John Wesley Longyear
Judge Longyear no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Longyear decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Longyear enforced fairly made maritime contracts even when later events made the bargain economically harsh for one side.
“Parties must understand that contracts fairly entered into will be strictly enforced in admiralty, as well as elsewhere.”
He limited contract damages to losses that the parties could have contemplated when they made the agreement.
“the rule of law is well settled that the damages must in all cases be such as must have been in the contemplation of the parties when the contract was entered into.”
Procedural preferences
Longyear required ownership and capacity objections in admiralty to be raised before the merits hearing rather than after the opposing party had proceeded without objection.
“If the claim is not thus put in issue, and the libel-lant goes to a hearing upon the merits without objection, it is a waiver of such preliminary inquiry”
He treated the deadline for rescinding an admiralty decree as binding and not subject to discretionary extension.
“This rule, made by the supreme court in pursuance of law, is of the same binding force upon this court as if it were a statute, and it cannot be disregarded.”
Cautions
Longyear placed responsibility on a vessel that created its own navigational emergency by failing to keep watch and slow in time.
“if the Masters did find herself in the emergency claimed, in which there was reasonable doubt as to which was her duty, whether to check her speed or go ahead, she is herself responsible for the emergency”
He refused a bankruptcy discharge where the debtor's own admissions established a fraudulent preference and misuse of estate funds.
“It does not need argument to show that the foregoing fully sustains the specifications.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“So far, therefore, as the motion was for the examination of the bankrupts on their application for a discharge,, the same was properly denied by the register.”
“so much of the claims of Torrey & Co., as was based on the note of one hundred and seventy-one dollars and six-two cents must be disallowed and expunged. and the balance of their claim must be allowed to stand as a debt against the estate of said bankrupts.”
“It results that the motion must be denied. Ordered accordingly.”
“such claim for witness fees must be disallowed.”
“The depositions not being admissible in evidence, there is no ground for a new trial. Motion denied.”
“The libel must be dismissed with costs to the respondent”
“the respective claims of the several libellants, Wolverton, Campbell and Owen, and Desotell and Hutton, in whole, and the claim of Keith and Co., in part (as to which adjudication has been heretofore made), together with the costs of each, must be first paid before the claims of the Security and Buffalo Insurance Companies”
“For which amount libellant must have a decree, with costs. Decree for libellant.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
No case-level docket record was returned for Longyear's tenure. The profile therefore makes no claim about his complete caseload mix, case duration, administrative dispositions, or motion timing.
A historical record
Judge Longyear no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.