David Brock Hornby

How Judge Hornby rules, drawn from 24 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Judge Hornby no longer sits on this court. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled here.

Court
U.S. District Court for the District of Maine
Position
District judge
Status
No longer serving
Appointed by
George H.W. Bush (Republican)
Commissioned
April 30, 1990
Education
University of Western Ontario, B.A., 1965; Harvard Law School, J.D., 1969
Signed orders read
24

About Judge Hornby

David Brock Hornby served on the United States District Court for the District of Maine after receiving his commission on April 30, 1990. He served as chief judge from 1996 to 2003 and assumed senior status on May 1, 2010. He took inactive senior status on February 28, 2022.

How Judge Hornby decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

On a post-Rehaif felon-in-possession challenge, Hornby reads the Supreme Court's holding narrowly: the government must prove the defendant knew his prohibited status, not that he knew federal law barred him from possessing a firearm: an argument for expanding Rehaif's knowledge element did not persuade him.

“But Rehaif nowhere reaches that conclusion; instead, the case refers only to proof of status ... The Superseding Indictment alleges the necessary elements as defined by Rehaif.”

In United States v. Thurlow, Hornby denied compassionate release despite finding extraordinary and compelling family circumstances because he concluded that Thurlow remained a danger to the community.

“I am concerned about the upbringing of these two young teenaged boys given their mother's death and their grandmother's current situation. Any adult or parent would be. But Thurlow remains a danger to the safety of the community and I therefore cannot release him.”

Procedural preferences

In Williams v. Waldo County, Hornby granted an unopposed summary-judgment motion on remaining state-law claims after the plaintiff failed to respond. He deemed the defendants' properly supported factual statements admitted under Local Rule 56(f).

“The date has passed for a response and the plaintiff has filed none. Under Local Rule 56(f), the defendants' statement of material facts, if properly supported by record citations, is deemed admitted.”

In Cousins v. Higgins, he denied Rule 59(e) reconsideration because the plaintiffs repeated arguments already rejected and showed neither manifest error nor newly discovered evidence.

“A motion for reconsideration is 'not the place to present arguments that could, and should, have been raised before the court's pulling of its judgment trigger.'”

Cautions

In United States v. Taylor, he denied a suppression challenge to the government's filter-agent screening of seized emails because the record did not show disclosure of privileged material to investigators and any screening error was harmless.

“The record does not support the defendant's assertion that attorney-client information was disclosed to the filter agent or any other government representative ... I conclude, therefore, that if the filter agent made any error here, it was harmless.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Hopkins v. Claroni
1:13-CV-229-DBH · 2014-02-26
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“The plaintiffs' objection to my Order dismissing the defendant McLellan for lack of service of process is OVERRULED.”

Barth v. Town of Waterboro, et al.
2:21-CV-27-DBH · 2021-05-11
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“The defendants' motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process is GRANTED without prejudice.”

Default judgment (plaintiff) Denied

“The plaintiff's motion for judgment in default is DENIED because the defendants have not been served properly.”

Quick v. Farmington Operations, LLC and Genesis Healthcare, LLC
1:14-CV-159-DBH · 2014-06-18
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“The defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The plaintiff has not responded as Local Rule 7(b) requires, and has failed to support her assertion that diversity of citizenship exists to give this court subject matter jurisdiction.”

Lampron v. Postmaster General
09-477-P-H · 2011-05-06
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted in part

“Accordingly summary judgment is GRANTED on Count I of the Complaint with respect to the alleged retaliatory transfer from Waterboro to Alfred, but is otherwise DENIED.”

Williams v. Waldo County Maine Deputy Merl Reed and Belfast Maine Police Chief Mike McFadden
1:16-CV-211-DBH · 2017-08-31
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“The defendants' motion for summary judgment on the state law claims is GRANTED.”

Blethen v. MaineGeneral Rehabilitation & Nursing Care and MaineGeneral Health
2:11-cv-277-DBH · 2012-09-18
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“It is therefore ORDERED that the Recommended Decision of the Magistrate Judge is hereby ADOPTED. The defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.”

Wiggin v. Town of Searsport
1:13-CV-409-DBH · 2014-12-05
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted in part

“The Recommended Decision of the Magistrate Judge is hereby ADOPTED. The defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.”

Hikel v. Town of Madison
1:13-CV-75-DBH · 2014-07-15
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted in part

“The defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to Count IV and DENIED as to Counts I, II and III.”

United States v. Alfred McIntosh, Jr.
2:16-CR-100-DBH · 2020-08-18
Motion for compassionate release (defendant) Denied

“I conclude that the circumstances here do not present extraordinary and compelling reasons to reduce McIntosh's sentence effectively by two-thirds and that his recidivism risk does create a danger to the community ... I therefore DENY the motion for compassionate release.”

United States v. David Thurlow
2:16-CR-53-DBH · 2021-12-15
Motion for compassionate release (defendant) Denied

“Thurlow remains a danger to the safety of the community and I therefore cannot release him ... Accordingly, Thurlow's motion to reduce sentence is DENIED.”

United States v. Kendall Francis
2:15-CR-61-DBH-02 · 2020-11-25
Motion for compassionate release (defendant) Moot / procedural

“At this time, I DENY the motion WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, i.e., the failure to make the request to the Warden.”

United States v. Jackie Darrel Taylor, Jr.
10-86-P-H · 2011-02-09
Motion to suppress (defendant) Denied

“The defendant's motion to suppress is therefore DENIED.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

The sampled dockets span employment discrimination, civil rights, mortgage foreclosure, Social Security disability appeals, ERISA, contract, and habeas/sentencing matters: a typical mixed caseload for a long-serving district judge in a small single-state district, plus a number of criminal drug and firearms cases from Hornby's active-status years.

Pending matters in the official report

Judge Hornby was last listed in the Civil Justice Reform Act report as of September 30, 2021.

Motions pending more than six months0
Bench trials submitted more than six months0
Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months0
Social Security appeals pending more than six months0
Civil cases pending more than three years0
ReportMotions over six monthsCases over three years
Sep 202100
Mar 202110
Sep 202030

A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.

A historical record

Judge Hornby no longer sits on this court. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled here. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.