Julianna Theall Earp
How Judge Earp decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On trade-secret pleadings she asks only whether the categories of information and the documents containing them are identified with enough specificity to put a defendant on notice -- she will not weigh a defendant's factual counter-narrative (e.g., that the information is 'really' generic) at the motion-to-dismiss stage if that narrative is not itself drawn from the complaint.
“The Court concludes that UTC has described the trade secrets at issue with sufficient specificity for its claim to survive the Motion ... Even more, UTC identifies the documents in which the trade secrets can be found.”
She applies a demanding, fact-specific standard for a de facto fiduciary duty between LLC members or between an employee and employer: mere managerial authority or a senior title is not enough, and she looks for whether one party actually held disproportionate financial or informational control -- if the plaintiff himself held some 'cards' (a voting protection, member status), no de facto duty arises even amid alleged mistreatment.
“Bourgeois may have been mistreated by the other members, but it happened while he was holding -- at the very least -- a card or two. In that circumstance, no de facto fiduciary duty arises.”
She treats an unbroken, automatically-renewing ('evergreen') employment relationship as continuing, adequate consideration for a restrictive covenant signed at the start of employment -- she distinguishes this from a covenant added mid-employment or one that resets in discrete annual terms, which under North Carolina law would need fresh consideration each time.
“Because there was no break in the contractual relationship, no new consideration was necessary to support the non-solicitation obligations.”
She reads a conversion claim strictly: if the defendant came into possession of money or property lawfully (the plaintiff handed it over voluntarily), the plaintiff must plead an actual demand for its return and a refusal -- alleging only that the money was misused, without a demand-and-refusal, is not enough, no matter how egregious the alleged misuse.
“Where there has been no wrongful taking or disposal of the goods, and the defendant has merely come rightfully into possession and then refused to surrender them, demand and refusal are necessary to the existence of the tort.”
Procedural preferences
On service of process she enforces North Carolina's private-process-server rule strictly: a plaintiff cannot unilaterally decide the sheriff would have been futile and hire a private server instead -- there is no futility exception, and only a court clerk's appointment (on a sworn affidavit) can substitute for the sheriff. Actual notice to the defendant does not cure the defect.
“There is no futility exception in Rule 4 that would permit a plaintiff to make a subjective determination that it is necessary to hire a private process server.”
When a plaintiff amends a complaint while a motion to dismiss is pending, she evaluates the proposed amended claims directly under the Rule 12(b)(6)/Rule 15 futility standard rather than requiring a fresh round of briefing -- she will grant leave to amend claim-by-claim, allowing some counts to proceed and others to fail within the same order.
“Since the test for futility mirrors the sufficiency test for a motion to dismiss, the Court will evaluate McGriff's claims, original and proposed, using this same standard.”
On a pre-suit derivative demand, she compares the specific wrongs and relief listed in the plaintiff's actual demand letter against the claims later pleaded in the complaint -- a demand that lists grievances only in vague, catch-all terms ('any change of accounts,' 'suitable action') will not support a later, more detailed derivative complaint, because the company must be able to assess its own rights and choose its own response before being sued.
“A demand to take 'suitable action' regarding 'any change of accounts,' for example, is not sufficiently specific to allow The Pit Box to assess its rights and obligations.”
In confirming arbitration awards she treats the statute's confirmation mandate as close to automatic once no party has timely moved to modify, correct, or vacate the award -- she does not re-examine the arbitrator's factual findings or damages calculations, even a lengthy multi-issue accounting like a wind-up distribution plan.
“Having received no motion to modify, correct, or vacate the Award, the Court concludes that confirmation of the Award is warranted.”
Cautions
She escalates discovery sanctions in proportion to how late and how consequential the nondisclosure was: a party who conceals a central fact (like the true source of financing) until the very end of an already-extended discovery period, after having affirmatively represented something different throughout the case, will be barred from using that concealed fact at all -- she frames this as 'swapping horses' after they have already reached the far bank, not mid-stream.
“Here, the attempted horse-swapping is not occurring midstream. Instead, and worse, the horse-swapping is being attempted after the horses have reached the far bank of the stream.”
She distinguishes sharply between proven evidence-fabrication (which she sanctions severely, including cost-shifting and adverse evidentiary rulings) and merely suspicious circumstantial inconsistencies (which she will not sanction absent an expert or other proof actually tying the alteration to the accused party) -- a forensic expert's inability to identify who made a disputed document's edits was fatal to one sanctions theory even where the same movant succeeded on a companion, better-proven theory in the same motion.
“Walton could not determine with certainty on which computer Scan 03-06 was created ... he could not discern whether 'Susan,' Russell, or someone else made changes to the document.”
She will not consider documents merely 'incorporated by reference' into an attached exhibit on a motion to dismiss if they were not themselves attached to or specifically referenced in the complaint and their authenticity is contested -- citing them extensively in briefing is not enough, and she declines to convert such a motion into one for summary judgment rather than stretch the pleading-stage record.
“Neither Plaintiffs' brief nor the Court's own research has disclosed any cases from North Carolina courts allowing consideration on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion of documents merely incorporated by reference into other documents.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss.”
“Plaintiff shall not be permitted to present evidence or argument regarding its intention to utilize funding from Bernard Rubin and his partner (i.e., the alternative funding plan) or any source other than Ameris Bank.”
“For these reasons the Court hereby DENIES the cross-motions for partial summary judgment ... Plaintiff's First Cause of Action seeking a declaratory judgment with respect to his status as a shareholder ... shall proceed to trial.”
“The Court DECLARES that Section 10.1 requires the agreement of more than a single member to avoid a mandatory dissolution event upon the death of a member ... Wendover Donuts, LLC; Kush Donuts, LLC; and Sarash Properties, LLC are each hereby dissolved ... Except as herein stated, Defendant's Motion is DENIED.”
“the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden with respect to the Laramie Emails that were created by Russell on 28 December 2020 and backdated to 10 July 2019 ... the evidence is insufficient at this stage for Plaintiffs to meet their burden to prove that Russell fabricated portions of the Association's bylaws.”
“THEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim is hereby DENIED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Futures Group, Inc.'s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Defendant Denis Brosnan's First and Second Claims for Relief is DENIED.”
“The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Bourgeois' First Claim for Relief, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, and Bourgeois' First Claim for Relief is DISMISSED with prejudice.”
“Therefore, the Court, in its discretion, DENIES Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Third Claim for Relief, Judicial Dissolution.”
“Stevenson's Motion to Dismiss as to Bourgeois' Fifth Claim for Relief, Conversion to Economic Interest Holder, is GRANTED and the Fifth Claim for Relief is DISMISSED with prejudice.”
“the Court, in its discretion GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Bourgeois' Sixth Claim for Relief, Conversion, and Bourgeois' Sixth Claim for Relief is DISMISSED without prejudice.”
“the Court, in its discretion, GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Seventh Claim for Relief, Conversion, and Auto Sales' Seventh Claim for Relief is DISMISSED without prejudice.”
“the entity Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Alternative Eighth Claim for Relief, Unjust Enrichment, is GRANTED, and the Eighth Claim for Relief against AAG and The Pit Box is DISMISSED without prejudice.”
“Therefore, the Court DENIES the individual Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Alternative Eighth Claim for Relief, Unjust Enrichment.”
“the Court, in its discretion, DENIES Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Bourgeois' Ninth Claim for Relief, Injunctive Relief.”
“Accordingly, the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, DENIES Bourgeois' Motion to Amend.”
“Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss UTC's First Cause of Action (Misappropriation of Trade Secrets) is DENIED.”
“The Court therefore DENIES Liquidia's Motion to Dismiss UTC's Second Cause of Action against it (Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices).”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and Plaintiff's Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Claims for relief are DISMISSED with prejudice.”
“McGriff's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint with respect to its breach of contract claim as to Hudson is GRANTED and Defendants' corresponding Motions to Dismiss are DENIED.”
“Accordingly, absent the blue-penciled clause identified above, McGriff's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint as to its breach of contract claim with respect to Stetson is GRANTED.”
“Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint with respect to its misappropriation of trade secrets claim, and Defendants' corresponding motions to dismiss this claim are DENIED.”
“Accordingly, with respect to the Tortious Interference with Contract claim against Hudson ... and OneDigital ..., the Court GRANTS McGriff's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and DENIES Defendants' corresponding motions to dismiss.”
“In other respects, McGriff's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint as to the Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Relations claim is GRANTED, and Defendants' corresponding motions to dismiss this claim are DENIED ... to the extent McGriff seeks to assert a claim for tortious interference with respect to the pharmacy proposals, McGriff's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint is DENIED.”
“Therefore, the Court GRANTS McGriff's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint as to its claim for violation of the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act and DENIES Defendants' corresponding motions to dismiss.”
“Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Defendants' Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage counterclaim.”
“Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Hudson's UDTPA counterclaim.”
“Having considered the Motion, the related briefs, other appropriate matters of record, and the arguments of counsel ..., the Court hereby DENIES the Motion.”
Put Judge Earp's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Earp actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Earp's own signed orders and cites them.