Louis A. Bledsoe III
How Judge Bledsoe rules, drawn from 37 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Judge Bledsoe no longer sits on this court. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled here.
About Judge Bledsoe
Louis A. Bledsoe III served on the North Carolina Business Court from 2014 through 2024 and was its chief judge from 2018 until his retirement. Before joining the bench, he practiced business litigation in Charlotte at Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson. He earned his undergraduate degree at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and his law degree at Harvard University.
How Judge Bledsoe decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Raja v. Patel, Bledsoe dismissed the individual plaintiffs’ claims for lack of standing because any increase in the company’s debt service affected the company and its members proportionally, rather than injuring the plaintiffs separately.
“to the extent that Sovereign’s increased debt service is an injury, it is an injury suffered by Sovereign and all of its members according to their pro rata interests, not an injury separate and distinct to the individual Plaintiffs.”
In Rickenbaugh v. Power Home Solar, he held that the parties’ incorporation of AAA rules delegated the question whether class arbitration was available to the arbitrator, and he stayed the litigation pending arbitration.
“the Court further concludes that the parties here clearly and unmistakably agreed in the Agreement that this determination is for the arbitrator rather than the Court.”
In Reynolds American v. Third Motion Equities, he declined to add an appraisal-rights requirement to a North Carolina statute on policy grounds, explaining that the legislature must make that choice.
“It is not the court’s function to rewrite legislation to make it better.”
In Stone Street Partners v. Estate of Siskey, he found that the special-relationship exception did not supply a duty to protect the plaintiffs from a third party's alleged financial misconduct because they alleged economic rather than physical harm.
“it appears to the Court that our appellate courts intend the special relationship exception to apply only where the plaintiff has suffered physical harm or bodily injury.”
Procedural preferences
He grants Rule 12(c) judgment on the pleadings only where the material facts are admitted and just questions of law remain; a genuinely contested contract construction is reserved for summary judgment or trial.
“A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) ‘is the proper procedure when all the material allegations of fact are admitted in the pleadings and only questions of law remain.’”
In Finley v. Brown, Bledsoe rejected a proposed derivative pleading requirement absent from the statute and denied dismissal of those claims. He deferred a separate statutory question about a direct claim and ordered supplemental briefing.
“Defendants’ construction seeks to impose a pleading requirement not present in the statute.”
In Golden Triangle 3 v. RMP-Mallard Pointe, he denied judgment on the pleadings because ambiguous option-agreement terms required evidence of the parties' intent.
“Based on this ambiguity, the Court concludes that judgment on the pleadings is improper under Rule 12(c) and that a determination of the parties’ intent through an examination of extrinsic evidence, either at summary judgment, trial, or both will be necessary”
Before the harshest sanction of dismissal for failure to prosecute, he requires express findings that less drastic sanctions were considered and would not suffice.
“the Court must ‘make findings of fact and conclusions of law which indicate that it has considered less drastic sanctions’ before it dismisses an action.”
Cautions
A confidentiality agreement or a party's own 'confidential' label is not enough to seal court records; the movant must show concrete harm from public disclosure sufficient to overcome the presumption of public access.
“the mere fact that disclosure of the Client Data may constitute a breach of the ASA, standing alone, is not a sufficient basis to justify sealing.”
In Bite Busters, LLC v. Burris, Bledsoe found the noncompete territory and five-year term unreasonable on the pleaded facts. He dismissed the related contract claim and explained that the restriction lacked separable parts he could decline to enforce.
“the Court concludes that on the facts as pleaded, the territory in the Agreement is unreasonable as a matter of law.”
In Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC v. AG Ins. SA/NV, Bledsoe applied Rule 26 to the requested depositions of two senior executives without adopting the federal apex doctrine. He allowed each deposition but limited questioning to four hours.
“the Court declines to adopt the federal apex doctrine, finding that Rule 26 resolves the current dispute concerning the depositions of Ms. Good and Mr. Jamil.”
In Window World of St. Louis, Inc. v. Window World, Inc., Bledsoe dismissed a breach-of-release counterclaim because the release supplied a defense, not an affirmative claim. The defendants had asserted that claim years into the litigation instead of seeking to amend their answers to plead the defense.
“the Court concludes that the Supreme Court of North Carolina, if faced with the issue, would conclude that a release may establish a defense but not an affirmative claim for breach of contract, at least in the circumstances presented here.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“acting ex mero motu, hereby DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ action without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”
“WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.”
“the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s derivative claims”
“The Court DEFERS consideration of Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s direct claim under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 36C-4-405.1(b) to permit an opportunity for supplemental briefing”
“the Court hereby GRANTS the Motions and dismisses Plaintiffs’ claims against Diane Siskey and the MetLife Defendants with prejudice.”
“Defendant Andrew Saville’s Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED, and Plaintiffs’ claims against Saville for conversion, tortious interference with contract, and unfair and deceptive trade practices under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 are hereby dismissed with prejudice.”
“The Court GRANTS the Motion as to Flynn’s purported claims for constructive trust and punitive damages, and those purported claims are DISMISSED without prejudice to Flynn’s right to seek those remedies for any surviving claims that warrant such relief. b. The Motion is otherwise DENIED.”
“Having considered the Motion, the related briefing, and the arguments of counsel at the hearing on the Motion, the Court hereby GRANTS the Motion and DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ claims against GEICO with prejudice.”
“the Court therefore concludes that Defendants’ counterclaims for declaratory judgment and breach of contract based on a breach of the June 2013 Agreement’s release provision should be dismissed.”
“the Court concludes that the Company’s claim for breach of contract based on the non-competition and customer non-solicitation provisions of paragraph 3(a) of the Agreement and its subparagraphs should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).”
“Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Arrowood Motion presents a factual issue for trial and must be denied.”
“Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Duke, the Court concludes that an issue of fact remains concerning whether either of the London Guarantee Policies contain a pollution exclusion. Continental’s Motion must therefore be denied.”
“WHEREFORE, the Court, for the reasons stated above, hereby DENIES the Chubb Defendants’ Motion and the AEGIS Defendants’ Motion without prejudice to the Insurers’ rights to renew either or both Motions after the completion of expert discovery.”
“The Court therefore concludes that a determination of the Motions, including on the separate grounds advanced by AGF and Old Republic, may require consideration of expert testimony and is therefore premature.”
“WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment.”
A historical record
Judge Bledsoe no longer sits on this court. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled here. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.