Noelle C. Collins
How Judge Collins decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On staleness, she follows 8th Circuit law that information about firearm possession ages slowly because gun owners tend to keep firearms for long periods; a delay of months between source information and warrant execution does not defeat probable cause where the affidavit shows ongoing possession of dangerous weaponry.
“the Howell search warrants did not grow stale by March 26, 2015 when they were served because the affidavits established that defendant faced criminal liability under Title 18, United States, Section 922. Thus, there was a reasonable probability that there were narcotics and firearms in defendant’s residences when the Howell warrants were issued.”
Procedural preferences
She enforces the treating-physician/retained-expert line under Rule 26: a treating physician disclosed late and without a Rule 26(a)(2)(B) report may testify to facts learned during treatment but is barred from offering retained-expert causation opinions. The remedy is to limit the testimony, not strike the witness wholesale.
“Upon review of the briefings, the Court will prohibit the testimony of Dr. Gornet as to causation but will permit his testimony of as to facts identified during his treatment of Plaintiff.”
Cautions
Her suppression R&Rs are nuanced rather than all-or-nothing: in Anderson she recommended suppressing evidence from a pat-down and pre-Miranda post-arrest statements while letting the rest of the search stand — a defendant can win discrete pieces of a suppression motion before her even when the motion is largely denied.
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Charles Lee Anderson’s motions to suppress [58 and 59] are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as stated in Judge Collins’ report and recommendation.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motion to suppress N = 3 |
Granted in part: 1Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Motion to sever N = 3 |
Denied: 2Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 2 |
Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Motion for bill of particulars N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for disclosure N = 1 |
Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to strike N = 1 |
Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Defendant Hagler’s Motion to Suppress Evidence (Doc. #32) be denied.”
“Upon review of the briefings, the Court will prohibit the testimony of Dr. Gornet as to causation but will permit his testimony of as to facts identified during his treatment of Plaintiff.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Charles Lee Anderson’s motions to suppress [58 and 59] are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as stated in Judge Collins’ report and recommendation.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motions to Suppress Evidence and for Franks Hearing [27] is DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant by Kentrell Diggs’s Motion to Sever is DENIED as moot. [ECF No. 57]”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Sever, Doc. [83], is DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Disclosure of Brady/Giglio Information and Motion for Early Production of Jencks Materials, Doc. [84], is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as set forth in the Report and Recommendation, Doc. [116] at 18-23.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss Indictment, or in the Alternative, to Obtain a Bill of Particulars, Doc. [85], is DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ various motions to dismiss and for a bill of particulars and their motions to sever defendants [67, 74, 77, 86] are denied.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ various motions to dismiss and for a bill of particulars and their motions to sever defendants [67, 74, 77, 86] are denied.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ various motions to dismiss and for a bill of particulars and their motions to sever defendants [67, 74, 77, 86] are denied.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 309 days (N = 9).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 334 days (N = 3).
Not systematically enumerated. The 10 Collins-assigned dockets surfaced skew toward Social-Security appeals (Henson, Steibel, Medley, Collins v. Colvin) and consent civil matters (PNC Bank negotiable-instrument, Nekouee ADA, EJS insurance, Simon other-statutory, S.W. civil-rights education), consistent with a magistrate judge's consent-and-SS docket. The consent civil cases observed all resolved by settlement rather than a merits ruling.