Shirley Brannock Jones
How Judge Jones rules, drawn from 25 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Judge Jones no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Jones decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In O'Neil, Jones kept the heightened fraud-pleading rule confined to claims actually sounding in fraud.
“The better rule is that because F.R.Civ.P. 9(b) is an exception to the general liberal notice pleading requirement of the federal rules, its application is narrow and should not be extended to other causes of action.”
In Metromedia, she required the city to explain why content-neutral sign regulation could not serve its stated interests.
“The City has advanced no arguments, and there appear to be none, why its interests in traffic safety and esthetics could not be served by a more narrowly drawn ordinance, regulating size and appearance of signs but not their content.”
In Washington Adventist Hospital, Jones found the administrative record strongly favored reimbursement.
“The evidence overwhelmingly supports the hospital’s contention that the costs associated with the nursing program are reimbursable.”
Procedural preferences
In Paice, Jones declined to dismiss a liberty-interest count where the record omitted the allegedly stigmatizing reports and their employment effect.
“The Court cannot say, on the present state of the record, that the statements allegedly made by members of the Commission could not, as a matter of law, implicate a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”
In J.H. Lawrence, she denied summary judgment because the confidentiality question remained fact-dependent.
“The motions for summary judgment must be denied because, as previously noted, questions of fact exist concerning whether the information qualifies as confidential information.”
In Polk, Jones applied a restrained standard to a prevailing civil-rights defendant’s fee request.
“Attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 should be granted sparingly to defendants in civil rights actions brought under § 1983.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“1. That the Bankruptcy Court’s order that the Complaint for Reclamation be dismissed be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED. 2. That the Bankruptcy Court’s order that General Motors Acceptance Corporation be required to pay counsel fees be, and the same hereby is, VACATED.”
“and will deny his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.”
“petitioner’s requests that counsel be appointed will be denied.”
“Interspersed throughout the pleadings in this case are requests for appointment of counsel, for an issuance of writ of mandamus to the state court for all relevant records and transcripts, and a motion for default judgment against respondent for his failure to timely comply with the order to show cause issued by this Court. In light of this Court’s disposition of this case without an evidentiary hearing, and since this Court is aware of no other special circumstances warranting an appointment of counsel, petitioner’s requests that counsel be appointed will be denied. The Court has considered the other aforementioned motions and requests • filed by petitioner, and determines that they are without merit.”
“That motion was rendered moot by the memorandum opinion subsequently issued by that Court; thus petitioner’s motion will be denied.”
“defendant Young’s motion to dismiss will be granted.”
“Accordingly, the motion for costs and attorneys’ fees is denied.”
After a bench trial, Jones fixed vessel-repair damages and prejudgment interest; no party-filed motion outcome was classified.
Jones held that maritime law did not govern the lighthouse-injury claim; the opinion did not resolve a party-filed motion.
“The motion to dismiss Counts One and Three is granted.”
“The motions for summary judgment must be denied because, as previously noted, questions of fact exist concerning whether the information qualifies as confidential information.”
“Claims I and II, the securities fraud claims, have been dismissed on other grounds, so it is necessary to discuss this contention only with respect to the remaining counts. The better rule is that because F.R.Civ.P. 9(b) is an exception to the general liberal notice pleading requirement of the federal rules, its application is narrow and should not be extended to other causes of action. 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1297 (1969). Since Claims III through VI are not subject to the requirements of Rule 9(b), they will not be dismissed.”
“Therefore, Southwestern’s argument is without merit and its Motion to Vacate the Order Permitting the Filing of a Third Party Complaint will be denied.”
“Accordingly, Burrey’s Motion to Vacate the Order Permitting the Filing of a Third-Party Complaint must be denied.”
“Summary judgment will be granted in favor of the defendant.”
“The order of the Bankruptcy Court is, therefore, affirmed.”
“In summary, because the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege an injury to competition and that defendants were a significant factor in the relevant product market, the claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act will be dismissed. Because plaintiff’s other claims are based in state law, this Court is without jurisdiction as to them, and they must also be dismissed.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
No assigned historical dockets were returned, so no sampled case-mix description is available.
A historical record
Judge Jones no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.