Howard Frederic Sachs
How Judge Sachs decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He applies Eighth Circuit law and predicts how the circuit would rule rather than adopting persuasive out-of-circuit exceptions. Ground jurisdictional arguments (e.g. Rooker-Feldman) in Eighth Circuit authority, not other circuits' minority rules.
“The Nesses exception to Rooker-Feldman has been unmentioned by judges in other Circuits, and I believe the Eighth Circuit would apply Rooker-Feldman rather than Nesses here.”
He credits firsthand, on-the-ground testimony over that of remote administrators, and will say plainly when a witness's distance from the facts makes the testimony unhelpful. Put witnesses with direct knowledge in front of him.
“The administrative personnel, while apparently experienced, well-motivated and competent, were so removed from in-cell conditions that their testimony was not very helpful.”
Procedural preferences
He avoids premature rulings, grounding his discretion in the constitutional bar on advisory opinions; where facts are fluid (e.g. a pending class settlement) he prefers to stay rather than dismiss, to let the issues harden. Do not press him to decide an issue that may never need an answer.
“the current situation is sufficiently fluid as to preclude judicial opining on issues that may never require an answer.”
On a preliminary injunction he applies the Dataphase factors and will deny relief where the threatened harm is not imminent, but he will pointedly warn the prevailing party that it proceeds at its own risk on the merits.
“Defendants know, however, that they proceed at their own risk, and have been dramatically alerted to the claim for equal treatment.”
Cautions
He rejects mootness-by-amendment: a defendant's voluntary repeal or change of a challenged practice does not deprive the court of power to rule on its legality. Do not assume a late amendment moots a constitutional challenge before him.
“a defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice.”
He decides ineffective-assistance habeas claims on the Strickland prejudice prong and will deny relief even after criticizing counsel's performance, deferring to the state trial judge's assessment of the likely outcome. A 2254 petitioner must show prejudice, not merely deficient performance.
“without rejecting criticism of defense counsel's performance, I conclude that relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 must be denied.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 2 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Habeas 28usc2254 N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to stay N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Preliminary injunction N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons stated, and for additional reasons briefed by defendants, the summary judgment motion (Doc. 112) shall be GRANTED and judgment entered in favor of defendants Funeral Directors Service, Inc., Franke & Schultz, P.C. and Cari Franke Walsh. SO ORDERED.”
“I conclude that relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 must be denied.3 The motion for relief (Doc. 1) is therefore DENIED.”
“ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment (ECF doc. 42) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, consistent with this opinion.”
“As a matter of discretion, therefore, I DENY the motion to dismiss, without prejudice to further consideration, and STAY these proceedings until counsel can report final action of the Florida trial court on the settlement agreement.”
“As a matter of discretion, therefore, I DENY the motion to dismiss, without prejudice to further consideration, and STAY these proceedings until counsel can report final action of the Florida trial court on the settlement agreement.”
“For the foregoing reasons a preliminary injunction is DENIED.”