Mary Elizabeth "Beth" Phillips
How Judge Phillips decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Missouri intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims face a very high bar before her: even a lawyer taking $60,000 and then blowing the appeal deadline is breach/malpractice, not conduct 'beyond all bounds of decency.' Do not bolt an IIED count onto an ordinary contract or malpractice theory.
“This is not to say that breach of contract and malpractice are not actionable wrongs; however, not everything that is actionable is outrageous enough to give rise to an IIED claim.”
On a UCC § 5-109 letter-of-credit fraud injunction she will weigh the Dataphase factors and treats likelihood of success as decisive; granular, document-by-document evidence that the underlying goods/invoice are fabricated can carry the 'material fraud' showing (here, that the contracted pipe did not exist).
“While “a court must consider all of the factors to determine whether the balance weighs toward granting the injunctive relief,” the likelihood of success on the merits is the most significant factor.”
Procedural preferences
Treats the scheduling order's amendment deadline as real: leave to amend after the deadline requires Rule 16(b)(4) good cause, which turns on diligence, and unrelated new claims will not be smuggled in via a Rule 12(b)(6)/15 response. File complete pleadings and seek amendment promptly with a diligence showing.
“Rule 16(b)(4) states that good cause is required to amend a Scheduling Order, and the Court of Appeals has emphasized that there is rarely good cause if the party requesting the scheduling change has not been diligent.”
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion filed after the answer is not rejected on timing alone; she follows 8th Cir. Westcott and construes it as a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings under the identical standard. A failure-to-state-a-claim defense preserved in the answer keeps the door open.
“since Rule 12(h)(2) provides that “[a] defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” may be advanced in a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), we will treat the [motion to dismiss] as if it had been styled a 12(c) motion.”
Cautions
In Fourth Amendment suppression litigation she applies 8th Cir. hotel-eviction law strictly: a guest's expectation of privacy ends the moment a manager justifiably decides to evict (e.g., on finding suspected drugs), validating the manager's consent to a warrantless entry. Privacy/standing arguments premised on the guest not yet being physically removed will fail.
“Justifiable eviction terminates a hotel occupant’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the room.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 2 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for leave to amend N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for jurisdictional discovery N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for disbursement of funds N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for temporary restraining order N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to suppress N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint, (Doc. 142), is DENIED, and the First Amended Complaint, (Doc. 92), remains Plaintiff’s operative pleading.”
“Bruce’s Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 133), is GRANTED, and Defendant Jeffrey Bruce is granted judgment on Counts IV and V.”
“The Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and the Motion to Conduct Discovery is DENIED. Dancing Cow Farms is not an entity capable of being sued, so it is dismissed. However, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts demonstrating that Emily Winchester is subject to jurisdiction in this Court, so her request to be dismissed is denied.”
“The Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and the Motion to Conduct Discovery is DENIED.”
“For all these reasons, the Court GRANTS GP3’s motion for a TRO and hereby enjoins Defendants from drawing on the SBLC or assigning their rights to a third party. GP3 is directed to post a $21,000,000.00 bond.”
“The Amended Joint Motion for Judgment and Disbursement of Funds, (Doc. 68), is GRANTED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court adopts Judge Rush’s R&R, and DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Suppress. (Doc. 17.)”