Daniel P. Jordan III
How Judge Jordan rules, drawn from 25 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Jordan
Daniel Porter Jordan, III is a judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Appointed by President George W. Bush, Judge Jordan received a commission on August 7, 2006.
Judge Jordan's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Jordan's own (checked October 9, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026).
How Judge Jordan decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Gearlds, Jordan found that the ERISA estoppel complaint did not allege bad faith or intentional misconduct sufficient to establish extraordinary circumstances.
“Gearlds’s Complaint contains no allegations of any bad faith or intentional misconduct by Entergy.”
In allocating tort duty between a shipper and a trucking carrier, the judge worked from the specific text of federal and state trucking regulations rather than general negligence principles, and required record evidence that a party actually undertook a voluntary duty before imposing one.
“The motor carrier industry is heavily regulated, yet all of these state and federal sources indicate that once cargo is loaded, a commercial driver has a duty to inspect, properly distribute, and secure it. None mention concurrent obligations held by the shipper.”
Faced with an unreliable expert whose design-alternative testimony kept changing at the hearing itself, the judge distinguished between an expert's admissible core opinion and speculative add-ons introduced late, rather than excluding the witness wholesale.
“Sutherland's evolving opinions regarding the fuse leaves the Court with nothing more than insufficient 'conceptualize[d] possibilities.' ... In short, Sutherland has not employed 'in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.'”
In Henderson v. Dunlap, he allowed limited discovery on whether federal employees acted within the scope of their employment after the plaintiff supplied specific allegations and supporting records suggesting a personal motive.
“And those allegations are enough to obtain discovery.”
Procedural preferences
In Moore v. Mississippi Department of Human Services, he granted summary judgment after the plaintiff cited no record evidence for her comparator argument and the proposed coworker was not similarly situated.
“This argument falls short for a host of reasons, beginning with Moore's failure to cite any record evidence supporting its factual basis. ... The motion can be granted on this basis alone.”
In Ware v. U.S. Bank National Ass'n, he rejected a new defective-process theory first raised in the summary-judgment response and declined late amendment after the relevant facts had long been known.
“A claim which is not raised in the complaint, but, rather, is raised only in response to a motion for summary judgment is not properly before the court. ... Given this combination of facts, the Court concludes that leave to amend should not be extended at this late date.”
In Williams v. Vanderbilt Mortgage & Finance, Inc., he denied dismissal motions without prejudice and invited fuller briefing on Mississippi tolling law and a title searcher's duty to third parties.
“The Court acknowledges and regrets that it is essentially punting the issues back to the parties. On the other hand, any order deciding these issues would be based on arguments and authorities that the parties have not yet fully addressed.”
In Macon, after the plaintiffs repeatedly failed to support their claims and left other dispositive arguments unanswered, he declined leave to amend.
“Because of these repeated failures—and other dispositive arguments Plaintiffs left unaddressed—leave to amend is not appropriate.”
Cautions
In Keener's habeas case, he denied the prisoner's letter to the extent it sought relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6).
“As set out in the Order, to the extent Keener's letter was intended as a Rule 60(b)(6) motion, it is denied.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Crane and IKBI's motions to remand should be granted. Kellogg's motion to file a sur-rebuttal is granted as the Court did consider, but declined to adopt, the arguments therein stated. This case is remanded to the Circuit Court of Neshoba County, Mississippi.”
“Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Crane and IKBI's motions to remand should be granted.”
“Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendant E-Z Trench's Motion for Summary Judgment is well-taken and should be granted.”
“Entergy's Motion to Dismiss [12] is GRANTED and the Complaint is dismissed without prejudice.”
“Canal is entitled to a declaratory judgment that it has no duty to defend and no duty to indemnify under the Policy for the subject accident... the Court finds that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment should be granted.”
“This Order protects Plaintiffs from the limited irreparable harm they have asserted, but allows Mississippi House Bill 1390 (‘the Act’) to take effect, at least for now... For these reasons, the motion for preliminary injunction [5] is granted in part.”
“the statute-of-limitations defense is denied without prejudice to Defendant's right to reassert the argument in a properly supported motion for summary judgment.”
“The Court therefore concludes that the motions should be denied without prejudice to the Defendants’ rights to reassert the legal arguments in a well-supported motion for summary judgment.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [37] is granted and Plaintiff's claims are dismissed with prejudice.”
“Defendant's Motion to Allow Payment of Attorneys' Fees, Costs and Expenses from Funds Subject to Forfeiture Order [161] ... [is] denied”
“Given that the Fifth Circuit has affirmed her conviction, the Court finds that the motion is moot. Regardless, the Court would deny the request.”
“the Government's Motion for Forfeiture of Property [174] is granted.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [23] is granted.”
“For the above stated reasons, the Court grants JSU's motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to Counts One and Two of the Amended Complaint but denies the motion with respect to Count Three.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Chase's Motion for Summary Judgment [86] is granted.”
“Nissan's Motion for Summary Judgment [37] is therefore granted, and this action is due to be dismissed.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Jordan's docket mixes prisoner section 1983 and habeas matters (2241 and 2254), employment and personal-injury civil suits, arbitration and insurance disputes, and a substantial criminal docket, with a steady flow of new civil and criminal filings continuing through mid-2026.
Pending matters in the official report
Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.
| Motions pending more than six months | 0 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 2 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2026 | 0 | 2 |
| Sep 2025 | 1 | 2 |
| Mar 2025 | 0 | 3 |
| Sep 2024 | 0 | 2 |
| Mar 2024 | 1 | 5 |
| Sep 2023 | 0 | 3 |
| Mar 2023 | 0 | 2 |
| Sep 2022 | 0 | 2 |
| Mar 2022 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2021 | 0 | 1 |
| Mar 2021 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2020 | 0 | 2 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
How long civil cases take in this court
For the whole of U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, not for Judge Jordan: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
| Cases | Median time | |
|---|---|---|
| All civil cases closed | 1,034 | 9.4 months |
| Closed with no court action | 613 | 8.4 months |
| Closed before pretrial | 385 | 9.9 months |
| Closed during or after pretrial | 26 | 21 months |
| Closed during trial | 10 | 21.5 months |
| 12 months ending | Cases closed | Median time |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | 1,034 | 9.4 months |
| Sep 2024 | 988 | 8.7 months |
| Sep 2023 | 972 | 11 months |
| Sep 2022 | 1,139 | 11.9 months |
| Sep 2021 | 1,061 | 11.2 months |
| Sep 2020 | 1,605 | 7.2 months |
| Sep 2019 | 1,094 | 9.3 months |
The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).
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