Debra M. Brown
How Judge Brown decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On a motion to dismiss premised on a defendant's failure to follow an internal policy, the judge treated the policy violation as legally irrelevant standing alone and focused instead on whether the plaintiff pleaded facts showing the individual defendant had actual notice of a constitutional risk.
“the failure to follow a relevant policy does not, standing alone, establish a violation of a constitutional right.”
Procedural preferences
The judge enforces case-management deadlines literally: a summary-judgment motion filed even one day after the court's own dispositive-motions cutoff was denied as untimely, regardless of its apparent merit, because the movant never sought an extension.
“This procedural ruling is not intended to suggest that the motion for summary judgment is without merit.”
Cautions
She will dismiss a Section 1983 official-capacity claim as duplicative of the claim against the government entity itself, even while declining to dismiss a parallel state-law official-capacity claim the state tort-claims statute expressly permits -- litigants should not assume one dismissal standard covers both theories.
“a Section 1983 claims against an officer in his official capacity are duplicative with the claims against the relevant entity”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The motion to dismiss [8] is GRANTED and the claims brought against the City, Bingham, Bracey, Lomax, and Livingston are DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim.”
“the first motion to dismiss will be denied.”
“The second motion to dismiss [18] is GRANTED in Part and DENIED in Part. The motion is GRANTED to the extent it seeks dismissal of the Section 1983 claims asserted against Fisher in his official capacity. The motion is DENIED in all other respects.”
“Because both the motion for summary judgment and the joinder to it were filed after the dispositive motions deadline, the motions [71][72] are DENIED as untimely.”
“Accordingly, MVSU's motion for summary judgment is DENIED.”
“Based on the above analysis, Defendants' motions are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The motions are DENIED to the extent they seek dismissal of this action.”
“As to Defendants' request for transfer of venue, the motions are GRANTED. Since this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over certain Defendants and venue is inappropriate in this District, it is hereby ORDERED that this ease is transferred to the Eastern District of Louisiana under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).”
“Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that the Motion for Summary Judgment [44] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Chase is awarded a judgment against Plaintiff for the balance of the credit card account in the amount of $30,063.76. The request for attorney's fees, however, is denied without prejudice at this time.”
“For the reasons above, Defendants' motion for summary judgment [14] is GRANTED. A judgment consistent with this opinion will issue.”
“Denice has not identified a policymaker or a policy which was enacted with deliberate indifference. Furthermore, Denice has not shown that Damion suffered a constitutional deprivation. Accordingly, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted as to the § 1983 claim.”
“For the reasons set forth above, the Court: (1) STRIKES Plaintiffs response [21] opposing Defendant's motion for summary judgment; (2) STRIKES Plaintiffs responsive memorandum [20] opposing Defendant's motion for summary judgment; and (3) GRANTS in Part and DENIES in Part Defendants' motion for summary judgment [15]. The motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs § 1983 claims, and is DENIED as to Plaintiffs state law claims, over which this Court has declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction. This matter is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of Coahoma County.”
“For the reasons above, Defendant's motion for summary judgment [27] is GRANTED.”
“For the reasons above, Defendants' motion for summary judgment [14] is GRANTED in Part and DENIED in Part. The motion is granted to the extent it seeks dismissal of: (1) Demetrius' § 1983 claims against the City and against Rosenthal, O'Bannon, and Hagerman in their official capacities; (2) Eugenia's § 1983 claims against the City and against Rosenthal, O'Bannon, and Hagerman in their official capacities; and (3) Eugenia's § 1983 claims against Hagerman in his individual capacity. The motion is denied as to: (1) Demetrius' § 1983 claim against Hagerman in his individual capacity; (2) the state law claims; and (3) in all other respects.”
“For the reasons above, Defendant's motion for summary judgment, Doc. # 43, is DENIED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
As Chief Judge of a three-active-judge district, her active docket spans Social Security appeals, employment and civil-rights claims, prisoner civil-rights suits, insurance and diversity contract disputes, copyright and criminal matters. Recent filings on her docket include a 2026 Clean Air Act citizen suit against an AI-data-center power plant and a state-court removal action naming an AI company as a defendant, reflecting the district's growing caseload of technology-adjacent disputes alongside its traditional civil-rights and Delta-region litigation.
Put Judge Brown's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Brown actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Brown's own signed orders and cites them.