Louis A. Bledsoe III
Judge Bledsoe no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Bledsoe decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On standing, he treats a shareholder's or LLC member's injury as belonging to the entity unless it is separate and distinct to the individual -- a harm suffered pro rata by the company and all its owners cannot be pursued in an individual capacity, and standing is a jurisdictional threshold he will police sua sponte.
“to the extent that Sovereign’s increased debt service is an injury, it is an injury suffered by Sovereign and all of its members according to their pro rata interests, not an injury separate and distinct to the individual Plaintiffs.”
He reads a party's incorporation of the AAA arbitration rules as clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties delegated substantive arbitrability -- including whether class arbitration is available -- to the arbitrator rather than the court.
“the Court further concludes that the parties here clearly and unmistakably agreed in the Agreement that this determination is for the arbitrator rather than the Court.”
He applies the plain-language canon strictly and defers policy choices to the legislature, refusing to read additional requirements into a statute the General Assembly did not include.
“It is not the court’s function to rewrite legislation to make it better.”
He construes tort duties owed to third parties narrowly: the special-relationship exception to the no-duty-to-control rule reaches only plaintiffs who suffered physical harm, not those claiming pure economic loss.
“it appears to the Court that our appellate courts intend the special relationship exception to apply only where the plaintiff has suffered physical harm or bodily injury.”
Procedural preferences
He grants Rule 12(c) judgment on the pleadings only where the material facts are admitted and just questions of law remain; a genuinely contested contract construction is reserved for summary judgment or trial.
“A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) “is the proper procedure when all the material allegations of fact are admitted in the pleadings and only questions of law remain.””
He declines to impose pleading requirements a statute does not contain, and where a novel, unbriefed statutory question controls he will defer ruling and order supplemental briefing rather than decide it prematurely.
“Defendants’ construction seeks to impose a pleading requirement not present in the statute.”
Where contract language is ambiguous he will not resolve intent against the nonmovant on the pleadings, sending the interpretive question to a fuller record.
“Based on this ambiguity, the Court concludes that judgment on the pleadings is improper under Rule 12(c) and that a determination of the parties’ intent through an examination of extrinsic evidence, either at summary judgment, trial, or both will be necessary”
Before the harshest sanction of dismissal for failure to prosecute, he requires express findings that less drastic sanctions were considered and would not suffice.
“the Court must “make findings of fact and conclusions of law which indicate that it has considered less drastic sanctions” before it dismisses an action.”
Cautions
A confidentiality agreement or a party's own 'confidential' label is not enough to seal court records; the movant must show concrete harm from public disclosure sufficient to overcome the presumption of public access.
“the mere fact that disclosure of the Client Data may constitute a breach of the ASA, standing alone, is not a sufficient basis to justify sealing.”
He strikes overbroad restrictive covenants as unenforceable as a matter of law at the pleading stage and will not judicially rewrite (blue-pencil) provisions lacking distinctly separable parts.
“the Court concludes that on the facts as pleaded, the territory in the Agreement is unreasonable as a matter of law.”
He resolves disputes over deposing senior executives through ordinary Rule 26 burden-versus-benefit balancing rather than any special 'apex' doctrine, so a blanket refusal to produce a top officer will not hold.
“the Court declines to adopt the federal apex doctrine, finding that Rule 26 resolves the current dispute concerning the depositions of Ms. Good and Mr. Jamil.”
A contractual release is a defensive shield, not a sword: absent a covenant not to sue, it cannot be repackaged into an affirmative counterclaim for breach of contract, and he will not rescue an untimely counterclaim by recharacterizing it as a defense after long delay.
“the Court concludes that the Supreme Court of North Carolina, if faced with the issue, would conclude that a release may establish a defense but not an affirmative claim for breach of contract, at least in the circumstances presented here.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“acting ex mero motu, hereby DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ action without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”
“WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.”
“the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s derivative claims”
“The Court DEFERS consideration of Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s direct claim under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 36C-4-405.1(b) to permit an opportunity for supplemental briefing”
“the Court hereby GRANTS the Motions and dismisses Plaintiffs’ claims against Diane Siskey and the MetLife Defendants with prejudice.”
“Defendant Andrew Saville’s Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED, and Plaintiffs’ claims against Saville for conversion, tortious interference with contract, and unfair and deceptive trade practices under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 are hereby dismissed with prejudice.”
“The Court GRANTS the Motion as to Flynn’s purported claims for constructive trust and punitive damages, and those purported claims are DISMISSED without prejudice to Flynn’s right to seek those remedies for any surviving claims that warrant such relief. b. The Motion is otherwise DENIED.”
“Having considered the Motion, the related briefing, and the arguments of counsel at the hearing on the Motion, the Court hereby GRANTS the Motion and DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ claims against GEICO with prejudice.”
“the Court therefore concludes that Defendants’ counterclaims for declaratory judgment and breach of contract based on a breach of the June 2013 Agreement’s release provision should be dismissed.”
“the Court concludes that the Company’s claim for breach of contract based on the non-competition and customer non-solicitation provisions of paragraph 3(a) of the Agreement and its subparagraphs should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).”
“Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Arrowood Motion presents a factual issue for trial and must be denied.”
“Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Duke, the Court concludes that an issue of fact remains concerning whether either of the London Guarantee Policies contain a pollution exclusion. Continental’s Motion must therefore be denied.”
“WHEREFORE, the Court, for the reasons stated above, hereby DENIES the Chubb Defendants’ Motion and the AEGIS Defendants’ Motion without prejudice to the Insurers’ rights to renew either or both Motions after the completion of expert discovery.”
“the Court concludes that a determination of the Motions, including on the separate grounds advanced by AGF and Old Republic, may require consideration of expert testimony and is therefore premature.”
“WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment.”
A historical record
Judge Bledsoe no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.