Julianna Theall Earp
How Judge Earp rules, drawn from 18 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Judge Earp no longer sits on this court. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled here.
About Judge Earp
Julianna Theall Earp served on the North Carolina Business Court from 2021 until her retirement from that court in August 2026. Before joining the bench, she spent more than three decades in civil litigation practice, including leadership roles at Smith Moore Leatherwood and Fox Rothschild. She earned her law degree from the University of Georgia.
How Judge Earp decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In United Therapeutics Corp. v. Liquidia Techs., Inc., Earp held that the complaint identified the alleged trade secrets with enough specificity to survive dismissal, including the documents containing them. She declined to resolve the defendant's competing account of the information at the pleading stage.
“The Court concludes that UTC has described the trade secrets at issue with sufficient specificity for its claim to survive the Motion ... Even more, UTC identifies the documents in which the trade secrets can be found.”
In Bourgeois v. LaPelusa, she dismissed a de facto fiduciary-duty theory because the complaint described voting protections for the plaintiff and did not show that another LLC member dominated its governance.
“Bourgeois may have been mistreated by the other members, but it happened while he was holding -- at the very least -- a card or two. In that circumstance, no de facto fiduciary duty arises.”
In McGriff Insurance Services v. Hudson, she held that an unbroken employment relationship supported the employee's non-solicitation obligations without fresh consideration on renewal.
“Because there was no break in the contractual relationship, no new consideration was necessary to support the non-solicitation obligations.”
In Bourgeois v. LaPelusa, she dismissed conversion claims without prejudice because the plaintiffs alleged that they voluntarily transferred the money but did not plead a demand for its return and a refusal.
“Where there has been no wrongful taking or disposal of the goods, and the defendant has merely come rightfully into possession and then refused to surrender them, demand and refusal are necessary to the existence of the tort.”
Procedural preferences
In Pro-Tops v. Maksimenko, she found service by a private process server defective after rejecting the plaintiff's claimed futility exception to North Carolina's sheriff-service rule.
“There is no futility exception in Rule 4 that would permit a plaintiff to make a subjective determination that it is necessary to hire a private process server.”
In McGriff Insurance Services v. Hudson, she evaluated the proposed amended claims under the same sufficiency standard as the original claims when deciding whether amendment would be futile.
“Since the test for futility mirrors the sufficiency test for a motion to dismiss, the Court will evaluate McGriff's claims, original and proposed, using this same standard.”
In Bourgeois v. LaPelusa, Earp held that the derivative demand's vague references to 'any change of accounts' and 'suitable action' did not sufficiently identify the asserted wrongs for The Pit Box to assess its rights before the later suit.
“A demand to take 'suitable action' regarding 'any change of accounts,' for example, is not sufficiently specific to allow The Pit Box to assess its rights and obligations.”
In Bourgeois v. LaPelusa, she confirmed an arbitration award after no party moved to modify, correct, or vacate it.
“Having received no motion to modify, correct, or vacate the Award, the Court concludes that confirmation of the Award is warranted.”
Cautions
In Miriam Equities, LLC v. LB-UBS 2007-C2 Millstream Rd., LLC, Earp barred the plaintiff from relying on an alternative financing plan it had withheld through the extended discovery period after representing a different source of financing.
“Here, the attempted horse-swapping is not occurring midstream. Instead, and worse, the horse-swapping is being attempted after the horses have reached the far bank of the stream.”
In Ford v. Jurgens, Earp found insufficient proof that the defendant fabricated the disputed bylaws because the forensic expert could not identify who made the document's changes. She separately found fabrication of the Laramie Emails and imposed costs and evidentiary sanctions on that ground.
“Walton could not determine with certainty on which computer Scan 03-06 was created ... he could not discern whether 'Susan,' Russell, or someone else made changes to the document.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss.”
“Plaintiff shall not be permitted to present evidence or argument regarding its intention to utilize funding from Bernard Rubin and his partner (i.e., the alternative funding plan) or any source other than Ameris Bank.”
“For these reasons the Court hereby DENIES the cross-motions for partial summary judgment ... Plaintiff's First Cause of Action seeking a declaratory judgment with respect to his status as a shareholder ... shall proceed to trial.”
“The Court DECLARES that Section 10.1 requires the agreement of more than a single member to avoid a mandatory dissolution event upon the death of a member ... Wendover Donuts, LLC; Kush Donuts, LLC; and Sarash Properties, LLC are each hereby dissolved ... Except as herein stated, Defendant's Motion is DENIED.”
“the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden with respect to the Laramie Emails that were created by Russell on 28 December 2020 and backdated to 10 July 2019 ... the evidence is insufficient at this stage for Plaintiffs to meet their burden to prove that Russell fabricated portions of the Association's bylaws.”
“THEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim is hereby DENIED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Futures Group, Inc.'s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Defendant Denis Brosnan's First and Second Claims for Relief is DENIED.”
“Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.”
“Stephenson’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and MOOTED in part.”
“Bourgeois’ Motion to Amend is DENIED.”
“Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss UTC's First Cause of Action (Misappropriation of Trade Secrets) is DENIED.”
“The Court therefore DENIES Liquidia's Motion to Dismiss UTC's Second Cause of Action against it (Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices).”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and Plaintiff's Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Claims for relief are DISMISSED with prejudice.”
“DENIES both Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss”
“GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint”
“DENIES Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims.”
“Having considered the Motion, the related briefs, other appropriate matters of record, and the arguments of counsel ..., the Court hereby DENIES the Motion.”
A historical record
Judge Earp no longer sits on this court. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled here. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.