Michael P. Mills

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi district Appointed by George W. Bush (Republican) 14 signed orders read

How Judge Mills decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

A fraudulent-joinder argument against a non-diverse defendant succeeds when the plaintiff's own briefing effectively concedes there is no viable federal or state claim against that party.

“Plaintiffs thus appear to belatedly recognize that they have no actual federal claims against the medical providers in this case, but this does not alter the fact that they asserted such a right to recovery in their complaint.”

In a jail-suicide Sec. 1983 case, a highly selective description of the record by the defendant moving to dismiss backfires -- the court would rather let the case proceed to summary judgment after discovery than resolve the record's ambiguities on the pleadings alone.

“the fact that defendant provides a highly selective and self-serving description of its own exhibit makes this court rather strongly inclined to conclude that discovery will, in fact, be required in this case before ruling on its merits.”

Procedural preferences

The judge has a strong preference for deciding cases on the merits over defaults, and will readily set aside a clerk's entry of default and allow a late answer once the movant offers any real justification.

“This court has a strong preference for deciding cases on their merits, rather than on the basis of defaults, and it accordingly concludes that counter-defendants' motions should be granted, for essentially the reasons stated in their motions seeking to do so.”

Punitive-damages summary judgment motions are routinely deferred to an evidentiary hearing at trial under Mississippi's mandatory bifurcation statute, rather than decided on the pretrial record.

“the most prudent course of action is to strictly follow the procedure outlined in Sec. 11-1-65(l)(c) and leave the issue of punitive damages for trial, in the event that an award of compensatory damages is entered against the defendant.”

Cautions

A public employer's ambiguous termination letter can still survive a due-process challenge if pay and benefits continue through the scheduled hearing date, even where other language in the letter suggests the firing was already final.

“Since Mr. Nelson was given an opportunity for a hearing on June 9, and since his pay continued through that date, that hearing opportunity must have been before he was deprived of any significant property interest.”

The judge will publicly flag sloppy or misleading boilerplate in a termination letter even while ultimately ruling for the drafting party, inviting counsel to fix the template going forward.

“Going forward, this attorney might consider clarifying the language of his termination letters to ensure they more obviously align with clear and binding precedent.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Bruno v. RIH Acquisitions MS I, LLC
530 F. Supp. 2d 819 · 2008-01-14
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted in part

“the court, having considered the memoranda and submissions of the parties, concludes that the motion should be granted in part and denied in part.”

Williamson Pounders Architects, P.C. v. Tunica County
681 F. Supp. 2d 766 · 2008-10-29
Motion to alter amend judgment (plaintiff) Denied

“As such WPA's request that the court find notice was given in February 2002 is denied.”

Champluvier v. Couch
N.D. Miss. 2008 · 2008-05-20

A pro se plaintiff, whose embezzlement conviction had been reversed on a technicality, sued the prosecutor who tried her, framing the claim as a constitutional violation rather than a Sec. 1983 suit. On 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(e)(2)(b) screening, the court found the prosecutor's interpretation of the embezzlement statute 'well within the bounds of reason' and dismissed with prejudice: 'the instant case shall be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.'

Hood v. Central United Life Insurance
664 F. Supp. 2d 672 · 2009-09-30
Motion for reconsideration (plaintiff) Granted

“Hood's motion for reconsideration is GRANTED.”

Summary judgment (defendant) Granted in part

“Central United's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.”

Brown v. Epps
758 F. Supp. 2d 347 · 2010-12-21
Habeas corpus 2254 (petitioner) Granted

“Brown has demonstrated that his claim for relief based upon Ground Two (violation of his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses) is well taken and will be granted. The judgment of the trial court will be vacated. ... The state must initiate a new trial on these charges against the petitioner within 120 days.”

Staples v. Regions Bank
825 F. Supp. 2d 754 · 2011-11-10
Motions to remand (plaintiff) Denied

“the motion to remand is due to be denied.”

Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“their motion to dismiss will be granted.”

Motion to compel arbitration (defendant) Granted

“Regions' motion to compel arbitration is granted;”

Goudelock v. McLemore
985 F. Supp. 2d 816 · 2013-12-05
Motion to reopen case (plaintiff) Denied

“the Motion to Reopen Case, Enforce Settlement, Remove Trustee, and Appoint Successor Trustee is DENIED.”

Baxter v. City of Hernando
997 F. Supp. 2d 463 · 2014-01-28

A resident's First Amendment challenge to a city sign ordinance -- converted from summary judgment briefing to a non-jury trial on stipulated facts -- was dismissed because he had already litigated and lost the identical challenge in Mississippi municipal and county court, and federal law required giving that state-court judgment preclusive effect: 'For the reasons stated above, this cause must be dismissed.'

38 Films, LLC v. Yamano
296 F. Supp. 3d 813 · 2017-10-30
Summary judgment (defendant) Denied

“the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Copyright claim [59] is DENIED.”

Boddie v. Walker
280 F. Supp. 3d 920 · 2017-11-21
Summary judgment (defendant) Moot / procedural

“Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment is dismissed without prejudice to the arguments therein being raised at an evidentiary hearing at trial, should such a hearing prove necessary.”

McCain v. City of Cleveland
286 F. Supp. 3d 800 · 2017-12-14
Motions to strike (defendant) Granted

“City of Cleveland and Charles Bingham's Motion to Strike Hearsay In Plaintiff's Brief is GRANTED.”

Wallace v. Desoto Cnty. Sch. Dist.
302 F. Supp. 3d 779 · 2018-03-21
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted in part

“it is ordered that defendant Desoto County School District's motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part, as more specifically set forth in this order.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Median motion-to-ruling time: 69 days (N = 5).

The sampled dockets spanned consumer credit and FCRA disputes, product-liability and personal-injury removals, employment and civil-rights litigation (including a superintendent's wrongful-termination suit and a county-jail suicide case), insurance and ERISA benefits disputes, contract and default-judgment collection actions, and several federal False Claims Act civil suits. Several sampled cases ended in stipulated or settlement dismissals rather than a contested ruling, consistent with a civil docket where most cases resolve before judgment; the docket also reflects a substantial criminal caseload (e.g. United States v. Brown) alongside the civil docket sampled here.

Put Judge Mills's record to work

Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Mills actually rules, not a generic AI guess.

Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Mills's own signed orders and cites them.