Adam M. Conrad
How Judge Conrad rules, drawn from 22 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Conrad
Adam M. Conrad has served on the North Carolina Business Court since 2016 and became its chief judge in August 2026. Before joining the bench, he practiced appellate and civil litigation in Charlotte and clerked for a federal appellate judge and a U.S. Supreme Court justice. He earned his law degree from the University of Georgia.
Judge Conrad's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Conrad's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge Conrad decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He treats mere non-disclosure or silence as legally distinct from actionable concealment: a fraud or constructive-fraud claim needs a pleaded affirmative act of hiding information (or a fiduciary duty to speak), not just an allegation that a counterparty stayed quiet about favorable terms it gave someone else.
“Nondisclosure alone is not an affirmative act of concealment. And 'mere generalities or conclusory allegations of fraud will not suffice.'”
In Brewster v. Powell Bail Bonding, Inc., he dismissed a section 75-1.1 claim arising from an internal shareholder dispute and criticized the repeated use of that statute in such disputes for increasing costs and complicating settlement.
“There exists an impulse to turn every shareholder dispute or disagreement between members of a limited liability company into a section 75-1.1 claim. ... By now, the message should be clear: section 75-1.1 plays no role in resolving these internal corporate disputes.”
In Tribike Transport, LLC v. Essick, he denied dismissal of a trade secret claim because the complaint described the confidential business plan and alleged its misuse; the defendants' claim that the plan was public relied on facts outside the pleading.
“Without citation, Defendants argue that the D2C plan consists of nothing more than publicly available information and is therefore not a trade secret. These factual assertions are not found in the amended complaint. The Court therefore cannot consider them under Rule 12(b)(6).”
In Charlotte Student Housing DST v. Choate Construction Co., he held that the conspiracy claim over an alleged concealment of construction defects bore a significant relationship to the construction contract and fell within its broad arbitration clause.
“This conspiracy, as alleged, bears a significant relationship to the contract between Choate and Sanctuary and is therefore a dispute ‘relating to’ that contract, making it subject to the contract’s broad arbitration clause.”
Procedural preferences
In Charlotte Student Housing DST v. Choate Construction Co., he denied the plaintiffs' attempt to compel arbitration against defendants who had asserted no contract claims, holding that equitable estoppel was a defensive theory.
“Equitable estoppel is a defensive theory. ... It ‘works to prevent the inequitable result that would occur if a party was able to use a contract as both a sword and shield.’”
In JCG & Associates v. Disaster America USA, he struck the defendants' answers and entered default judgment on liability after repeated pretrial noncompliance and their failure to respond to a show-cause order or attend the hearing.
“Defendants have refused every invitation to explain their conduct. ... the Court concludes that they have made deliberate decisions not to comply with the show-cause order and not to contest an award of sanctions.”
In McFee v. Presley, he denied default judgment on McFee's fiduciary-duty and constructive-fraud claims against Stacks because an officer's duty ran to the company and the complaint alleged no separate fiduciary relationship with McFee.
“As an officer, Stacks owed a fiduciary duty to the company but not to its members, former members, or employees. ... McFee has not alleged any other facts to show that she was in a fiduciary relationship with Stacks.”
In Lunsford v. JBL Communications, he barred the plaintiffs from presenting evidence for their claims and defenses after a second discovery-order violation, finding that earlier, lighter sanctions had failed.
“This is Plaintiffs' second failure to obey a discovery order. The relatively light sanctions imposed after the first violation appear to have had no effect.”
After a long bankruptcy stay, Conrad dismissed an abandoned appeal and a foreign-judgment claim for failure to prosecute where the affected parties had not participated, the delay prejudiced the opposing side, and lesser sanctions would not be effective. He dismissed the claim without prejudice.
“The Court has considered lesser sanctions but concludes that they would be insufficient.”
Cautions
In Kixsports, Conrad found Pye's sworn account of limited text messaging contradicted by a forensic examination that recovered more than 30,000 messages from his devices.
“Pye went so far as to testify that he was ‘not very proficient with technology’ and therefore does not ‘send many emails or text messages.’ (Pye Aff. ¶ 11.) Yet Reliance retrieved more than 30,000 text messages from Pye’s mobile devices.”
In Charlotte Student Housing DST v. Choate Construction Co., he noted that the plaintiffs first opposed arbitration and later sought it for other claims, but denied the later motion on equitable-estoppel grounds without deciding waiver.
“It is perhaps even rarer for a plaintiff to request arbitration after first opposing it, as Plaintiffs have done here. ... the Court has not found, and neither side has cited, any case in which a plaintiff unsuccessfully opposed arbitration of some claims and then afterward sought to compel arbitration of other pending claims.”
In Bennett v. Bennett, he denied summary judgment on the validity of an LLC operating-agreement amendment after two versions with identical signature pages raised a factual question about which version the members intended to accept.
“There is a question of fact as to whether their signatures manifest the intent to be bound by one version of the amendment or the other.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For all these reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss Maxwell's claim for fraudulent concealment and the related request for punitive damages. The claim is DISMISSED with prejudice.”
“The Court therefore denies Smithfield's motion to dismiss the claim for breach of the PSA's price term.”
“For all these reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint.”
“For these reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the motions to dismiss as follows:”
“The absent shareholders are therefore not necessary parties. The Court denies the motion to dismiss the claim for judicial dissolution.”
“the Court concludes that Brewster has adequately stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. The Court also concludes that Brewster has stated a claim for civil conspiracy.”
“The Court therefore grants Defendants' motion and dismisses the claim for unfair or deceptive trade practices with prejudice.”
“The motion for default judgment against CPP is GRANTED as to the claims for fraudulent transfer and unjust enrichment. The motion is DENIED as to the claims against CPP for conversion and violations of section 75-1.1.”
“The motion for default judgment against Stacks is GRANTED as to the claim for unjust enrichment. The motion is DENIED as to the claims against Stacks for breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, conversion, fraudulent transfer, and violations of section 75-1.1.”
“The motion for default judgment against Stacks Holding and Sabr Leme is GRANTED as to the claim for unjust enrichment. The motion is DENIED as to the claims against Stacks Holding and Sabr Leme for fraudulent transfer, conversion, and violations of section 75-1.1.”
“In short, the complaint does not adequately allege a breach of the fiduciary duties owed by MAP and therefore does not state a claim for constructive fraud. The Court therefore grants the motion to dismiss this claim.”
“The claim for breach of fiduciary duty is not barred by the prior pending action doctrine. The Court therefore denies the motion to dismiss the claim.”
“Defendants’ answers, including all affirmative defenses asserted therein, are STRICKEN. ... Defendants’ third-party claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. ... Default judgment is ENTERED as to liability on all remaining claims for relief (other than the alternative claim for negligent misrepresentation) asserted against Defendants, and this matter shall proceed to a determination of Plaintiffs’ damages.”
“The motion for reconsideration is therefore denied.”
“the Court stays the claims against Sanctuary pending the conclusion of Plaintiffs’ arbitration with Choate and Geoscience.”
“The Court therefore grants the motion to stay the claims against the Miller Defendants.”
“The Court therefore grants the motion to stay the claim asserted against the Pappas Defendants.”
“Therefore, Plaintiffs' motion to compel is denied.”
“As a result, the Court must determine whether the non-arbitrable claim against the Pappas Defendants should be stayed ... Plaintiffs' motion to compel arbitration must be denied for all the reasons discussed above.”
“For the remainder of this action (including but not limited to any motion for summary judgment or trial), Plaintiffs are prohibited from supporting any of their affirmative claims or defenses or opposing any of New JBL’s counterclaims or defenses. ... In all other respects, the Court DENIES New JBL’s motion.”
“The Court GRANTS the motion as to the claim for declaratory judgment to the extent that it is based on the declarations requested in subparagraphs 82(b), (c), (e), and (f) ... The Court DENIES the motion as to the claim for declaratory judgment in all other respects.”
“The Court grants summary judgment in favor of Graham, Ann, and Jim as to the derivative claim for breach of fiduciary duty.”
“The Court therefore denies the motion for summary judgment as to the derivative claim for breach of contract.”
“Thus, the Court denies the motions for summary judgment as to Bert's individual claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”
“Therefore, the Court denies the motions for summary judgment as to this claim.”
“For the reasons given above, the Court DENIES Louise's motion for summary judgment.”
“Kixsports, Carr, and Pye shall reimburse Defendants in the amount of $51,707.10. ... The Court holds that Defendants shall be entitled to an adverse inference jury instruction ... The Court DENIES the request to hold Kixsports, Carr, and Pye in contempt.”
“For all these reasons, the Court DENIES McHatton’s motion to dismiss.”
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