Fernando Joe Gaitan Jr.
How Judge Jr. decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On a motion to dismiss a declaratory-judgment counterclaim as redundant, he follows the cautious rule: dismissal is improper unless there is no doubt the counterclaim will be mooted by adjudication of the main action, and he will keep a counterclaim that raises distinct issues (exclusions, misrepresentation, separate costs). To knock out such a counterclaim, show it is a true mirror image with no independent issue.
“the safer course for the court to follow is to deny a request to dismiss a counterclaim for declaratory relief unless there is no doubt that it will be rendered moot by the adjudication of the main action.”
On removal/remand he applies bright-line Supreme Court / Eighth Circuit rules: formal service of process (not mere notice) starts the 30-day removal clock, and the citizenship and consent of fraudulently or nominally joined parties are disregarded. Frame removal-timeliness and unanimity arguments around the date of formal service and the real parties in interest.
“a defendant is 'required to take action' as a defendant-that is, bound by the thirty-day limit on removal- 'only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.”
Procedural preferences
Enforces Local Rule 56.1(a) literally at summary judgment: a movant's stated facts are deemed admitted unless the opponent specifically controverts them with record evidence. A non-movant who fails to controvert (or who produces no evidence at all) will lose on the papers.
“[a]ll facts set forth in the statement of the movant shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party.”
Will not rule on a dispositive question without adequate briefing of the controlling (often state) law; rather than guess, he provisionally denies the motion and orders supplemental briefing. Brief the governing state law fully the first time.
“The Court hereby orders HBD to provide a full briefing containing relevant law from Missouri”
On collateral review he resolves threshold bars before merits: he enforces the 28 U.S.C. 2255 one-year limitations period and the 2244 certification requirement for successive petitions, and treats Booker as non-retroactive on collateral review.
“The Court agrees with respondent that movant's motion is time barred and requires certification pursuant to Section 2244. Thus, the Court will not consider movant's motion on its merits because his claims are time barred.”
Cautions
He is unmoved by state-law claims dressed in constitutional labels and applies the Eighth Circuit's demanding 'truly irrational' standard in substantive-due-process (e.g. zoning) cases. Plead a genuine federal violation, not a relabeled state-law grievance.
“It is not enough simply to give these state law claims constitutional labels such as 'due process' or 'equal protection' in order to raise a substantial federal question under section 1983.”
He is irritated by litigants who demand strict compliance from an opponent while excusing their own procedural lapse. Do not move to penalize the other side for a rule violation you are also committing.
“Plaintiff demands that defendant strictly comply with the pleading rules, but then asks the Court to ignore its own violation of the rules. The Court declines to do so.”
Gives pro se pleadings liberal construction but still requires concrete historical facts, standing (a personal injury), and a cognizable legal theory; conclusory allegations are dismissed.
“While a pro se pleading is to be liberally construed, it still must allege some historical facts, which if proven true, would entitle the plaintiff to some legal relief against the named defendant(s) based on some cognizable legal theory.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 8 |
Granted: 6Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 5 |
Granted: 1Denied: 2Moot / procedural: 2 | counts only |
| Motions to remand N = 2 |
Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Motion to vacate sentence 2255 N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion in limine N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to strike N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for leave to amend N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to set evidentiary hearing N = 1 |
Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for emergency hearing habeas N = 1 |
Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for subpoena duces tecum N = 1 |
Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for sanctions N = 1 |
Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to compel N = 1 |
Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Texas OUSA's motion to dismiss with prejudice (Doc. No. 226) is GRANTED, and Count II of the Counterclaim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
“Plaintiff/counterclaim-defendant Lundy's motion for summary judgment on this claim (Doc. No. 99) is DENIED AS MOOT.”
“Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment for Declarations and Avoidance Relief (Doc. No. 101) is DENIED;”
“Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Count D (Doc. No. 104) is DENIED;”
“Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine (Doc. No. 169) is GRANTED; and”
“Defendants' Motion to Set Evidentiary Hearing (Doc. No. 207) is DENIED as premature.”
“Third-Party defendant's, HBD, Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 56) is PROVISIONALLY DENIED.”
“movant's motion to vacate, correct, or set aside his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. No. 8) is DENIED and movant is entitled to no relief.”
“movant's motion for emergency hearing for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. No. 6), and movant's motion in support of issuance of subpoena duces tecum (Doc. No. 5) are DENIED AS MOOT.”
“movant's motion for emergency hearing for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. No. 6), and movant's motion in support of issuance of subpoena duces tecum (Doc. No. 5) are DENIED AS MOOT.”
“Plaintiff's Motion for Remand is hereby DENIED (Doc. # 7).”
“the Court hereby GRANTS defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 64)”
“and DENIES AS MOOT defendant's Motion for Sanctions and to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 37(d) (Doc. No. 63).”
“the Court hereby GRANTS defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint (Doc. # 2).”
“Accordingly, plaintiff's Motion to Strike Certain Paragraphs of Defendant's Answer is hereby DENIED (Doc. # 17).”
“Accordingly, defendant 's Motion to Amend is hereby DENIED (Doc. # 22).”
“the Court hereby GRANTS defendant's Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's Substantive Due Process Claims (Doc. # 33).”
“Therefore, the Court hereby GRANTS Raymore Defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 33).”
“Therefore, the Court hereby GRANTS Kansas City defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 52).”
“Therefore, the Court hereby GRANTS the Board of Election Commissioners Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 49).”
“Plaintiff's Motion to Compel (Doc. No. 2) is DENIED AS MOOT.”
“Therefore, the Court hereby DENIES plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 10).”
“Accordingly, the Court hereby DENIES defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 5).”
“Accordingly, plaintiff's Motion to Remand is hereby DENIED (Doc. #8).”