Taylor B. McNeel
How Judge McNeel rules, drawn from 30 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge McNeel
Taylor Brantley McNeel is a judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Appointed by President Donald J. Trump, Judge McNeel received a commission on December 14, 2020.
Judge McNeel's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge McNeel's own (checked October 9, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026).
How Judge McNeel decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On an emergency TRO in an NCAA-eligibility antitrust case, the judge measured the plaintiff's showing of irreparable harm against a comparable case from another circuit, focusing on concrete, provable stakes (playing time, a starting role, specific NIL income) rather than accepting general assertions of harm.
“Wade does not even list which position on the basketball court he plays, much less what specific amount of NIL income that he is potentially missing out on. Absent more, the Court cannot see how an ex parte temporary restraining order would be necessary to change the status quo.”
In Wade v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, he weighed the player's delay in seeking emergency relief after an internal appeal against the requested restraining order.
“Wade does not put forward any law that requires a plaintiff to exhaust the administrative remedies of the NCAA (a non-governmental entity) as a prerequisite to bring an antitrust suit. ... But he waited until this late date.”
An arbitration clause embedded in an employee handbook was unenforceable where the employer retained unilateral authority to revoke, change, and interpret the handbook's terms; the purported promise did not bind the employer and was therefore illusory.
“Because the Defendants have reserved the unilateral right to revoke, change, and interpret the arbitration provision, just like any other term in the Handbook, the promise to arbitrate is an illusory promise—meaning the Defendants really have made no promise at all.”
At the pleading stage in Johnson, a prior state limitations dismissal did not preclude renewed fraud-based claims. The court also found the alleged forged LLC documents sufficiently specific to permit discovery.
“a dismissal based on the statute of limitations is not a final adjudication on the merits.”
In First Service Bank v. Swarek, he granted the bank summary judgment after finding that the borrower’s opposition offered only unsupported conclusions.
“Swarek only makes unsupported and conclusory arguments in opposition, and the standard at summary judgment requires more.”
Procedural preferences
In Wade v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, he found that the proposed temporary restraining order would create a new status quo rather than preserve the one already in place.
“Rather than protecting the status quo, Wade's motion for temporary restraining order seeks to establish it.”
In Ruffin v. Turner, he denied preliminary relief after the plaintiff failed to give the defendants the notice the court had directed.
“the Court cannot enter a preliminary injunction because Ruffin has not notified the Defendants, despite the Court’s instruction to do so.”
Cautions
In the consolidated PH litigation, the judge preserved a negligent retention and supervision claim against the school district where the timing of reports and alleged misconduct remained disputed. He identified that the timeline might support judgment at trial, but would not weigh it on summary judgment.
“it is not this Court’s responsibility to weigh the evidence at this stage.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, for the reasons stated on the record at the hearing held on May 19, 2023, Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order [2] is DENIED.”
“John Wade’s Motion for an ex parte Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction [3] is DENIED in part. The ex parte relief is denied, and all other aspects of the motion are taken under advisement.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that this matter is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. This CASE is CLOSED.”
“This civil action is dismissed without prejudice for failure to obey the Court's Orders and to prosecute.”
“IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that this civil action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as frivolous and for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, for the reasons stated on the record at the hearing held on November 3, 2022, Melissa N. Rayborn's Motion to Remand [6] is DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the claims asserted in Aaron Paul McLendon's Complaint [1] are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE to their being asserted again until the conditions set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), are met.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss [14] is GRANTED. ... IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [1] filed by Candra Beth Clark is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Petitioner's Motion for Preliminary Injunction [19] is DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [14] is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that this CASE is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Willard's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that this civil action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to obey the Court's Orders.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, for the reasons stated on the record at the hearing held on October 4, 2022, Gulfport's Motion to Dismiss [10] is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, for the reasons stated on the record at the hearing held on October 4, 2022, Gulfport's Motion to Quash [20] is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
His general docket in the Gulfport/Hattiesburg divisions includes personal-injury removals, civil-rights and employment claims, prisoner habeas petitions, contract and insurance disputes, and criminal cases; he also handles emergency motions referred to him under the court's internal reassignment rule when the regularly assigned judge is unavailable.
Pending matters in the official report
Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.
| Motions pending more than six months | 1 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 1 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2026 | 1 | 1 |
| Sep 2025 | 2 | 1 |
| Mar 2025 | 5 | 1 |
| Sep 2024 | 2 | 2 |
| Mar 2024 | 1 | 2 |
| Sep 2023 | 1 | 2 |
| Mar 2023 | 1 | 2 |
| Sep 2022 | 0 | 2 |
| Mar 2022 | 0 | 3 |
| Sep 2021 | 0 | 1 |
| Mar 2021 | 0 | 1 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
How long civil cases take in this court
For the whole of U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, not for Judge McNeel: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
| Cases | Median time | |
|---|---|---|
| All civil cases closed | 1,034 | 9.4 months |
| Closed with no court action | 613 | 8.4 months |
| Closed before pretrial | 385 | 9.9 months |
| Closed during or after pretrial | 26 | 21 months |
| Closed during trial | 10 | 21.5 months |
| 12 months ending | Cases closed | Median time |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | 1,034 | 9.4 months |
| Sep 2024 | 988 | 8.7 months |
| Sep 2023 | 972 | 11 months |
| Sep 2022 | 1,139 | 11.9 months |
| Sep 2021 | 1,061 | 11.2 months |
| Sep 2020 | 1,605 | 7.2 months |
| Sep 2019 | 1,094 | 9.3 months |
The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).
Draft for Judge McNeel with the record in hand
Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge McNeel, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.
Opens in Ezel Pro.
- Grounded in Judge McNeel's own signed orders
- Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
- Chat, drafting and research in one workspace