Patrick Joseph Schiltz
How Judge Schiltz decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Schiltz reads a statute as an integrated scheme and will not let a litigant use a general provision to evade a specific procedural limit the legislature deliberately set. In Anderson & Koch he refused to allow a dealer to use the MVSDA's general 'unfair practices' subsections to block a new dealership more than 10 miles away, because a specific section (80E.14) caps that right at a 10-mile radius and sets a 30-day limitations period. A litigant before him should anticipate that a textually plausible reading will lose if it produces consequences the statutory scheme cannot have intended.
“Anderson & Koch cannot use § 80E.13(k) or (p) to evade the explicit procedures provided by the Minnesota Legislature for challenging a new dealership. To hold otherwise would create bizarre consequences. ... That would make no sense, and it would do violence to the scheme prescribed by the Minnesota Legislature...”
On summary judgment Schiltz declines to resolve ambiguous contracts as a matter of law: where a contract is 'susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation' and the extrinsic evidence is disputed, he sends the meaning to the trier of fact rather than picking a reading. Counsel moving for SJ on a poorly drafted contract should expect denial and a trial unless the language is genuinely unambiguous.
“In short, the contracts are ambiguous, the extrinsic evidence is unhelpful, and the record is inadequate. The Court therefore denies both parties' motions for summary judgment on REA's breach-of-contract claim against Novel.”
Schiltz holds a breach-of-contract plaintiff to its burden to prove damages with reasonable certainty, and will grant summary judgment against a claim where the movant proves a breach but offers no non-speculative evidence of resulting harm. A claimant who cannot quantify damages (e.g. via expert testimony) risks losing even an otherwise-viable breach theory.
“Even if Novel is correct, however, the record contains no evidence of any harm that Novel suffered as a result. ... Novel proffers no expert testimony or other evidence that would allow a jury to find (much less to quantify) damages. ... the Court grants REA summary judgment on the issue of financing introductions.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 5 |
Granted: 2Granted in part: 3 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 5 |
Granted: 2Granted in part: 1Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Default judgment N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim [ECF No. 13] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows: 1. The motion is GRANTED with respect to Counts I, II, and III ... to the extent that those counts seek relief against the proposed new Ford dealership in Forest Lake, Minnesota ... 2. The motion is DENIED in all other respects.”
“REA's motion for partial summary judgment [ECF No. 116] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows: a. Novel's claim against REA for breach of the PPA by failing to provide financing introductions is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AND ON THE MERITS. b. Novel's claim against REA for breach of the LPA is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AND ON THE MERITS. c. The motion is DENIED in all other respects.”
“Novel's motion for partial summary judgment [ECF No. 131] is DENIED.”
“Plaintiff's “Motion to/for Default Judgment” (ECF No. 8) is DENIED.”
“Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 19) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE IN PART.”
“Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 4) is granted. ... The Complaint is dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim.”
“defendants’ motion to dismiss [ECF No. 32] is GRANTED and the Second Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
“Seasons’ motion to dismiss [ECF No. 15] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows: a. Count III is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE insofar as it asserts a claim to relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4). b. Count IV is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”
“Defendant’s motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 84] is GRANTED. ... Plaintiff’s amended complaint [ECF No. 5] is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AND ON THE MERITS.”
“Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [#14] is GRANTED; ... The case is remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §405(g) for further proceedings consistent with the Report and Recommendation;”
“Defendant’s motion for summary judgment [#22] is DENIED;”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 282.5 days (N = 4).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 210.5 days (N = 4).
Schiltz-assigned dockets seen this session (not exhaustive): REA Investments v. Novel Energy 0:23-cv-01159 (contract: other); Anderson & Koch Ford v. Ford Motor 0:23-cv-00762 (contract, later reassigned to J. Bryan after Schiltz's MTD ruling); Lindell v. US Dominion 0:21-cv-01332 and My Pillow v. US Dominion 0:21-cv-01015 (440 civil rights); plus a recent (2026) cluster of criminal matters (United States v. Langley/Allen/Hodges/Hassan), 463 Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee petitions (Contento-Lapo v. Blanche, Bano Quishpe v. Lyons), and 380 personal-property / Strike 3 Holdings copyright suits. Mix spans commercial contract, civil rights, criminal, and immigration habeas. A deepening pass should enumerate the full docket and sample older terminated civil cases for dispositive-motion outcomes.