John Andrew Ross
How Judge Ross decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He polices removal/diversity jurisdiction closely and resolves subject-matter jurisdiction before personal jurisdiction when the SMJ question is straightforward. The removing party bears the burden, and ties go to the plaintiff. If you are opposing remand on a joinder theory, do not relabel 'fraudulent misjoinder' as 'fraudulent joinder' -- he sees through it.
“All doubts about federal jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state court.”
Fraudulent-joinder doctrine will be applied to keep a diverse case in federal court: a non-diverse (resident) defendant is dropped where there is no reasonable basis in fact and law for a claim against them. A bare MHRA claim against an individual co-employee did not survive.
“The Court will grant the Motion to the extent it seeks dismissal of Defendant Rachel Kyburz because she was fraudulently joined as a defendant in this case.”
On 1983 prisoner suits he grants summary judgment on qualified immunity where the plaintiff cannot tie the challenged conduct to a clearly-established constitutional violation, and a retaliation claim needs a real causal nexus (an inference of retaliatory motive) between the protected grievance and the adverse act.
“Based upon the record, the Court finds that Plaintiff's 1983 claims against the Prison Defendants are barred by qualified immunity.”
In Social Security cases, 42 U.S.C. 405(g) is the exclusive route to judicial review and you must point to a reviewable 'final decision' of the Commissioner; without one the court lacks jurisdiction and dismisses under Rule 12(b)(1).
“Because Plaintiff has not satisfied the statutory requirement of Section 405(g) that he obtain a final agency decision by the Commissioner that is properly subject to judicial review, the Court lacks jurisdiction over his claim.”
Procedural preferences
He enforces the local and federal pleading rules strictly and treats an unopposed motion as conceded. Amend only with leave under Rule 15(a)(2) and Local Rule 4.07 (motion for leave + underlined additions/struck-through deletions); an amended pleading filed without leave will be stricken. Respond on time or expect the motion to be granted as 'well taken.'
“Here, Plaintiff has not abided by any of the requirements to amend his Complaint pursuant to the Court's local rules or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Plaintiff also failed to respond to Defendant's Motion. Therefore, Defendants' Motion is well taken.”
Reconsideration is hard to get: a motion that 'raises no new arguments' in support of the movant's position or against the opponent's will not move him off a prior ruling.
“Plaintiff raises no new arguments either in support of his motion or in opposition to Defendant's motion that could cause the Court to reconsider its previous rulings.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 3 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 1Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 3 |
Granted: 3 | counts only |
| Motion for reconsideration N = 2 |
Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Motions to strike N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to remand N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, construed as a motion for reconsideration is DENIED.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [102] and Defendant Chandler's Motion for Summary Judgment [104] are GRANTED.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [102] and Defendant Chandler's Motion for Summary Judgment [104] are GRANTED.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Remand [8] is GRANTED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [4] is DENIED without prejudice as moot.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss Defendants Brendan Decker and Rachel Kyburz (Doc. 10) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows. The Motion is DENIED as moot to the extent it seeks dismissal of Defendant Brendan Decker. The Motion is GRANTED to the extent it seeks dismissal of Defendant Rachel Kyburz.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [16] is GRANTED and Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Amended Complaint [ECF No. 24] is GRANTED.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 18) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are awarded $102,979.17 in delinquent contributions ... for a total of $129,053.88.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Angela Nails' Motion to Reconsider [7] is DENIED.”
EXCLUDED FROM MOTION STATS (no party motion). Self-represented ADA employment-discrimination suit screened under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2): the court had dismissed the two individual defendants (no individual ADA liability) and directed the plaintiff to amend to name her employer; when she failed to comply or prosecute, the case was sua sponte DISMISSED without prejudice under Rule 41(b), with a certification that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Counts as an order read, not toward motion stats. Added in the 2026-06-07 enrichment pass.
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median motion-to-ruling time: 85 days (N = 3).