Richard Fred Suhrheinrich

How Judge Suhrheinrich rules, drawn from 20 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Judge Suhrheinrich no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

Court
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
Position
district
Status
Retired 1990
Served
1984–1990
Appointed by
Ronald Reagan (Republican)
Commissioned
1984-10-04
Education
Wayne State University (B.S., 1960); Detroit College of Law (now Michigan State University College of Law) (J.D., 1963); University of Virginia School of Law (LL.M., 1990)
Signed orders read
20

How Judge Suhrheinrich decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

The court entered judgment in a labor dispute after finding that the employee bypassed the appeal steps in the union constitution.

“it is apparent that plaintiff did not follow the grievance procedures outlined in the UAW constitution.”

Procedural preferences

The court granted forfeiture judgment after the claimant failed to support an innocent-owner defense with facts that could create a triable dispute.

“must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.”

Cautions

The court treated a damages verdict based on pesticide-label warnings as an indirect state labeling mandate inconsistent with federal uniformity.

“Allowing recovery under state tort law where Congress has preempted state law would effectively authorize the state to do through the back door exactly what it cannot through the front.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Samczyk v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co.
· 1987-07-16
Summary judgment (defendant Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company) Granted

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.”

Morris v. Detroit Edison (In Re Morris)
· 1986-08-27
Motion to enjoin termination of utility services (debtor-appellants) Denied

“For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Debtors’ Motion to Enjoin Continued Termination of Utility Services is DENIED and the decision of the Bankruptcy Court is AFFIRMED. Costs are denied.”

Bankruptcy appeal (debtor-appellants) Denied
United States v. Miller
· 1988-06-22
Motion to reduce sentence (defendant) Granted

“the Court shall grant defendant’s motion for reduction of sentence and reduce the sentence to a period of probation.”

Grant-Southern Iron & Metal Co. v. CNA Insurance
· 1986-12-30
Motion for partial summary judgment (plaintiffs Grant-Southern Iron & Metal Company and Detroit Briquetting Company) Denied

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED.”

Motion for partial summary judgment (defendant insurers) Granted

“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment is GRANTED with respect to the duty of defendants’ to defend Grant-Southern in the underlying state class action lawsuit.”

Samczyk v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co.
· 1986-08-14
Motions to remand (plaintiff) Denied

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to remand and award of attorney fees is DENIED.”

Request for attorney fees (plaintiff) Denied
Motion to amend removal petition (defendant) Denied

“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant’s motion to amend the petition for removal is hereby DENIED.”

Motions to remand (plaintiff) Denied

“The Court, therefore, holds that it has jurisdiction over this suit and no grounds for remand exist.”

Brown v. United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers, Local 892
· 1987-09-28
Motions to remand (plaintiff Clarence L. Brown) Denied

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff Clarence L. Brown’s motion to remand is DENIED.”

Summary judgment (defendant UAW Local 892) Granted

“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant UAW’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.”

Summary judgment (defendant Ford Motor Company) Granted

“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that summary judgment for defendant Ford is GRANTED sua sponte.”

Michigan Teamsters Joint Council No. 43 v. Bufalino
· 1985-07-29
Motion for interpleader certification (plaintiff Michigan Teamsters Joint Council No. 43) Granted

“The Court concludes that the proposed stake in this action is appropriate and that interpleader under Fed.R.Civ.P. 22 is a proper method of resolving the rights of former creditors of former Teamster Local 985.”

Stand Buys, Ltd. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.
· 1986-05-23
Summary judgment (defendants Michigan Bell Telephone Company and AT&T) Granted in part

“Thus, summary judgment is granted as to all of plaintiff’s claim requiring willful misconduct.”

Michigan State Podiatry Ass'n v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan
· 1987-11-20
Motion for rehearing (plaintiff class representatives) Denied

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for rehearing is DENIED.”

Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, Inc.
· 1987-12-22
Summary judgment (defendant Mallinckrodt, Inc.) Granted

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.”

United States v. One 1985 Ford F-250 Pickup
· 1988-11-25
Summary judgment (United States) Granted

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the United States’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.”

Brock v. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, & Agricultural Implement Workers
· 1988-06-01
Petition for order compelling compliance (Secretary of Labor) Denied

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Secretary’s petition for an order compelling compliance with the supervisory instructions of the Secretary of Labor is DENIED.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Suhrheinrich carried a general civil and criminal trial docket in the Eastern District of Michigan before his 1990 elevation to the Sixth Circuit. The contested outcomes described here come from his published district-court opinions.

A historical record

Judge Suhrheinrich no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.