Gene Carter
Judge Carter no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Carter decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In summary-judgment and reconsideration practice, he expected the losing side's factual and legal positions to be internally consistent from the first round of briefing onward; a new legal theory introduced only after losing -- even a non-frivolous one -- will not be entertained on reconsideration if it could have been raised earlier and there is no persuasive reason it was not.
“It is, however, difficult for the Court to believe with confidence, in a case as hard-fought and well-litigated as this case has been, that Plaintiffs' attorneys simply failed to "focus" on this integral issue relating to the effective date of the 2003 Plan... This factor weighs against reconsideration.”
On expert-admissibility challenges, he read Daubert/Kumho Tire as a gatekeeping standard focused on whether an opinion has an adequate factual foundation and a reliable method, not as a vehicle for excluding an expert merely because the challenging party disputes the expert's factual premises -- that kind of dispute goes to weight for the jury, not admissibility.
“Because it does not appear that Mr. Barnett is proffered as an accident reconstruction expert, Defendant's challenge to Mr. Barnett's factual understanding of how the accident occurred goes to the weight, and not the admissibility, of his testimony.”
On trademark preliminary injunctions, sound-alike names alone did not move him; he wanted evidence that the two businesses actually competed for the same customers through the same channels before finding a likelihood of confusion.
“the general focus of a lounge or bar operation is significantly different than that of a family-style restaurant... the record does not disclose that there is a relationship between the parties advertising or channels of trade.”
Procedural preferences
He was reluctant to grant an unopposed Rule 54(b) request for an early appealable judgment on a single claim without a developed record showing why the usual practice of one appeal at the end of the case should not apply -- a bare assertion that a party wants finality was not enough.
“A 'talismanic' statement in the judgment that 'there is no just reason for delay in the entry of final judgment' is not sufficient to signal[] such a decision... That sparse factual predicate does not permit the Court to articulate a basis for a deliberative and properly considered discretionary decision.”
On motions to set aside a default, he applied the First Circuit's good-cause factors generously toward resolving cases on the merits where the defaulting party's explanation was credible and not willful, even when the party's own diligence had been imperfect.
“This is not to say, however, that Defendant Lanoie's lack of diligence forecloses a showing of good cause to set aside the default... his conduct was not egregious... it does so only slightly, and fails to outweigh those factors which favor setting aside the default.”
Cautions
In auditing a contractual attorneys'-fee request, he cross-checked the substance of the underlying filings against the hours billed for them, and disallowed time that appeared duplicative between attorneys, excessive for the complexity of the document actually produced, or attributable to paralegal work or firm overhead rather than legal services.
“This Court's role 'as the guarantor of fairness obligates it not to accept uncritically what lawyers self-servingly suggest is reasonable compensation for their services.'”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“it is ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel be, and it is hereby, DENIED.”
Order on a joint motion setting the briefing schedule and page limits for the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment; not a ruling on a dispositive motion. "it is hereby ORDERED that the Joint Motion be, and it is hereby GRANTED, in part, and that the briefing schedule and page limitations for Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be..."
“the Court will grant Plaintiffs' Motion as to Counts I, II, and III, and deny Plaintiffs' Motion as to Count IV.”
“Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be, and it is hereby, GRANTED on Count I to the extent it encompasses the period prior to January 1, 2003, and is otherwise DENIED”
“Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be, and it is hereby, GRANTED as to Count I to the extent it encompasses the period on and after January 1, 2003, and is otherwise DENIED”
“Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be, and it is hereby, GRANTED as to Counts II and III in their entirety”
“Defendants' Motion for Oral Argument (Docket Item No. 154) be, and it is hereby, DENIED as the Court has no need for oral argument.”
“Plaintiffs' Appeal to the District Court of the Magistrate Judge's June 14, 2005, Decision (Docket Item No. 116) is MOOT”
“After weighing the factors suggested in Roberts, the Court is persuaded that the interests of justice do not justify the Court granting the requested reconsideration. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend be, and it is hereby, DENIED.”
“the Court APPROVES the award of Eighty-Five Thousand Dollars ($85,000) in attorneys' fees in this case.”
“Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction be, and it is hereby, GRANTED as to Defendants Tom Allison, Terry LeClere, and Montylee Watt, and the Complaint is hereby DISMISSED as to those Defendants without prejudice, and is DENIED as to Defendants Applied Microwave Technologies, Inc. and Timothy Scheurs”
“Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count V for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted be, and it is hereby, DENIED.”
“Defendants' Motion to Transfer Case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa be, and it is hereby, DENIED.”
“it is ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction be, and it is hereby, DENIED.”
“It is FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Oral Argument (Docket Item No. 9) be, and it is hereby, DENIED.”
“Defendant Giddings & Lewis Machine Tools LLC's Motion to Preclude Testimony from Plaintiff's Expert Ralph Barnett be, and it is hereby, DENIED.”
“That sparse factual predicate does not permit the Court to articulate a basis for "a deliberative and properly considered discretionary decision" ... Accordingly, the motion is hereby DENIED.”
“the Court concludes that there are material issues of fact including, inter alia, whether any conduct on the part of Phoenix, Inc. caused the Plaintiff's injuries. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that Third-Party Defendant Phoenix Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment be, and it is hereby, DENIED.”
“the Court concludes that there are material issues of fact including, inter alia, whether any conduct on the part of CNC Engineering, Inc. caused the Plaintiff's injuries. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that Third-Party Defendant CNC Engineering Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment be, and it is hereby, DENIED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
His directly-assigned docket in this era included a broad general civil docket typical of a senior district judge carrying a reduced but still active caseload: contract and insurance disputes, ERISA and labor cases, employment discrimination, products liability, prisoner civil-rights and habeas petitions, trademark and trade-secret disputes, and a share of Social Security disability appeals and criminal matters referred through the district's magistrate judges.
A historical record
Judge Carter no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.