Mark Douglas Harpool
How Judge Harpool decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
At the pleading stage he is plaintiff-favorable on motions to dismiss, especially in antitrust: he applies the Eighth Circuit's reluctance to resolve market-definition questions on the pleadings and will let even 'thin' allegations proceed to discovery. Defendants should usually save market-definition and merits attacks for summary judgment.
“Eighth Circuit courts are particularly reluctant to dismiss an antitrust suit at the pleadings stage, as 'proper market definition can be determined only after a factual inquiry into the commercial realities faced by consumers.'”
At summary judgment he decides on the narrowest dispositive ground and declines to reach alternative theories in the interest of judicial efficiency. Lead with your single strongest dispositive argument rather than spreading effort across every theory.
“The Court, having granted summary judgment based on Plaintiffs having to bring their claim as a compulsory counterclaim in the first arbitration and in the interest of judicial efficiency, need not proceed on the issue of res judicata.”
Procedural preferences
Treats a party's failure to respond to an argument as a concession of it. Respond to every distinct argument raised against you, including in a summary-judgment opposition.
“This Court agrees with Defendants that the contract between Plaintiff and Defendants precludes Plaintiff's unjust enrichment allegation in Count Three.”
On exemption and other fact-intensive defenses he denies summary judgment where the substance of the duties (not the job label) is genuinely disputed; he reserves such questions for the factfinder.
“this Court finds that material disagreement exists between the parties related to the nature of Plaintiff's professional duties as an office manager at the Dealership, thereby precluding summary judgment.”
Applies Missouri substantive law strictly to the elements of a claim: there is no fiduciary duty in an ordinary borrower-lender relationship (defeating equitable-accounting claims), and a punitive-damages claim must be tethered to a properly pled independent and willful tort.
“The relationship between borrower and lender is a debtor-creditor, not a fiduciary relationship.”
He enforces the pleadings/non-pleadings distinction strictly: a Rule 12(f) motion to strike cannot be used against summary-judgment briefing (declarations, statements of fact) because those are not pleadings; objections to summary-judgment evidence belong in the summary-judgment briefing itself, not a separate motion to strike.
“Neither a motion for summary judgment, nor its accompanying memorandum in support, nor the attached statement of uncontroverted facts is a pleading, and courts in this district have generally not permitted parties to attack such non-pleadings through motions to strike.”
Cautions
He penalizes parties who misstate the holdings of the cases they cite, and will say so bluntly when the cited precedent cuts against the citing party. Cite authority accurately; do not overstate that opposing language is 'identical'.
“This demonstrates, rather clearly, that Defendant Howard's claim about identical language is meritless.”
He construes asserted Eleventh Amendment immunity waivers narrowly and requires the most express federal-court language; a state-law or state-court waiver will not subject a state entity to suit in federal court.
“The CEFA does not contain 'the most express language' or 'overwhelming implication' that it intends to waive its immunity in federal courts.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 69) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.”
“For foregoing reasons, Defendants Morris and Howard's Motions to Dismiss are DENIED.”
“For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is GRANTED in PART and DENIED in PART.”
“Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count I – Breach of Contract is DENIED. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count II – Petition to Determining Amounts Due is GRANTED. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count III – Punitive Damages for Breach is DENIED.”
“For foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.”
“Also before this Court are Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for judicial notice of two relevant arbitration awards, which this Court GRANTS, and motion for extension of time for amended pleadings, which this court finds as MOOT, since Defendants' motion to dismiss is hereby denied.”
“...and motion for extension of time for amended pleadings, which this court finds as MOOT, since Defendants' motion to dismiss is hereby denied.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Summary Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Defendants.”
“Defendants' Motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Summary judgment is denied as to Counts One and Two, but granted in favor of Defendants as to Count Three.”
“To the extent Plaintiff believes her opposition reflects her own summary judgment motion, such a motion is DENIED.”
“For the reasons discussed above, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Case is DENIED.”
“For the reasons discussed above, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to Count I - Unjust Enrichment and Count II - Injunctive Relief.”
“For the reasons stated, the Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Declaration and Other Inadmissible Portions of her Factual Statements and Responses is DENIED.”
Put Judge Harpool's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Harpool actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Harpool's own signed orders and cites them.