Adam M. Conrad
How Judge Conrad decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He treats mere non-disclosure or silence as legally distinct from actionable concealment -- a fraud or constructive-fraud claim needs a pleaded affirmative act of hiding information (or a fiduciary duty to speak), not just an allegation that a counterparty stayed quiet about favorable terms it gave someone else.
“Nondisclosure alone is not an affirmative act of concealment. And 'mere generalities or conclusory allegations of fraud will not suffice.'”
He is openly skeptical of section 75-1.1 (North Carolina's unfair-and-deceptive-trade-practices statute) claims layered onto ordinary shareholder or LLC-member disputes, and will dismiss them with prejudice as internal-business-only conduct even when the underlying breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim survives -- he views this as a recurring, avoidable tactic that inflates litigation cost and distorts settlement leverage.
“There exists an impulse to turn every shareholder dispute or disagreement between members of a limited liability company into a section 75-1.1 claim. ... By now, the message should be clear: section 75-1.1 plays no role in resolving these internal corporate disputes.”
On misappropriation-of-trade-secrets claims at the pleading stage, he asks only whether the plaintiff identified the categories of confidential information and a plausible acquisition/use/disclosure sequence -- he will not accept a defendant's factual assertion that the information was 'really' public or generic unless that fact appears on the face of the complaint itself.
“Without citation, Defendants argue that the D2C plan consists of nothing more than publicly available information and is therefore not a trade secret. These factual assertions are not found in the amended complaint. The Court therefore cannot consider them under Rule 12(b)(6).”
He reads a broad arbitration clause ('arising out of or relating to') expansively to reach conspiracy and tort claims that are factually intertwined with a construction contract, even when the claim doesn't require interpreting a specific contract term -- a significant relationship to the contract is enough.
“The clause therefore 'does not limit arbitration to the literal interpretation or performance of the contract.' ... the question is whether the claim has a significant relationship to the contract.”
Procedural preferences
He will not let a plaintiff invoke equitable estoppel offensively to force an unwilling, non-claimant defendant into arbitration -- estoppel binds a party who has already sought a benefit from a contract, but it cannot be wielded by that same party as a sword against someone who never asserted a contract-based claim of their own.
“Equitable estoppel is a defensive theory. ... It 'works to prevent the inequitable result that would occur if a party was able to use a contract as both a sword and shield.'”
When a party stays silent in the face of a show-cause order and skips the hearing after being expressly warned that silence forfeits any contest, he treats that as a deliberate decision not to contest sanctions and will not hold back from the most severe remedy -- striking pleadings and entering default judgment -- once lesser sanctions have already failed.
“Defendants have refused every invitation to explain their conduct. ... the Court concludes that they have made deliberate decisions not to comply with the show-cause order and not to contest an award of sanctions.”
In multi-defendant default-judgment motions, he insists on defendant-by-defendant analysis of each claim rather than a blanket entry: a plaintiff who conflates a corporate defendant's liability with an individual officer's or affiliated shell entity's liability will get default judgment only on the theories that are independently well-pleaded against that specific defendant.
“As an officer, Stacks owed a fiduciary duty to the company but not to its members, former members, or employees. ... McFee has not alleged any other facts to show that she was in a fiduciary relationship with Stacks.”
On repeat discovery noncompliance he escalates deliberately rather than jumping straight to dismissal: a first violation draws fee-shifting and a firm new deadline; only a second, well-documented failure -- especially one paired with counsel's own admission that assurances of compliance were unfounded -- draws the harsher sanction of evidence preclusion.
“This is Plaintiffs' second failure to obey a discovery order. The relatively light sanctions imposed after the first violation appear to have had no effect.”
Cautions
A party's sworn affidavit denying possession of responsive documents will be tested hard against forensic evidence -- if a court-ordered forensic examination later contradicts the affidavit (e.g., recovering thousands of messages a witness said didn't exist), he will treat that as clear evidence of a knowingly false statement to the court, not an innocent memory lapse, and will sanction accordingly.
“Pye went so far as to testify that he was 'not very proficient with technology' and therefore does not 'send many emails or text messages.' Yet Reliance retrieved more than 30,000 text messages from Pye's mobile devices.”
He is wary of a party who first opposes arbitration, loses, and then pivots to demand arbitration of other claims once it becomes strategically convenient -- while he does not always resolve the case on waiver grounds, he flags the tactic explicitly and searches hard for an independent doctrinal reason to deny the about-face.
“It is perhaps even rarer for a plaintiff to request arbitration after first opposing it, as Plaintiffs have done here. ... the Court has not found, and neither side has cited, any case in which a plaintiff unsuccessfully opposed arbitration of some claims and then afterward sought to compel arbitration of other pending claims.”
When two versions of a signed contract or amendment surface in discovery and no witness can explain which one the parties actually agreed to, he treats that as a jury question on mutual assent rather than resolving it himself on summary judgment -- signing a document does not manifest intent to be bound if the signer cannot show which terms they were actually agreeing to.
“There is a question of fact as to whether their signatures manifest the intent to be bound by one version of the amendment or the other.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For all these reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss Maxwell's claim for fraudulent concealment and the related request for punitive damages. The claim is DISMISSED with prejudice.”
“The Court therefore denies Smithfield's motion to dismiss the claim for breach of the PSA's price term.”
“For all these reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint.”
“The Court DENIES the motions as to ... the claims against Corinthia for misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious interference with contractual relationships, unfair or deceptive trade practices under section 75-1.1, and breach of the stipulated injunction order.”
“The Court DISMISSES with prejudice the claims against Fowler and Tucker for breach of contract, tortious interference with contractual relations, misappropriation of trade secrets, and unfair or deceptive trade practices under section 75-1.1.”
“The absent shareholders are therefore not necessary parties. The Court denies the motion to dismiss the claim for judicial dissolution.”
“the Court concludes that Brewster has adequately stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. The Court also concludes that Brewster has stated a claim for civil conspiracy.”
“The Court therefore grants Defendants' motion and dismisses the claim for unfair or deceptive trade practices with prejudice.”
“The motion for default judgment against CPP is GRANTED as to the claims for fraudulent transfer and unjust enrichment. The motion is DENIED as to the claims against CPP for conversion and violations of section 75-1.1.”
“The motion for default judgment against Stacks is GRANTED as to the claim for unjust enrichment. The motion is DENIED as to the claims against Stacks for breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, conversion, fraudulent transfer, and violations of section 75-1.1.”
“The motion for default judgment against Stacks Holding and Sabr Leme is GRANTED as to the claim for unjust enrichment. The motion is DENIED as to the claims against Stacks Holding and Sabr Leme for fraudulent transfer, conversion, and violations of section 75-1.1.”
“In short, the complaint does not adequately allege a breach of the fiduciary duties owed by MAP and therefore does not state a claim for constructive fraud. The Court therefore grants the motion to dismiss this claim.”
“The claim for breach of fiduciary duty is not barred by the prior pending action doctrine. The Court therefore denies the motion to dismiss the claim.”
“Defendants' answers, including all affirmative defenses asserted therein, are STRICKEN. Defendants' third-party claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. Default judgment is ENTERED as to liability on all remaining claims for relief.”
“The motion for reconsideration is therefore denied.”
“The Court therefore stays the claims against Sanctuary pending the conclusion of Plaintiffs' arbitration with Choate and Geoscience.”
“The Court therefore grants the motion to stay the claims against the Miller Defendants.”
“The Court therefore grants the motion to stay the claim asserted against the Pappas Defendants.”
“Therefore, Plaintiffs' motion to compel is denied.”
“As a result, the Court must determine whether the non-arbitrable claim against the Pappas Defendants should be stayed ... Plaintiffs' motion to compel arbitration must be denied for all the reasons discussed above.”
“For the remainder of this action ... Plaintiffs are prohibited from supporting any of their affirmative claims or defenses or opposing any of New JBL's counterclaims or defenses. ... The Court DENIES the request to hold Kixsports, Carr, and Pye in contempt.”
“The Court GRANTS the motion as to the claim for declaratory judgment to the extent that it is based on the declarations requested in subparagraphs 82(b), (c), (e), and (f) ... The Court DENIES the motion as to the claim for declaratory judgment in all other respects.”
“The Court grants summary judgment in favor of Graham, Ann, and Jim as to the derivative claim for breach of fiduciary duty.”
“The Court therefore denies the motion for summary judgment as to the derivative claim for breach of contract.”
“Thus, the Court denies the motions for summary judgment as to Bert's individual claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”
“Therefore, the Court denies the motions for summary judgment as to this claim.”
“For the reasons given above, the Court DENIES Louise's motion for summary judgment.”
“Kixsports, Carr, and Pye shall reimburse Defendants in the amount of $51,707.10. ... The Court holds that Defendants shall be entitled to an adverse inference jury instruction ... The Court DENIES the request to hold Kixsports, Carr, and Pye in contempt.”
“the Court concludes that the record contains evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could infer that a portion of the Project's trusses were defective and thus did not conform to the General Contract's warranty ... Crescent gained the right to self-correct if AP Atlantic ... failed [to cure].”
Put Judge Conrad's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Conrad actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Conrad's own signed orders and cites them.