John Andrew Ross
How Judge Ross decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He polices removal/diversity jurisdiction closely and resolves subject-matter jurisdiction before personal jurisdiction when the SMJ question is straightforward. The removing party bears the burden, and ties go to the plaintiff. If you are opposing remand on a joinder theory, do not relabel 'fraudulent misjoinder' as 'fraudulent joinder' -- he sees through it.
“All doubts about federal jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state court.”
Fraudulent-joinder doctrine will be applied to keep a diverse case in federal court: a non-diverse (resident) defendant is dropped where there is no reasonable basis in fact and law for a claim against them. A bare MHRA claim against an individual co-employee did not survive.
“The Court will grant the Motion to the extent it seeks dismissal of Defendant Rachel Kyburz because she was fraudulently joined as a defendant in this case.”
On 1983 prisoner suits he grants summary judgment on qualified immunity where the plaintiff cannot tie the challenged conduct to a clearly-established constitutional violation, and a retaliation claim needs a real causal nexus (an inference of retaliatory motive) between the protected grievance and the adverse act.
“Based upon the record, the Court finds that Plaintiff's 1983 claims against the Prison Defendants are barred by qualified immunity.”
In Social Security cases, 42 U.S.C. 405(g) is the exclusive route to judicial review and you must point to a reviewable 'final decision' of the Commissioner; without one the court lacks jurisdiction and dismisses under Rule 12(b)(1).
“Because Plaintiff has not satisfied the statutory requirement of Section 405(g) that he obtain a final agency decision by the Commissioner that is properly subject to judicial review, the Court lacks jurisdiction over his claim.”
He enforces Missouri's borrowing statute to bar claims that accrued in another state and are time-barred there, reading it as an anti-forum-shopping rule; a derivative loss-of-consortium claim falls with the time-barred primary claim.
“The purpose of the borrowing statute is ‘primarily to prevent a plaintiff from forum shopping for a statute of limitations’ and ‘gaining more time to bring an action merely by suing in a forum other than where the cause of action accrued.’”
He holds that the FCRA affords no private right to injunctive relief and will strike such a request; only the FTC may pursue FCRA injunctions.
“The Court agrees with the reasoning of the Courts in this District and holds that the FCRA does not permit injunctive relief. The Court strikes Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief.”
Procedural preferences
He enforces the local and federal pleading rules strictly and treats an unopposed motion as conceded. Amend only with leave under Rule 15(a)(2) and Local Rule 4.07 (motion for leave + underlined additions/struck-through deletions); an amended pleading filed without leave will be stricken. Respond on time or expect the motion to be granted as 'well taken.'
“Here, Plaintiff has not abided by any of the requirements to amend his Complaint pursuant to the Court's local rules or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Plaintiff also failed to respond to Defendant's Motion. Therefore, Defendants' Motion is well taken.”
Reconsideration is hard to get: a motion that 'raises no new arguments' in support of the movant's position or against the opponent's will not move him off a prior ruling.
“Plaintiff raises no new arguments either in support of his motion or in opposition to Defendant's motion that could cause the Court to reconsider its previous rulings.”
He applies Rule 15(a) liberality to leave-to-amend, denying only for compelling reasons such as futility; futility means the amended pleading could not survive a Rule 12 motion, and mere unlikelihood of success is not enough.
“For these reasons, the Court finds the claim Plaintiff seeks to add is not clearly frivolous.”
A thinly pleaded but non-frivolous claim is met with a Rule 12(e) more-definite-statement / repleading opportunity rather than outright dismissal.
“The Court, therefore, grants Defendant’s request for a more definite statement and affords Plaintiff seven (7) days to file an amended complaint that complies with this Court’s Order.”
Cautions
Dismissal as a discovery sanction is reserved for willful refusal; a pro se litigant who belatedly but substantially complies in good faith will avoid the 'harshest of sanctions,' though narrower sanctions remain available.
“Upon careful review of Plaintiff’s discovery submissions, this Court finds that the harsh sanction of dismissal is not warranted. ... Plaintiff, a pro se litigant, has now made a good faith effort to respond to Defendant’s interrogatories and requests for production. Overall, Plaintiff has substantially complied with Defendant’s discovery requests.”
A litigant cannot manufacture recusal by naming the presiding judge as a defendant; adverse rulings are not a basis for recusal, and such motions are denied as frivolous judge-shopping.
“Courts have repeatedly and understandably held, however, that litigants may not ‘judge-shop’ by naming the presiding judge as a defendant and seeking recusal.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that that Plaintiff’s Motion for Two Day Extension [73] and Motion for Leave to File in Excess of Fifteen Pages [75] are GRANTED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Memorandum, docketed as a motion for Reconsideration [77] is DENIED as moot.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant’s Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, construed as a motion for reconsideration is DENIED.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [102] and Defendant Chandler's Motion for Summary Judgment [104] are GRANTED.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Remand [8] is GRANTED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [4] is DENIED without prejudice as moot.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss Defendants Brendan Decker and Rachel Kyburz (Doc. 10) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows. The Motion is DENIED as moot to the extent it seeks dismissal of Defendant Brendan Decker. The Motion is GRANTED to the extent it seeks dismissal of Defendant Rachel Kyburz.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [16] is GRANTED and Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Amended Complaint [ECF No. 24] is GRANTED.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 18) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are awarded $102,979.17 in delinquent contributions ... for a total of $129,053.88.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Angela Nails' Motion to Reconsider [7] is DENIED.”
In a self-represented ADA employment-discrimination suit screened under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2), the court dismissed two individual defendants because the ADA imposes no individual liability and directed the plaintiff to amend to name her employer. When she failed to comply or prosecute, Ross dismissed the case sua sponte and without prejudice under Rule 41(b), certifying that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Petition [25] and Motion for Leave to Add Party Defendant [26] are GRANTED.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts II and III of the Complaint and to Strike Plaintiff’s Request for Injunctive Relief [6] is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part. Plaintiff is granted seven (7) days from the date of this Order to file an amended complaint. The Court strikes Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) Motion to Defer Ruling on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Permit Limited Discovery [13] is DENIED as moot.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Case for Failure to Cooperate in Discovery and Obey the Court’s Discovery Order (Doc. 34) is DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Reset the Dispositive Motion Deadline and Vacate Trial Setting (Doc. 45) is GRANTED in part. The trial setting of November 9, 2020 and all trial-related deadlines are hereby VACATED. The dispositive motion deadline shall be extended to November 13, 2020.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median motion-to-ruling time: 85 days (N = 3).
Put Judge Ross's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Ross actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Ross's own signed orders and cites them.