting rights.
“The Voting Agreement does not inhibit its signatories from casting one vote per share; it simply binds them to cast each of those votes in accordance with the provisions found in the agreement.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons set forth above, SEI's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.”
“Thus, at a minimum, Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden of alleging an unreasonable restraint of trade via the indirect method by alleging the existence of sufficient market power held by Defendants in the Asheville Inpatient Services market, coupled with the potential for anticompetitive effects stemming from unwanted contractual provisions unilaterally imposed by Defendants on insurers.”
“Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' monopoly acquisition claim is GRANTED, and this claim is DISMISSED without prejudice.”
“Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' monopoly maintenance claim is GRANTED, and this claim is DISMISSED without prejudice.”
“Therefore, for all of these reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED without prejudice as to Plaintiffs' monopoly leveraging theory.”
“Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED without prejudice as to Plaintiffs' attempted monopolization claim.”
“Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' monopolization claim under the North Carolina Constitution is GRANTED, and this claim is DISMISSED with prejudice.”
“In summary, Brakebush has established standing to assert its claims for breach of contract and declaratory judgment under the Maxum, Ironshore, Novae, Hallmark, and Hudson Policies, but not under the Brit, Evanston, or Liberty Policies.”
“Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Portions of Defendants' Reply Brief or, in the Alternative, Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply pursuant to Rule 12(f)... should be DENIED.”
“THEREFORE, it is ORDERED that Willette and BR Ventures' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Poluka's claim for UDTP is hereby DISMISSED.”
“The Excess Underwriters' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's breach of contract claim is GRANTED, and this claim is DISMISSED without prejudice.”
“The Excess Underwriters' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's bad faith and UDTPA claims is GRANTED, and these claims are DISMISSED without prejudice.”
“The Primary Underwriters' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's bad faith and UDTPA claims is DENIED.”
“The Agency Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the negligence claims against them is GRANTED, and these claims are DISMISSED.”
“THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory Judgment is DENIED, without prejudice.”
“Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' claim for UDTP is GRANTED, and this claim is DISMISSED with prejudice.”
“Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' individual claims for breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud is GRANTED, and these claims are DISMISSED without prejudice.”
“Defendants CCHS and CFVASC’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to the individual claims contained within Claims One, Three, and Five in the Complaint is GRANTED, and these claims are DISMISSED without prejudice.”
“Defendants SCA and NSC’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to the individual claim contained within Claim Two in the Complaint is GRANTED, and this claim is DISMISSED without prejudice.”
“Defendant CFVASC’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Claim Four of the Complaint is GRANTED, and this claim is DISMISSED with prejudice.”
“Defendants CCHS and CFVASC’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to the individual claim contained within Claim Eleven in the Complaint is DENIED. ... Defendant SCA’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to the individual claim contained within Claim Eight in the Complaint is DENIED.”
“Defendants’ NSC and SCA’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Claim Six in the Complaint is GRANTED without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to seek punitive damages as a remedy for his surviving claims to the extent permitted by law.”
“Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff's misappropriation of trade secrets claim ... is GRANTED, and the claim is DISMISSED.”
“Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff's UDTP claim ... is GRANTED, and the claim is DISMISSED.”
“The Motion is DENIED with respect to ... Plaintiff's third cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty; and ... Plaintiff's fourth cause of action for tortious interference with prospective economic relations.”
“Sciteck's Motion to Amend is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part.”
“Innovare's Motion to Dismiss Sciteck's breach of contract counterclaim is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part.”
“Innovare's Motion to Dismiss Sciteck's counterclaims for conversion, unjust enrichment, declaratory judgment, and specific performance is GRANTED, and these counterclaims are DISMISSED with prejudice.”
“Innovare's Motion to Dismiss Sciteck's counterclaims for common law unfair competition and fraud is GRANTED, and those counterclaims are DISMISSED without prejudice.”
“Innovare's Motion to Dismiss Sciteck's counterclaims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, UDTP, and violation of the Lanham Act is DENIED.”
“Innovare's Motion to Strike is GRANTED as to Sciteck's affirmative defenses of force majeure, restraint of trade, and preemption. Innovare's Motion to Strike is otherwise DENIED without prejudice.”
“Defendants’ pending motions are GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part, as follows:”
“Defendants Maxum, Ironshore, Novae, Hallmark, and Hudson’s Motion to Reconsider is DENIED AS MOOT.”
“Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are GRANTED as to LIU's claims for breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, unjust enrichment, breach of confidence, and piercing of the corporate veil.”
“Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are DENIED as to LIU's claims for UDTP, conversion, and civil conspiracy.”
“Genfine's Motion for Summary Judgment on its counterclaims is GRANTED as to liability.”
“Accordingly, the Court, in its discretion, hereby DISSOLVES the preliminary injunction entered on 1 July 2019.”
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