Walter Evan Black Jr.
How Judge Black rules, drawn from 16 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Judge Black no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Black decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Baltimore Neighborhoods, Black read the fair-housing design-and-construction duty broadly enough to reach responsible participants throughout the process.
“To hold otherwise would defeat the purpose of the FHAA to create available housing for handicapped individuals and allow wrongful participants in the design and construction process to remain unaccountable.”
In Curry, he required a compelling justification for a content-based restriction on political signs and found traffic and aesthetic interests insufficient.
“Again, while recognizing aesthetics and traffic safety to be ‘significant government interests,’ none of these courts found those interests sufficiently compelling to pass the applicable strict scrutiny test.”
In Asquino, Black treated employee-integrity standards as a regulatory measure rather than a purely pecuniary collection device.
“Because this provision governs standards of conduct, it has obvious public policy ramifications, irrespective of any pecuniary interest.”
Procedural preferences
In McKenna, Black enforced the summary-judgment requirement for competent evidence rather than unsupported disagreement with the negotiated contract’s construction.
“Plaintiffs, who took no part in the negotiations that culminated in the adoption of the 1977 agreement, presented no competent evidence to contradict that construction.”
In Nutramax, he rejected selective use of sworn statements where the opposing party lacked a fair opportunity to test them through cross-examination.
“A fact finder is left with a distorted view of the evidence, resulting from the opposing party being without the opportunity to cross examine the witness raising the possibility of perjurious testimony going unchallenged.”
In Hicks, Black declined to convert a potentially curable identification gap into summary judgment when discovery may have caused the problem.
“Plaintiffs' inability to identify the specific officers who patted them down is likely a failure of the discovery process that may be cured at trial.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“That Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Paper 82) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:”
“That Plaintiff H. Kevin Knussman’s Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Paper 84) is DENIED;”
“That plaintiff Nutramax Laboratories, Inc.’s Motion to Strike Affidavits of William Faloon and for Sanctions Against Life Extension Foundation, Inc. (Paper 63) IS GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:”
“That plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Paper 210) BE, and the same hereby IS, GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, as follows:”
“That defendant’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (Paper 211) BE, and the same hereby IS, GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, as follows:”
“That Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment BE, and the same hereby IS, DENIED.”
“Accordingly, the Colts’ pending motion — being treated as a motion for summary judgment — will be granted”
“That the Motion to Reconsider (Paper 81) filed herein on behalf of Plaintiff John A. Shirkey, BE, and the same hereby IS, DENIED as MOOT;”
“That the defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Paper 22) BE, and the same hereby IS, DENIED;”
“That the plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Paper 23) BE, and the same hereby IS, DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;”
“For the aforegoing reasons, the motions for summary judgment filed on behalf of defendant Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical *515Corporation (Paper 16) and on behalf of defendants United Steelworkers of America and Local 4599 of United Steelworkers of America (Paper 21) BE, and the same hereby ARE, GRANTED.”
“Accordingly, the Court will grant plaintiffs, motion for summary judgment.”
“For all the foregoing reasons the Court will grant in part and deny in part defendants’ Motion for Judgment, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial.”
“the Court will deny defendants LOB, Rommel, and Rommel Builders’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Paper 47) and Supplement (Paper 64)”
“grant defendant Rommel Builder’s Motion for Joinder in Defendants’ Supplement (Paper 67)”
“grant in part and deny in part defendant LGGCI’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Paper 63) and Supplement (Paper 65)”
“grant in part and deny in part plaintiffs’ Second Motion for Summary Judgment (Paper 68).”
“That Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Paper 12) as to count 1 of the complaint BE, and the same hereby IS, DENIED;”
“That Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Paper 13) as to Count 1 of the plaintiff’s complaint BE, and the same hereby IS, GRANTED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 1969.5 days (N = 10).
A fixed-seed sample of ten terminated historical cases included four product-liability matters, two contract matters, one habeas matter, one other statutory action, and two cases without a retained nature-of-suit label. None retained a motion-entry timeline.
A historical record
Judge Black no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.