Joshua M. Divine
How Judge Divine rules, drawn from 23 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Divine
Joshua Michael Divine is a judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. Appointed by President Donald J. Trump, Judge Divine received a commission on July 24, 2025.
Judge Divine's practices and standing orders
Rules for cases before Judge Divine, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.
Key rules
Filing
Attach proposed orders and judgments as PDFs to the corresponding filing and email an editable version to the assigned clerk.
“Any proposed order or proposed judgment must be filed electronically as a PDF attachment to the motion or memorandum to which it pertains. In addition, the proposed order or judgment must be emailed to the clerk assigned to your case in a word-processing format.”
Filing
Do not submit courtesy copies unless the court directs otherwise; bring a copy of exhibits to trial.
“Do not file courtesy copies unless instructed to do so by the Court. The only exception is for trials. Bring a courtesy copy of exhibits to trial.”
Filing
Attach a redline comparison as the final attachment to every amended pleading.
“Any amended pleadings shall be accompanied by a redline comparison of the original and amended pleading.”
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026).
How Judge Divine decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On § 1915(e) screening of failure-to-protect claims, distinguishes deliberate indifference (which can proceed) from negligence/policy violations (which cannot). Officers told of a specific risk who do nothing can be sued; officers who merely failed to do rounds, or who acted on the information, cannot. Plead actual knowledge plus conscious disregard.
“violations of prison policy or regulations alone are not enough to establish deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment.”
In Mills v. Precythe, Divine allowed some failure-to-protect allegations to pass initial screening despite doubts about whether the alleged risk was pervasive, because the Eighth Circuit had already found the complaint potentially viable at that stage.
“So at this early stage of frivolity review, the Court is bound by the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion about Mills’s complaint.”
In Buskuehl v. Howell, Divine considered each Graham factor and held that the plaintiff’s refusal to obey repeated commands to get on the ground could count as passive resistance. The court also considered the officers’ knowledge of his recent criminal history.
“Buskuehl repeatedly defied the officers’ directives to get on the ground.”
In Buskuehl v. Howell, the parties disputed whether an officer struck the plaintiff with a baton or a fist during an arrest. Taking the plaintiff’s version for the qualified-immunity analysis, the court still found the force reasonable under the circumstances and granted summary judgment for the officers.
“Accepting Buskuehl’s version of the facts as true for this qualified-immunity analysis, Buskuehl’s claim still fails because Howell’s use of force was constitutionally reasonable.”
In Selective Insurance Company of America v. United States, Divine denied a jurisdictional challenge to a negligence claim over fire damage at a leased Postal Service building. The lease could be relevant later, but the alleged negligence supplied an independent tort basis for the claim.
“The Court has jurisdiction because Selective’s claim sounds in tort, not contract.”
Procedural preferences
In United States v. Easley, the court adopted a magistrate judge’s recommendation to deny the defendant’s motions but declined to adopt its conclusion that a Missouri statute was unconstitutional. The court found that question premature and unnecessary because the statute did not apply to the defendant’s conduct.
“That constitutional determination is both premature and unnecessary.”
In Mills v. Precythe, the court denied the plaintiff’s discovery motions as premature because no case management order had issued and discovery had not opened. It said he could renew discovery requests later and reminded defendants to preserve potentially relevant evidence.
“Mills’s motions are premature. The Court has not yet issued a case management order or authorized discovery in this case.”
In Hurst v. Adams, Divine denied the habeas petition on equitable grounds because Hurst made no colorable showing of factual innocence; having found no basis for equitable relief, he did not decide the statutory arguments.
“This Court need not assess both sets of requirements. ... If a prisoner cannot persuade the Court to exercise equitable discretion to grant habeas relief, the analysis need extend no further.”
In United States v. Rivera-Vasquez, the court declined the parties’ joint request for a time-served sentence of just under four months and imposed 12 months and one day, within the Guidelines range. Before sentencing, it requested briefing on deterrence and respect for the law, then explained those factors in a written opinion.
“That is too low. The Court is required by statute to impose a sentence high enough to deter illegal immigration offenses and promote respect for the rule of law.”
In one civil-detainee summary-judgment ruling, Judge Divine treated the plaintiff’s failure to oppose one defendant-specific claim as a waiver and granted judgment on that part of the motion while denying it on the other claims.
“Because Gray has not opposed summary judgment with respect to Koderick on count II, the Court grants summary judgment.”
In Hancock, the court dismissed a prisoner complaint without prejudice where the pleading itself admitted the grievance appeal was still pending at filing.
“Hancock must wait until the grievance process concludes before filing in federal court.”
Cautions
Enforces compliance with court orders and Local Rules even for pro se litigants: failing to file an ordered amended complaint, and filing leave-to-amend motions without attaching the proposed pleading (L.R. 4.07), leads to Rule 41(b) dismissal. Follow the form/order requirements.
“Ware’s self-represented status does not eliminate the obligation to follow court orders, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or this Court’s Local Rules.”
Supervisory and official-capacity § 1983 claims fail without specific, non-conclusory allegations of personal participation or a policy/custom; naming a director/warden 'responsible for subordinates' is not enough.
“Because Mills has alleged no factual content to support any allegations of a failure to train, the Court will dismiss his claims against defendants Precythe, Adams, Lewis, Freeman, Tandarich, and Wheeler.”
In Reeves v. First Bank, the court dismissed a foreclosure-related complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. It found the pleading’s many statutory references and arguments resembling sovereign-citizen claims unsupported by facts establishing a federal question.
“This case is DISMISSED for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because none of the facts asserted by Reeves raises a federal question and because the complaint is patently frivolous.”
In Prudential Insurance Co. v. Sailor, the parties asked the court to proceed with an interpleader action, but the court examined jurisdiction on its own. Finding neither diversity nor federal-question jurisdiction, it dismissed the case and denied Prudential’s default-judgment motion as moot.
“Courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even when no party challenges it.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The Court, having reviewed de novo the report and recommendation from United States Magistrate Judge Joseph S. Dueker, DENIES all pro se Defendant Roosevelt Easley’s motions addressed in that report as well as his subsequent motion to supplement the record.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mills’s motion to appoint counsel is DENIED without prejudice. ECF 44.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mills’s motions seeking discovery are DENIED without prejudice. ECF 40, 41, 43, 48, and 49.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mills’s amended motions for leave to appeal in forma pauperis are DENIED as moot. ECF 34 and 39.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all pending motions are DENIED as moot.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to dismiss is denied in part and granted in part. Counts Two through Five are DISMISSED. Count One is DISMISSED as to the City of Berkeley and Officer Conway in the officer’s official capacity, but survives as to Officer Conway in Conway’s individual capacity. To the extent it exists as a separate claim, Count Six is also DISMISSED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel, Doc. [4], is DENIED without prejudice.”
“Ware’s objections (Doc. 84) are overruled, the parts of Judge Cohen’s report and recommendation (Doc. 81) that have been challenged are adopted, and Ware’s motion to suppress (Doc. 45) and motion for an additional hearing (Doc. 88) are denied.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Hurst’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, ECF 1, is DENIED. A separate order of dismissal shall accompany this memorandum and order.”
True-bill interpleader action over a $400,000 servicemembers' life-insurance payout where the named beneficiary is a suspect in the insured's killing. Divine held the Court lacked both diversity jurisdiction (the disinterested-stakeholder's citizenship is disregarded; all real claimants are Missouri citizens) and federal-question jurisdiction (no express or implied cause of action under the governing statute) and dismissed the case sua sponte for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, denying the pending motion for default judgment as moot.
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Phillips’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF 2, motion for appointment of counsel, ECF 3, and motion for summary judgment, ECF 9, are DENIED.”
“The Court DENIES Carter’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, ECF 1. A separate order of dismissal shall accompany this memorandum and order.”
“The Court also DENIES as moot (1) his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF 2, and (2) his motion to appoint counsel, ECF 3.”
Sua sponte Rule 41(b) dismissal for failure to comply with a court order: plaintiff never paid the filing fee or moved for IFP status after being ordered to do so, with ample opportunity to comply. No party motion; dismissal without prejudice.
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Suarez’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, ECF 1, is DENIED. The Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of the petition and this order on the respondents.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median motion-to-ruling time: 201 days (N = 9).
- The docket has not been systematically enumerated.
- The nine grounded motions below span six dockets: two inherited pro se prisoner/civil-rights cases from predecessor judges (Mills v. Precythe/Berger; Ware v. Missouri DOC, where the IFP rulings were signed by a magistrate and only the Rule 41(b) dismissal is Divine's), one inherited products-liability removal case dismissed on the plaintiff's own voluntary-dismissal notice (Hiedger v. Coca-Cola), one inherited employment-discrimination/whistleblower case that went all the way to a Divine-signed summary-judgment ruling on the eve of trial (Payeur v. Boeing), and one inherited employment collective action compelled to arbitration and administratively closed (Crafton/Hicks v. SSM Health Care).
- His published orders separately cover an excessive-force civil-rights summary judgment (Buskuehl v. Howell), a hostile-work-environment motion-to-dismiss denial (Summers v. Union Pacific), a foreclosure/sovereign-citizen dismissal, an interpleader jurisdictional dismissal, several pro se habeas/§1983 screening and dismissal orders, a criminal suppression ruling, a detention-authority opinion, and a sentencing opinion: together painting an early docket that is heavy on pro se prisoner and habeas matters but also includes ordinary inherited civil litigation reaching final disposition under him.
Pending matters in the official report
Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.
| Motions pending more than six months | 0 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 1 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2026 | 0 | 1 |
| Sep 2025 | 0 | 2 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
How long civil cases take in this court
For the whole of United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, not for Judge Divine: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
| Cases | Median time | |
|---|---|---|
| All civil cases closed | 1,561 | 6 months |
| Closed with no court action | 502 | 4.3 months |
| Closed before pretrial | 1,031 | 7 months |
| Closed during or after pretrial | 16 | 15.3 months |
| Closed during trial | 12 | 31.2 months |
| 12 months ending | Cases closed | Median time |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | 1,561 | 6 months |
| Sep 2024 | 1,525 | 6.6 months |
| Sep 2023 | 1,323 | 7 months |
| Sep 2022 | 1,466 | 10.6 months |
| Sep 2021 | 1,424 | 8.8 months |
| Sep 2020 | 1,950 | 5.5 months |
| Sep 2019 | 2,913 | 2.2 months |
The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).
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Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge Divine, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.
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